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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores the sources of government legitimacy in China by 
utilizing a series of large-scale public opinion surveys and comparing the results against 
local economic and environmental data. In analyzing how ordinary Chinese citizens form 
opinions about government performance, I look beyond more static explanatory factors 
such as demographic information and political ideology, and focus instead on 
quantifiable changes in quality of life indicators such as the provision of public goods and 
local environmental quality. In particular, I emphasize the importance of air pollution, 
both real and perceived, in shaping citizen attitudes. 
 The results of this dissertation are divided into three studies. The first study 
utilizes survey data from 2003-2016 and finds evidence that, despite the persistence of 
vast socioeconomic and regional inequalities, low-income citizens and residents living in 
China’s less-developed inland provinces have actually reported comparatively greater 
increases in satisfaction since 2003.  
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The second study uses survey data to analyze interactions between objective and 
perceived air pollution, subjective well-being, government satisfaction, and 
environmental activism. It finds that Chinese citizens are able to accurately assess the 
severity of local air pollution, but that changes in air quality are more important in 
determining life satisfaction. It also shows that, although perceived air quality affects 
how citizens view environmental governance, it does not affect their willingness to 
participate in environmental protests.  
Finally, the third study compares air pollution measurements from local 
government and U.S.-controlled monitoring stations in five Chinese cities, and shows that 
government-controlled stations systematically report lower-than-expected pollution 
concentrations when air quality is poor. These results suggest that local manipulation of 
air quality data in China remains widespread, and refutes the findings of other recent 
studies which argue that manipulation largely ended after policy reforms in 2013. 
 Together, these three studies offer insight into the ability of the Chinese 
government to maintain popular support in the face of declining growth, environmental 
degradation, and institutional failures. While widespread anti-government uprisings 
appear unlikely, this dissertation shows that Chinese people do respond to real changes in 
living standards, and that government leaders cannot continue to take the allegiance of 
ordinary citizens for granted.       
  
 ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
APPROVAL PAGE ......................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... iv 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ ix 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... xivv 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................... xvii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... xviii 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Environmental Degradation in China: An Existential Threat? ................................. 1 
1.2 Thesis Outline and Summary of Major Findings ...................................................... 5 
1.2.1 Chapter 2: Economic Reforms and the Closing of the "Satisfaction Gap" ........ 5 
1.2.2 Chapter 3: Objective vs. Perceived Air Quality and Subjective Well-Being .... 8 
1.2.3 Chapter 4: Assessing the Accuracy of Government-Reported Air Quality Data 
in Mainland China..................................................................................................... 11 
1.2.4 The Future of Environmental Quality and Government Legitimacy in China  14 
CHAPTER 2 - TO SERVE THE PEOPLE: INCOME, REGION, AND CITIZEN 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (2003-2016) ....................... 16 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 17 
2.2 Assessing the Sources of CCP Legitimacy ............................................................. 19 
 x 
 
2.3 The Challenge: Reform Era Inequality ................................................................... 21 
2.4 The Consequences for Local Governance .............................................................. 22 
2.5 Elite Politics: A Turn Towards Egalitarianism? ..................................................... 24 
2.6 Data and Methodology ............................................................................................ 29 
2.6.1 Key Advantages of the Survey ........................................................................ 29 
2.6.2 Survey Methodology ........................................................................................ 30 
2.7 Building a Theoretical Model ................................................................................. 33 
2.8 Adding the Macro-Scale Economic Variables ........................................................ 37 
2.9 Results ..................................................................................................................... 38 
2.9.1 Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................................ 38 
2.9.2 Pooled Ordered Logistic Regression Models .................................................. 41 
2.9.3 Demographic Control Variables ...................................................................... 43 
2.9.4 Sole Effects of Income and Region ................................................................. 43 
2.9.5 Analyzing the Interaction Terms (Hypothesis 1 and 2 Results) ...................... 44 
2.9.6 Differences between the Hu-Wen and Xi Jinping Administrations................. 45 
2.9.7 Hypothesis 3 Results ........................................................................................ 47 
2.10 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 52 
CHAPTER 3 - SOMETHING IN THE AIR: COMPARING OBJECTIVE AND 
SUBJECTIVE MEASURES OF LOCAL AIR QUALITY AND PERCEIVED 
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA .......................................................................................... 54 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 55 
3.2 Literature Review.................................................................................................... 57 
 xi 
 
3.2.1 Comparing Objective and Perceived Pollution ................................................ 57 
3.2.2 The Environmental Determinants of Subjective Well-Being .......................... 59 
3.2.3 Air Pollution, Government Approval, and Citizen Complaints ....................... 61 
3.3 Data and Survey Methodology ............................................................................... 63 
3.3.1 Survey Questionnaire and Air Pollution Data ................................................. 63 
3.3.2 Variable Selection ............................................................................................ 64 
3.3.3 Statistical Model Selection .............................................................................. 67 
3.4 Results and Discussion ........................................................................................... 68 
3.4.1 Summary Statistics........................................................................................... 68 
3.4.2 Regression 1: Objective vs. Perceived Local Air Quality ............................... 69 
3.4.3 Regression 2: Air Quality and Life Satisfaction .............................................. 75 
3.4.4 Regression 3: Satisfaction with Environmental Governance........................... 79 
3.4.5 Regression 4: Willingness to Participate in Environmental Protests ............... 82 
3.5 Robustness Checks.................................................................................................. 86 
3.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 90 
CHAPTER 4 - DIFFERENT METHOD, SAME RESULT: AIR QUALITY DATA 
MANIPULATION IN CHINESE CITIES ................................................................... 92 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 93 
4.2 Bureaucratic Fragmentation and Incentives to Manipulate .................................... 96 
4.3 Literature Review: Chinese Air Quality Laws and Tests for Manipulation ......... 100 
4.4 Data and Methods ................................................................................................. 106 
4.4.1 Data Sources .................................................................................................. 106 
 xii 
 
4.4.2 Statistical Methods ......................................................................................... 107 
4.5 Results ................................................................................................................... 111 
4.5.1 Summary Statistics......................................................................................... 111 
4.5.2 Confirming Manipulation in the 2001-2010 API Data .................................. 114 
4.5.3 The End of Blue Sky Threshold Manipulation After 2012 ............................ 116 
4.5.4 Detecting More Subtle Forms of Manipulation using Impulse-Indicator-
Saturation (IIS) Analysis......................................................................................... 118 
4.6 Robustness Checks................................................................................................ 124 
4.6.1 Testing for False Positives ............................................................................. 124 
4.6.2 Testing for False Negatives ........................................................................... 127 
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................................... 129 
CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION.................................................................................... 134 
5.1 Recap of Major Findings ...................................................................................... 134 
5.2 Tying it all Together: A Look Ahead ................................................................... 139 
APPENDIX 1 ................................................................................................................. 141 
A.1.1 Survey Sample Weighting Procedures .............................................................. 141 
A.1.2 Macro-Scale Economic Variables ..................................................................... 143 
A.1.3 Mean Government Satisfaction Rates (2003-2016) .......................................... 144 
APPENDIX 2 ................................................................................................................. 147 
A.2.1 Survey Methodology ......................................................................................... 147 
A.2.2 Missing Values and Multiple Imputation.......................................................... 151 
 xiii 
 
APPENDIX 3 ................................................................................................................. 157 
A.3.1 The National Air Quality Index (AQI) in Mainland China .............................. 157 
A.3.2  IIS Analysis using Hourly Chunks................................................................... 159 
A.3.3 Comparing Impulse Outliers and Hourly PM2.5 Concentrations using Logistic 
Regression Models ...................................................................................................... 164 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 165 
CURRICULUM VITAE ............................................................................................... 179 
 
  
 xiv 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Chapter 2 
Table 2.1 Mean Satisfaction Increase between 2003 and 2016 (By Income and Region).
................................................................................................................................... 39 
Table 2.2 The Income Effect (2003-2016). ...................................................................... 42 
Table 2.3 The Region Effect (2003-2016). ....................................................................... 42 
Table 2.4 Comparing Interaction Terms between the Full and Reduced Models. ........... 46 
Table 2.5 The Income Effect with Additional Macro-Scale Variables (2003-2016). ...... 48 
Table 2.6 The Region Effect with Additional Macro-Scale Variables (2003-2016). ....... 49 
Table 2.7 Comparing the Interaction Term Coefficients Before and After the Addition of 
the New Macro-Scale Economic Variables. ............................................................. 51 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Table 3.1 Definitions of Variables and Sample Characteristics. ...................................... 66 
Table 3.2 Regression 1 Results (Dependent Variable is AQ Local). ................................ 72 
Table 3.3 Regression 2 Results (Dependent Variable is Life Sat). ................................... 75 
Table 3.4 Regression 3 Results (Dependent Variable is AP Town). ................................ 80 
Table 3.5 Regression 4 Results (Dependent Variable is Protest). .................................... 83 
Table 3.6 Comparing the Original and Restricted Regression Models. ........................... 87 
Table 3.7 Testing for Non-Linear Effects of Air Pollution on Citizen Pereptions. .......... 88 
 
 
 
 xv 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Table 4.1 Data Sources. .................................................................................................. 106 
Table 4.2 Average Annual AQI and Sub-Pollutant Concentrations for All Cities (2014-
2018). ...................................................................................................................... 112 
Table 4.3 Likelihood of Engaging in Threshold Manipulation by City Type. ............... 116 
Table 4.4 McCarry Discontinuity Tests for all Air Quality Datasets. ............................ 118 
Table 4.5 Testing the Hypothesis that Positive Impulses > Negative Impulses. ............ 120 
Table 4.6 IIS Coefficient T-Tests for Individual Cities. ................................................. 120 
Table 4.7 Comparing Embassy and Government-Reported Average PM2.5 
Concentrations. ....................................................................................................... 122 
Table 4.8 Likelihood of Engaging in Threshold Manipulation by City Type. ............... 123 
Table 4.9 Observed vs. Expected Significant Impulses for Taiwan Data. ..................... 126 
Table 4.10 Testing Mean IIS Coefficients in Taiwan. .................................................... 126 
Table 4.11 Signs of Data Manipulation over Time in Xinyu and Xinyang Cities.......... 128 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Table A.1.1 Example of Population Weighting (Proportion of City population/Proportion 
of Sampled City Population). .................................................................................. 141 
Table A.1.2 Example of Population Weighting (Proportion of City population/Proportion 
of Sampled City Population). .................................................................................. 141 
Table A.1.3 Example of Age Weighting. ....................................................................... 142 
Table A.1.4 Example of Income Weighting. .................................................................. 143 
Table A.1.5 Mean Government Satisfaction Rates over Time (High vs. Low Income). 145 
 xvi 
 
Table A.1.6 Mean Government Satisfaction Rates over Time (Core vs. Periphery). ..... 146 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Table A.2.1 More Detailed Information about the Survey Locations. ........................... 150 
Table A.2.2 Missing Value Rates for all Regression Variables. .................................... 152 
Table A.2.3 Omitted Observation Rates for Each Regression Model. ........................... 153 
Table A.2.4 Regression Results using Multiple Imputation for Missing Values. .......... 155 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Table A.3.1 AQI Categories in Mainland China. ........................................................... 157 
Table A.3.2 AQI Threshold Cutoffs for Different Sub-Pollutant Concentrations .......... 158 
Table A.3.3 IIS Coefficient T-Tests (Hourly Chunks for all Five Cities). ..................... 169 
Table A.3.4 Logistic Regression Model Assessing the Likelihood of Positive Impulses by 
Embassy-Reported PM2.5 Concentration ................................................................ 162 
Table A.3.5 Logistic Regression Model Assessing the Likelihood of Negative Impulses 
by Embassy-Reported PM2.5 Concentration. .......................................................... 162 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 xvii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Chapter 2 
Figure 2.1 Survey Locations and the Core / Periphery Divide ......................................... 36 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Figure 3.1 Daily Mean AQI and Perceived Local Air Quality. ........................................ 70 
Figure 3.2 Daily Mean SO2 Concentrations and Perceived Local Air Quality. ............... 71 
Figure 3.3 SEM Path Analysis for Regression 2. ............................................................. 78 
Figure 3.4 SEM Path Analysis for Regression 3. ............................................................. 82 
Figure 3.5 SEM Path Analysis for Regression 4. ............................................................. 85 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Figure 4.1 Average Annual API Values in Mainland China (2001-2018). .................... 113 
Figure 4.2 Average Annual PM2.5 Concentrations in Embassy Cities (2013-2018). ..... 114 
Figure 4.3 McCarry Discontinuity Tests for Daily API and PM10 Values (2001-2010). 115 
Figure 4.4 Comparing the Distributions of Old vs. New Air Quality Data. ................... 117 
Figure 4.5 Distribution of Impulse Coefficients in the Pooled Embassy City Dataset. . 119 
Figure 4.6 Positive Impulses as a Function of Embassy-Reported PM2.5 Concentrations.
 ................................................................................................................................ 121 
 
Appendix 2 
 Figure A.2.1 Survey Location Map. .............................................................................. 149 
 xviii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AIT ..........................................................................................American Institute in Taiwan 
API ......................................................................................................... Air Pollution Index 
AQI ........................................................ Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan 
ARMA............................................................................ Auto-Regressive Moving Average 
CCDI ............................................................ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
CCP ..............................................................................................Chinese Communist Party 
CES ............................................................................................... Cadre Evaluation System 
CO ............................................................................................................ Carbon Monoxide 
COD ................................................................................. Central Organization Department 
EBF .....................................................................................................Extra-Budgetary Fees 
EPB .................................................................................. Environmental Protection Bureau 
FDI .............................................................................................. Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP................................................................................................ Gross Domestic Product 
GHG ............................................................................................................ Greenhouse Gas 
IAQI ......................................................................................... Individual Air Quality Index 
IDW............................................................................................ Inverse-Distance-Weighted 
IIS ............................................................................................ Impulse-Indicator-Saturation 
IPE.................................................................. Institue of Public and Environmental Affairs 
MAR ..................................................................................................... Missing At Random 
MCAR ............................................................................... Missing Completely At Random 
MEE ......................................................................... Ministry of Ecology and Environment 
 xix 
 
MEP .......................................................................... Ministry of Environmental Protection 
MPS............................................................................................ Ministry of Public Security  
NAAQS ................................................................. National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
NDRC ...................................................... National Development and Reform Commission 
NEP ..............................................................................................New Ecological Paradigm 
NO2 ........................................................................................................... Nitrogen Dioxide 
NPC ............................................................................................ National People's Congress 
O3 ................................................................................................................................ Ozone 
OLS .................................................................................................. Ordinary Least Squares 
PM10 ............................................ Particulate Matter with a Diameter of 10 Microns or less 
PM2.5 .......................................... Particulate Matter with a Diameter of 2.5 Microns or less 
PSI ..................................................................................................Pollution Standard Index 
SEM ............................................................................................ Structural Equation Model 
SEPA ...................................................................... State Environmental Protection Agency 
SO2 .............................................................................................................. Sulphur Dioxide 
SOE ................................................................................................. State-Owned Enterprise 
SWB .................................................................................................. Subjective Well-Being 
TSP .......................................................................................... Total Suspended Particulates 
VAQ ......................................................................................................... Visual Air Quality 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Environmental Degradation in China: An Existential Threat? 
Since the beginning of the reform era in 1978, the People’s Republic of China has 
enjoyed four decades of nearly uninterrupted economic growth, transforming an 
impoverished and isolated nation into an emerging superpower with the world’s second 
largest economy. Although China has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, such an 
extended period of breakneck economic development has not come without a price. 
Rapid urbanization, industrialization, and GDP growth have ravaged China’s natural 
environment and generated serious public health concerns. In 2014 alone, air pollution 
contributed to the deaths of 1.6 million Chinese citizens, accounting for nearly 30% of air 
pollution-related deaths worldwide (Brauer 2016; Rohde and Muller 2015). Of China’s 
560 million urban dwellers, less than 1% breathe air considered safe by European Union 
standards, while in the countryside, more than 300 million lack access to clean drinking 
water (Piovani 2015). Along China’s frontier, the pace of deforestation and 
desertification continues to accelerate, and even the country’s most pristine regions are 
showing signs of habitat destruction and biodiversity loss (Elvin 2008). On the global 
stage, China is now the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, releasing more CO2 
into the atmosphere than the U.S., Russia, and India combined (Emissions Database for 
Global Atmospheric Research 2016). 
The human cost of these environmental challenges is staggering, with numerous 
cities, towns, and villages across China reporting rising rates of lung cancer, leukemia, 
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asthma, and chronic respiratory infections (Millman et al. 2008; Zhao et al. 2010). In 
terms of economic damages, the costs of China’s environmental degradation are less 
precise, though even conservative estimates peg the number between 3.5% and 8% of 
annual GDP (World Bank 2007).   
As these dismal figures become more apparent, they have started to attract the 
attention of government officials and policy-makers in Beijing. Central leaders 
increasingly view environmental degradation as an existential threat to the long-term 
prosperity and stability of the country as a whole, and in recent years China has begun to 
transform these concerns into tangible policy actions. As of 2017, China has 20 national 
environmental laws enacted by the National People’s Congress (NPC), 200 national 
environmental regulations issued by the State Council, and more than 1,000 local 
environmental regulations adopted by local People’s Congresses (Turiel et al. 2017). 
These laws include a 2-10% resource tax imposed on primary energy producers (Ma 
2015), a nationwide cap-and-trade system (Dong et al. 2016), and hard targets for 
atmospheric pollution concentrations in urban areas (MEP 2013). China also leads the 
world in renewable energy investment (Saikawa 2014) and has committed itself to 
ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions benchmarks in accordance with the 
December 2015 Paris Climate Agreement (Schreurs 2016). Of course, policy declarations 
alone mean little without actual implementation, and in China local enforcement of 
environmental regulations remains woefully inadequate. However, for the first time, 
central leaders appear serious about addressing the root causes of pollution, even if it 
means permanently altering the structure of the nation’s economy.      
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As the Chinese government begins this process of implementing significant 
environmental policy reforms, it must also contend with a nationwide upsurge in popular 
concern for environmental issues; not just among academics and the media, but also from 
the nearly 1.4 billion citizens who call China home. Between 1996 and 2011, the number 
of “environmental mass incidents” in China increased at an average annual rate of 29%, 
capped by a remarkable increase of 120% in 2011 alone (at which point the government 
stopped reporting official statistics) (Balme and Tang 2014). Furthermore, the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences estimates that, between 2000 and 2013, half of all large-
scale protests in China were triggered by concerns over air and water pollution (Lin and 
He 2014). Indeed, several of these environmental demonstrations, including the 2004 Nu 
River protests and the 2007 Xiamen anti-PX plant protests, have been singled out by 
researchers as evidence of society’s ability to shape official policy in China (Jian and 
Chan 2016). 
Despite this rise in public engagement, existing literature offers surprisingly little 
information about how ordinary Chinese citizens form opinions about local 
environmental problems, and even less about whether or not these opinions have the 
capacity to drive real changes in environmental policy. Thus, one of the primary 
motivations behind this thesis is the idea that, before sweeping environmental policies 
can be successfully implemented, it is necessary to have at least a basic understanding of 
how ordinary people will react to them. For instance, will Chinese citizens become more 
satisfied as soon as they see government officials taking the problem seriously, or will 
improvements in public opinion occur only after tangible declines in local pollution 
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concentrations? Also, are environmental attitudes driven primarily by socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics (which are largely static), or are they shaped more by 
objective pollution levels and government-issued reports (which can change over time or 
be manipulated)?  
In a larger sense, it is also important to understand the broader factors (beyond 
just environmental quality) that drive citizen perceptions of government legitimacy in 
China. With the passing of the “revolutionary generation” and a general lack of 
enthusiasm for traditional Maoist slogans, how will the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
ensure that it maintains its tight grip over the nation’s political system? Will ordinary 
people remain content with one-party rule as long as the economy continues to expand, or 
will rising inequality and environmental degradation drive a dangerous ideological wedge 
between China’s “haves” and “have-nots?” Also, with respect to citizens’ assessment of 
governmental performance, do people respond primarily to the tangible flows of money, 
resources, and public services; or is empty government rhetoric and propaganda enough 
to keep the masses placated? The answers to these questions carry significant 
implications for the large body of literature that seeks to understand whether or not public 
opinion and bottom-up citizen movements can play a meaningful role in authoritarian 
states.  
Finally, for any study that uses quantitative techniques to assess political and 
social realities, it is imperative to know whether the underlying data is accurate and 
trustworthy. When participating in public opinion surveys, are Chinese citizens willing to 
express dissatisfaction with the government’s performance, or does fear of political 
  
5 
retribution prevent them from giving truthful answers? Also, are official statistics on 
Chinese air quality and other environmental indicators accurate, or are they subject to 
manipulation and falsification by the local government officials tasked with collecting 
them?         
 The primary aim of this thesis is to address all of the above questions and to 
explore the complex interactions between local environmental quality, public opinion, 
government legitimacy, and official government data in China. As China continues to 
grow in international importance, and as controlling pollution becomes one of the 
fundamental problems of the 21st century, the answers to these questions should be of 
considerable interest to researchers and policy-makers alike, both in China and abroad. 
 
1.2 Thesis Outline and Summary of Major Findings 
 The body of this thesis is divided into three main chapters, each exploring a 
separate aspect of public opinion and local environmental quality in China.  
1.2.1 Chapter 2: Economic Reforms and the Closing of the “Satisfaction Gap” 
Chapter 2 utilizes a unique, multi-year public opinion survey to analyze trends in 
self-reported governmental satisfaction among Chinese citizens between 2003 and 2016. 
The survey was administered in eight separate waves, with data from more than 31,000 
individuals across 15 urban and rural Chinese localities. In each iteration of the survey, 
citizens are asked to rate their satisfaction with all four levels of government (central, 
provincial, county, and township). They are also asked a wide variety of other questions, 
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ranging from basic demographic information to more specific attitudes towards 
government policies and current events. The main goal of Chapter 2 is to assess changes 
in relative satisfaction rates over time across different demographic, socioeconomic, and 
geographical groups; and also to relate these changes to measureable flows of public 
goods and services at the local level.  
More specifically, Chapter 2 seeks to ascertain whether the CCP can maintain 
political legitimacy in the face of declining growth rates and pervasive socioeconomic 
disparities. While China’s economy has expanded rapidly since the early 1980s, the gains 
of China’s reforms have not been distributed equally, with growth and investment 
concentrated in urban, coastal regions. At the same time, fiscal recentralization and tax 
reform policies have left many localities strapped for cash and unable to provide essential 
public goods and services without help from the central government.  
In recent years, Chinese leaders have begun to acknowledge and address these 
socioeconomic and geographic imbalances. After formally assuming power in 2003, 
General Secretary Hu Jintao (along with Premier Wen Jiabao) turned his attention to the 
plight of China’s disadvantaged populations in a way that Jiang Zemin, his predecessor, 
had not. While much of this shift in tone was purely rhetorical and intended to solidify 
political alliances, Hu and Wen did in fact manage to pass a series of reforms aimed at 
redistributing some of the country’s newfound economic wealth. During their ten years in 
power, China greatly expanded access to healthcare and education for the country’s 
poorest residents. The central government also invested billions of Yuan into three 
massive infrastructure development projects in China’s rural, inland regions. This shift in 
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rhetoric and financial capital flows was largely continued under Xi Jinping, who assumed 
office in 2013. While several researchers have noted this change in China’s development 
strategy, none have formally tested whether these changes have had any real effect on 
citizens’ views of governmental performance.  
Chapter 2 shows that citizens in China’s poorer, inland regions did in fact exhibit 
relatively greater increases in government satisfaction when compared with their more 
well-to-do, coastal counterparts. Furthermore, not only have China’s marginalized 
populations closed the “satisfaction gap” that existed in the early 2000s; in many cases, 
poorer residents in inland areas now actually report higher rates of satisfaction than 
wealthier residents along China’s eastern seaboard. These findings, which I decompose 
into an “income effect” and a “region effect,” are stronger at the county and township 
levels, which are responsible for the providing the bulk of public goods and services.  
In a second set of regressions, I also show that local infrastructure provision and 
government spending on social assistance programs are significantly associated with 
increased government satisfaction, while urban-rural income inequality is significantly 
associated with decreased satisfaction. More importantly, after controlling for these new 
macro-scale economic variables, the magnitude of the aforementioned “income” and 
“region” effects declines considerably, suggesting that a large proportion of the observed 
increases in relative satisfaction amongst China’s poor and inland populations can be 
explained by real changes in government policy.       
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Together, these results show that the redistributive policies initiated by Hu Jintao 
and continued under Xi Jinping have in fact led to measurable increases in popular 
support amongst the vulnerable populations they were intended to serve. Thus, while 
declining growth rates and persistent inequality remain serious issues, Chapter 2 shows 
that they are unlikely to lead to a wave of popular discontent capable of threatening the 
authority of China’s current leaders.  
1.2.2: Chapter 3: Objective vs. Perceived Air Quality and Subjective Well-Being      
While Chapter 2 deals with governmental satisfaction and regime legitimacy in 
general terms, Chapter 3 takes a more focused look at the effects of real and perceived air 
quality on citizen attitudes and government support. To do this, I utilize another author-
designed survey questionnaire, implemented via face-to-face interviews with 3,693 
individuals across 74 Chinese municipalities in the summer of 2016. In addition to 
standard demographic and socioeconomic information, the survey asks a wide range of 
questions concerning citizen perceptions of air quality, governance, and life satisfaction. 
It also asks respondents about their environmental values, personal habits, media 
consumption, and environmentally-related behaviors. The main goal of Chapter 3 is to 
compare these subjective personal assessments against objective pollution data gathered 
from local air quality monitoring stations.      
Although studies linking objective pollution levels to individual perceptions are 
relatively common in developed regions such as North America and Europe, as of yet 
there are no published articles using nation-wide data to compare measured and perceived 
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air quality in mainland China. Furthermore, while the existing literature largely agrees 
that air pollution (either real or perceived) likely has some effect on subjective well-being 
(SWB), no such consensus exists for the effects of air pollution on perceptions of 
governance or the willingness of ordinary people to lodge complaints or engage in 
environmental protests. Thus, Chapter 3 is the first study to explore these issues in detail, 
offering valuable insights into how continued environmental degradation is likely to 
impact public opinion and shape the future behaviors of Chinese citizens. 
Included among the results of Chapter 3 are four major findings. First, objective 
air quality at the city level (as measured by China’s official Air Quality Index, or AQI) is 
significantly and negatively associated with perceived local air quality. However, other, 
less-sensible pollutants such as SO2 have no discernable effect on perceived air quality. 
This suggests that Chinese citizens are in fact capable of accurately assessing air quality 
in their localities, but only when the primary pollutants in question are easily detected by 
the naked eye. 
Second, objective air pollution levels have no direct effect on reported life 
satisfaction, though daily deviations from annual AQI means do. This lends evidence to 
the hypothesis that Chinese citizens become habituated to air pollution over time. 
Although people are able to sense when local pollutant concentrations are high, bad air 
quality alone is not enough to reduce levels of SWB. In other words, Chinese citizens 
become resigned to pollution when it is persistent over time, and only respond negatively 
when air quality declines noticeably from baseline levels. 
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Third, objective measures of air quality have no direct effect on citizen’s 
satisfaction with local environmental governance, although observed air quality does 
have an indirect effect via the pathways of perceived air quality and life satisfaction. This 
finding makes sense, since citizens are unlikely to hold government accountable for 
pollution that they either cannot sense or do not care about. However, because objective 
pollution levels are linked to perceived air quality, which in turn is linked to perceived 
governance, local governments still have reason to be concerned that worsening air 
quality could lead to rising rates of citizen dissatisfaction.    
Finally, neither objective nor perceived measures of local air quality appear to 
directly affect an individual’s willingness to participate in environmental protests. Rather, 
such a willingness is primarily governed by an individual’s personal political and 
environmental ideology, as well as by their past exposure to air-pollution-related health 
issues. This finding suggests that poor air quality may lead to rising citizen discontent, 
but that this discontent is unlikely to boil over into anti-government uprisings unless 
people feel that air pollution is a direct threat to their own personal well-being (or the 
well-being of their immediate family members). 
In sum, these four main findings represent the first comprehensive analysis of air 
pollution perceptions in mainland China, and offer an early look at how citizens in non-
democratic, developing countries are responding to the global phenomenon of worsening 
air quality.   
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1.2.3. Chapter 4: Assessing the Accuracy of Government-Reported Air Quality Data in 
Mainland China 
While Chapter 3 uses government-reported pollution concentrations to compare 
objective vs. perceived local air quality, not all “objective” pollution data is necessarily 
accurate or trustworthy. Indeed, Chapter 4 shows that, in some cases, these numbers are 
falsified by local leaders who face pressure to achieve centrally-mandated air quality 
targets. The idea that Chinese officials sometimes manipulate data is neither surprising 
nor particularly groundbreaking. Several existing studies show that government-reported 
data from China is often inaccurate; with official numbers on fish catch (Watson and 
Pauly 2001), agricultural land conversion (Seto et al. 2000), coal use (Nielsen and Ho 
2013), GDP growth (Wallace 2016), and carbon emissions (Guan et al. 2012) all being 
called into question. Nevertheless, although China’s air pollution statistics are likewise 
viewed with suspicion, as of yet no studies have provided any significant evidence of 
data manipulation under China’s current system of air quality monitoring (which began in 
2013).      
Before 2013, air quality data in China was limited to daily reports from fewer 
than 100 municipalities, with local performance evaluated by the annual proportion of 
“blue sky days” (days with an Air Pollution Index (API) lower than 100). Cities that 
achieved a high proportion of blue sky days were eligible to receive the title of “National 
Model City for Environmental Protection,” which was conferred by the central Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (MEP) and offered local cadres the promise of favorable 
publicity and enhanced promotion odds. However, in addition to this pressure from 
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above, directors of local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) also had to secure 
political and financial backing from their city’s communist party standing committee, 
which was generally more concerned with promoting economic growth than with 
achieving environmental performance targets. Thus, caught between the conflicting 
interests of their two administrative benefactors, EPB directors needed to find a way to 
report the “correct” air pollution numbers to the MEP while also remaining in the good 
graces of local political and business leaders.  
For many EPB directors, the solution to this problem was to simply manipulate 
the data they reported to the MEP. Because the dividing line between “good” and “bad” 
air pollution was so arbitrary, it was easy to tweak the numbers on days when air quality 
was close to the blue sky day threshold, thus ensuring that there were no “near misses” in 
terms of acceptable air quality. In 2012, Chen et al. became the first peer-reviewed study 
to expose this pattern of threshold manipulation, showing a much higher-than-expected 
frequency of daily API reports just below the cut-off point of 100. Ghanem and Zhang 
(2014) expanded upon this work, finding evidence of threshold manipulation in roughly 
50% of the cities in their dataset.  
However, after 2012, China revised their air quality monitoring standards in an 
attempt to improve data availability and reliability. The number of monitoring stations 
was greatly increased, and cities were required to report hourly air quality data directly to 
the MEP (without any handling by local officials). Additionally, the blue sky day metric 
was officially scrapped, and cities were instead judged by their ability to reduce their 
average annual concentrations of specific sub-pollutants over time.  
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By initiating these policy reforms, the central government hoped to remove both 
the opportunity and incentive for local leaders to manipulate air quality data; and, after 
2013, early results appeared promising. In 2016, Thomas Stoerk found that evidence of 
data manipulation disappeared entirely after the adoption of China’s new air quality 
monitoring standards. That same year, Liang et al. (2016) compared air quality data from 
government monitoring sites to data reported by U.S. embassies and consulates in five 
Chinese cities, finding no signs of significant discrepancies.  
Despite this apparent decline in fraudulent reporting, Chapter 4 provides evidence 
that Chinese localities did in fact continue to manipulate official air quality data after 
2012, albeit in more subtle, difficult-to-detect ways. To identify these more elusive forms 
of data manipulation, I analyze the relationship between air quality measurements 
reported by local governments to those reported by U.S. embassies and consulates using a 
novel form of outlier analysis called Impulse-Indicator-Saturation (IIS). In four out of 
five cities tested, I find that impulse outliers (discrepancies in the long-run relationship 
between the two time series) are more frequent than would be expected by random 
chance. Furthermore, when the two datasets temporarily diverge, it is almost always the 
government-controlled sites which report lower-than expected air pollution 
concentrations relative to those measured at U.S. embassies and consulates. Finally, these 
“negative impulses” are significantly more likely to occur during times of heavy 
pollution, indicating that the correlation between government-reported and embassy-
reported pollution measurements declines when air quality is poor.  
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Together, these three results strongly suggest that local government officials 
continue to manipulate the air quality data they report to the central government. To test 
the degree to which these results are robust, I repeat the above IIS analyses using 
measurements from five Taiwanese cities over the same period and find no equivalent 
signs of manipulation. I also examine data from two additional mainland Chinese cities 
where air pollution data fraud was publically exposed and punished by the central 
government, showing that the methods used in Chapter 4 are sensitive enough to detect 
manipulation where it is already known to exist. Finally, in the concluding section of 
Chapter 4, I explore some of the reasons why data manipulation continues to be a 
problem in China and also propose some policy options to address the issue. I also 
examine China’s most recent (post-2016) reforms to its air quality assessment laws, and 
explain why the central government may finally be on the right track towards limiting 
local data fraud.  
1.2.4. The Future of Environmental Quality and Government Legitimacy in China 
 As China continues to build its economic, political, and military might, a few 
key challenges stand in the way of achieving the CCP’s stated goal of becoming a 
“modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, civilized, and 
harmonious” by mid-century (Callahan 2016). The first, and perhaps most serious 
challenge, is preserving the long-term legitimacy of a government that inspires popular 
support primarily through the continued deliverance of material gains. For 40 years, 
China’s central leaders have succeeded in gaining widespread public approval by 
ensuring that each new generation of Chinese citizens is better off than the one before. 
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However, rising economic prosperity cannot last forever, and no issue threatens the well-
being of Chinese people more than continued environmental degradation, with air 
pollution being an especially grave concern. Therefore, the ways in which ordinary 
citizens respond to local air pollution, and the ways in which government officials handle 
the tasks of collecting accurate data and implementing effective policies, are of utmost 
importance to China’s future welfare. As such, the principal goal of this thesis is to 
examine these issues in detail and to offer an early look at how the themes of public 
opinion, government legitimacy, and environmental quality intersect with one another in 
the world’s largest developing nation.                 
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CHAPTER 2 
TO SERVE THE PEOPLE: INCOME, REGION, AND CITIZEN ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (2003-2016) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Through use of a unique, multi-year public opinion survey, this chapter seeks to 
measure changes in self-reported governmental satisfaction among Chinese citizens 
between 2003 and 2016. Despite the persistence of vast socioeconomic and regional 
inequalities, I find evidence that low-income citizens and residents living in China’s less-
developed inland provinces have actually reported comparatively greater increases in 
satisfaction since 2003. These results, which I term the “income effect” and “region effect” 
respectively, are more pronounced at the county and township levels of government, which 
are most responsible for public service provisions. My findings also show that the 
satisfaction gap between privileged and more marginalized populations in China is 
beginning to close, in large part due to efforts by the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping 
administrations to rebalance the gains of economic growth and shift resources towards the 
populations most overlooked during China’s first few decades of reform. 
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2.1 Introduction  
 
China’s current economic slowdown has led many observers to wonder whether long-
standing regional and income inequalities will evolve into more widespread dissatisfaction 
with governance. Although scholars increasingly recognize that the legitimacy of the CCP 
does not rest solely on delivering material gains, some researchers have questioned the 
long-term resiliency of government support in the face of declining growth rates and 
pervasive socioeconomic disparities (Yu et al. 2011).1  My research provides a much 
needed quantitative analysis of this issue by examining a unique, multi-annual survey 
dataset of more than 31,000 Chinese respondents, covering both urban and rural areas and 
implemented in eight waves between 2003 and 2016. Launched at the beginning of the Hu 
Jintao -Wen Jiabao administration, the survey is the longest-running independent effort to 
track citizen approval with all four levels of the Chinese government across time. With 
data stretching back more than a decade, it is able to monitor and assess changes in public 
opinion corresponding to major shifts in governmental policies and economic conditions. 
The regression analyses yield two main results, illustrating what I have termed an 
“income effect” and a “region effect” in satisfaction with governmental performance. First, 
between 2003 and 2016, I observe that low-income Chinese citizens experienced 
significantly higher rates of growth in governmental satisfaction than high-income 
residents. This effect was especially pronounced at the county and township levels. Second, 
residents living in China’s less developed, inland “periphery” regions experienced 
significantly higher rates of satisfaction increase than residents living in more wealthy 
                                                        
1 For more on the economic determinants of social instability in China, see also Knight (2013). 
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coastal regions. This effect was significant for all four levels of government and was 
especially strong in rural areas. Together, these two findings provide powerful evidence 
that key populations often considered the most susceptible to instability and dissatisfaction 
with government – low-income citizens and those living in more remote inland areas – 
have actually strengthened their relative satisfaction with government vis-à-vis their high 
income and coastal counterparts. Moreover, these relative satisfaction increases grow 
successively larger as one moves downwards from the central government towards the 
local township government, indicating that the long-observed “satisfaction gap” between 
upper and lower levels of government may finally be starting to close.     
My findings also suggest that Chinese citizens are beginning to respond to the 
government’s recent attempts to rebalance economic growth along regional lines and to 
establish a basic social safety net for the country’s most vulnerable residents. These efforts, 
which began in earnest under the Hu-Wen administration and will be discussed in further 
detail below, have had a mixed record of success, and some scholars have justifiably 
questioned their efficacy in reducing China’s level of inequality.2 However, the survey 
results provide evidence that citizen satisfaction does in fact respond to tangible changes 
in living conditions at the local level. In a second set of regressions, I show that local 
infrastructure provision and government spending on social assistance programs are 
significantly associated with increased satisfaction, while urban-rural income inequality is 
significantly associated with decreased satisfaction. More importantly, after controlling for 
                                                        
2 Xie et al. (2014) report that China’s nation-wide GINI coefficient is between 0.53-0.55, and has continued 
to increase in recent years. 
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these new macro-scale economic variables, the magnitude of the aforementioned “income” 
and “region” effects declines considerably, suggesting that a large proportion of the 
observed increases in relative satisfaction amongst China’s poor and inland populations 
can be explained by real changes in government policy.   
 
2.2 Assessing the Sources of CCP Legitimacy 
Several studies have used satisfaction and trust in government as proxies for regime 
legitimacy in China (Dickson et al. 2016; Lewis-Beck et al. 2014; Lu 2014). However, 
simply aggregating citizen responses into a single satisfaction variable runs the risk of 
obscuring the wide variation in regime support across different levels of government. 
Existing research shows that Chinese citizens tend to “disaggregate” the state, and that 
although they express high levels of satisfaction with the central government, satisfaction 
declines at each lower level of government (Li 2004; Li and O’Brien 1996; Liu and Raine 
2016; Saich 2015a; Saich 2015b). The fact that satisfaction declines as the state gets closer 
to the people is understandable, as it is the local government, especially at the county and 
township levels, that is responsible for providing most public services yet carries the 
heaviest financial burden. Although these findings may raise concerns about the quality of 
local governance, they do not necessarily undermine the ways in which citizens judge the 
central government or the system as a whole. Many citizens appear to blame problems on 
poor local policy implementation, rather than either a systemic bias or a lack of will at the 
center (Gao 2012). Thus, whereas the central government retains a strong source of 
legitimacy amongst virtually all subsets of the population, at the local level the relationship 
between state and society is more tenuous and subject to variability.  
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While many factors have the ability affect individual perceptions of governmental 
performance, a few recent analyses have pointed to the importance of improved living 
standards (either real or perceived) in driving regime support. For example, Knight and 
Gunatilaka (2011) report that perceived income change over the past five years is positively 
correlated with political trust. Dickson et al. (2016) also find that county-level spending on 
healthcare, education, and social welfare are all significantly and positively associated with 
government trust and satisfaction in urban areas. Moreover, this effect of public goods 
provision on satisfaction is greater at the local level than at the central level. In a similar 
study measuring perceived rather than actual flows of public goods, Michelson (2012) finds 
an association between self-reported improvements in local service provision after China’s 
2008 stimulus program and an enhanced opinion of government officials. Once again, these 
effects are strongest at the local level. 
 Other studies have attempted to measure the effects of intra and inter-regional 
inequality on generalized government support. Whyte (2010) writes that although a 
majority of Chinese citizens express concern about national income disparities, most feel 
that these disparities can be attributed to variation in the ability, hard work, and education 
of individuals rather than any kind of broader societal unfairness. Furthermore, while 72% 
thought inequality was excessive in China as a whole, fewer than 40% thought it was 
excessive in their own neighborhood or workplace. Somewhat surprisingly, poorer rural 
residents had significantly more optimistic attitudes about inequality than wealthier 
urbanites; a gap which widened even further in Whyte’s follow-up survey five years later 
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(Whyte and Im 2014).3  In short, because rural areas have suffered for so long under 
government policy, any positive changes in rural incomes tend to be compared favorably 
against the recent past when nearly all villagers were poor.  
 
2.3 The Challenge: Reform Era Inequality 
Although China’s reform and opening up policies brought massive increases in 
economic growth and lifted millions out of poverty, they nevertheless served to exacerbate 
the problem of income inequality, especially at the regional level. Since the early 1980s, 
coastal areas have been able to develop their economies very rapidly, while western, 
northeastern, and central provinces have not fared so well by comparison. In recent years, 
these provinces have struggled with very high levels of unemployment, ageing industry 
and infrastructure, and social welfare bills that are increasingly difficult to meet (Saich 
2015b). 
 The uneven distribution of foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) has also 
exacerbated regional inequalities, contributing further to greater wealth concentration in 
coastal areas. In 2015, Guangdong alone received over 21% of China’s FDI, whereas Inner 
Mongolia received less than 3% (Hong Kong Trade Development Council 2016). That 
same year, the three south-eastern coastal provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang 
accounted for 60% of total national export value, despite comprising only 14% of China’s 
population.  Guangdong is also home to nearly one-quarter of the foreign-funded 
enterprises in China, with the three eastern municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) 
                                                        
3 Whyte’s original survey was conducted in 2004 and published in 2010, while his follow-up survey was 
conducted in 2009 and published in 2014. 
  
22 
accounting for a further 20%. By contrast, the western and north-eastern regions together 
comprise well under 15% of the total (China Statistical Yearbook 2016). 
 
2.4 The Consequences for Local Governance 
Regional inequality raises a number of consequences for Chinese governance. By the 
mid-1990s, continued variation of local development rates stemming from large disparities 
in revenue generation ability, combined with a decline in the Communist Party’s moral 
authority, led some researchers to argue that there had been a potentially unhealthy rise in 
the power of the regions (Yang and Wei 1996).  In 1994, central leaders attempted to 
reverse this trend by re-centralizing the country’s tax system. However, while the central 
government soon began to claim a larger share of total national revenue, it still required 
the bulk of public goods and services to be provided at the local level, thus placing local 
governments in a difficult fiscal position (Wong and Bird 2008).  
These mounting financial pressures forced resource-constrained localities to derive 
their own sources of funding in order to meet centrally-mandated obligations. During the 
late 1990s, an increasingly large percentage of localities turned to extra-budgetary fees 
(EBFs) and levies to raise local revenues, a practice which was technically illegal but 
nonetheless tacitly supported by central authorities (Oi et al. 2012). These fees were 
especially pervasive in poor, rural areas and contributed greatly to rising discontent in the 
Chinese countryside. Local financial pressures also led to a general preference for 
development plans that maximized short-term revenue extraction over longer-term needs, 
as well as policies that were disinclined to favour distributional and welfare priorities. In 
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effect, the main concern of officials at all levels was to increase revenues rather than to 
think about the correct role of government. 
By the early 2000s, the central government began to realize the untenable nature of 
this fiscal situation, and in 2002 it consolidated all extra-budgetary fees into a single 
agriculture tax (Wong and Bird 2008). After a few years of local experimentation and pilot 
projects, the agricultural tax was eliminated completely in January 2006, leaving local 
governments in rural areas with few direct means of revenue generation.4 By the time the 
agricultural tax was abolished, China’s provinces and municipalities accounted for roughly 
70% of all sub-national-level fiscal revenue, whereas counties and townships (where needs 
are greatest), accounted for only 30% (Sun and Zhao 2006). Thus, local governments were 
forced to rely primarily on financial transfers from above in order to meet their budget 
obligations; a trend which continues to the present day. 
Despite this reliance on fiscal transfers, localities are still required to provide the vast 
majority of China’s public goods and services. While, in theory, the central government 
should be able to direct the bulk of financial transfers towards poorer and more resource-
constrained localities, in reality local service provision continues to vary widely across 
regions. 5  As a result, China’s fiscal system remains highly regressive, with local 
governments in poorer areas often having no choice but to eliminate certain public goods 
and services from their budget. 
                                                        
4 Unable to implement their own fees and levies, local governments have increasingly turned to illegal land 
seizures as a means of financing their growing budget shortfalls. For more on this phenomenon, see Ma and 
Adams (2014), pp. 158-224. 
5 For instance, Dollar (2007) estimates that per capita spending in China’s richest county is 48 times that of 
its poorest. 
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Thus, despite massive improvements in living standards and household incomes, 
China’s reform era has unleashed a fiscal crisis at the local level; a crisis which 
disproportionally affects poorer and more remote inland communities. These problems 
were largely ignored during the Jiang Zemin administration, and it wasn’t until the 
ascendance of Hu Jintao, and later of Xi Jinping, that they were first addressed 
systematically at a national level.    
 
2.5 Elite Politics: A Turn towards Egalitarianism? 
The first survey was completed during the spring and summer of 2003. In March 
of that year, China’s leadership transition was officially completed when Hu Jintao was 
appointed as China’s new President, having previously been appointed General Secretary. 
At the same time, Wen Jiabao took office as the country’s new Premier, accompanied by a 
largely technocratic cabinet. 6  
 From the start of their administration, Hu and Wen portrayed themselves as open, 
practical, and concerned leaders focused on the plight of the poor. To many observers, 
Jiang Zemin represented the interests of China’s economic and coastal elites; a 
characterization which, during the later years of Jiang’s rule, led to increasing concern 
about inequality and the potential threat this might pose to stability. By contrast, 
economic policies under Hu and Wen reflected a more populist approach. Before 
assuming office, both Hu and Wen had spent significant phases of their careers in poorer 
Western provinces; unlike Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and Li Peng, who had worked 
                                                        
6 Much of the discussion in this section can be found in Saich (2015b). 
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primarily in the developed metropolis of Shanghai and in the central ministries of 
Beijing. In completing the transition of power from Jiang to Hu, the implicit message was 
that the new leadership would show greater concern for those who had been left behind 
by China’s reform program.  
 Thus, compared to the Jiang era, both political rhetoric and policy practice became 
more people-centered. Hu combined populist gestures with attempts to tighten control over 
state and society in the name of preserving social stability and ensuring continued 
economic growth. At a speech to the Central Party School in February 2003, Hu proposed 
a new concept referred to as the “Three People’s Principles” (san min zhuyi 三民主义). 
This new platform was promulgated more coherently at the Sixth plenum of the 16th Party 
Congress in October 2006, which was remarkable for both its focus on social development 
and also for putting forward the slogan of building a “harmonious society”（hexie shehui 
和谐社会). In introducing his new slogan, Hu did not entirely reject Jiang’s previous 
growth-oriented policies, but rather suggested that they be moderated. By more clearly 
outlining his goal of “putting people first” (yiren weiben, 以人為本), Hu confirmed the 
need to pay more attention to the negative effects of development and to provide assistance 
to the groups who had not benefitted as much from China’s economic reforms, including 
migrants, the rural poor, and laid-off urban workers. 
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Some of the specific policy measures pursued during the Hu-Wen administration 
included the improvement of access to healthcare and education for migrants and 
residents in rural areas, the improvement and extension of the social security system, the 
moderation of environmental impacts from economic development, and the creation of 
greater feedback opportunities for disgruntled citizens. In just five years, the percentage 
of China’s population covered by health insurance more than doubled, from 43% in 2006 
to 95% in 2011 (McKinsey et al. 2012).7 Tuition fees for compulsory education were 
abolished, and by the mid-2000s, 70% of China’s villages had explicit rules about the 
maximum number of corvee (forced) labor days per year (Oi et al. 2012).  
In a symbolic move, beginning in 2004, the State Council’s Document No. 1 was once 
more dedicated to rural affairs, marking a return to the early years of reform. This move 
coincided with comments by Hu and other leading rural policy-makers that it was time for 
the cities to support the development of the countryside. In 2003, the government launched 
the New Rural Cooperative Medical System, followed by the New Rural Social Pension 
System in 2012. By 2011, the central government’s expenditure on rural and agricultural 
issues had reached nearly three trillion yuan, ten times the same expenditure in 2004 
(Fewsmith and Gao 2014). This increased flow of investment was also visible at the local 
level, with average per capita investments into villages rising from just 350 yuan in 1997 
to more than 1,000 yuan in 2008 (Oi et al. 2012). 
                                                        
7 Note that these numbers reflect official government statistics and may therefore be somewhat inflated. 
However, other independent researchers have also confirmed sharp increases in healthcare coverage, 
especially in rural and western regions. See also Meng et al. (2015).  
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During this time, the central government also began to focus on addressing larger, 
regional-level imbalances in economic development The biggest and most important of 
these efforts was the “Develop the West” (xibu da kaifa 西部大开发) policy, which was 
launched in late 1999 under Jiang Zemin but not officially confirmed until the Tenth NPC 
in March of 2003. It covered 12 mostly-poor inland provinces and was designed to 
stimulate state-led funding for infrastructure projects and also to put political pressure on 
more developed provinces to shift investment towards China’s interior region. A Leading 
Group on Developing the West was established and chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao, and 
by 2005 the government had initiated 70 large-scale construction projects and invested one 
trillion Yuan (Yao 2009). Investment in rural infrastructure was especially pronounced, 
with annual outlays for rural road construction increasing from 36 billion Yuan in 2001 to 
124 billion Yuan in 2004 (Liu et al. 2009). Nevertheless, many observers criticized the 
program as being insufficient or improperly managed. Most of the projects announced were 
already scheduled and provinces often sought to simply shift the costs of current projects 
to the central exchequer. At the time, many analysts also felt that the Develop the West 
initiative served purposes that were more political than developmental in nature.8  
Even so, the Develop the West campaign sent a powerful message to western 
provinces that had been largely neglected during the previous decades of reform, and in 
2004, Hu and Wen supplemented this program with one of their own, which was branded 
“Revive the Northeast Industrial Base”(zhenxing dongbei lao gongye jidi 振兴东北老工
                                                        
8 For example, see Shih (2004). 
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业基) (Chung et al. 2009). This program was designed to deal with what had become a 
major problem area during China’s economic reforms, namely the decline in the capacity 
of many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the country’s former industrial heartland. Then, 
five years later, the excluded central provinces were finally brought into the fold with the 
“Plan to Promote the Rise of Central China” (cuijin zhongbu diqu jueqi guihua 促进中部
地区崛起规划), which was launched in September of 2009 (Yang 2014). The focus of this 
most recent program was to develop clusters around new growth poles and to attract 
investment both domestically and from abroad.  
A small handful of recent studies have attempted to measure the effects of these three 
large-scale regional development projects. For example, Fan et al. (2011) write that overall 
regional income inequality in China appears to have levelled off and even slightly declined 
after 2005. Moreover, since 2009, rural household income per capita has grown faster than 
urban household income per capita, while real wages in Guizhou and Gansu (two of 
China’s poorest provinces) have increased rapidly since 2003 (Zhang et al. 2009). 
However, other studies are careful to note that regional income data in China is often 
unreliable, and that apparent declines in regional inequality may simply be an artefact of 
inconsistent accounting measures (Li and Gibson 2013). Fan et al. (2011) also attribute 
some of the observed drop in regional inequality after 2005 to the 2008 economic 
slowdown (which disproportionally affected coastal export hubs) and the resultant stimulus 
package, which emphasized infrastructure development in inland regions. Thus, while 
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initial assessments of China’s regional development projects offer some early signs of 
encouragement, the longer-term efficacy of these programs is still largely uncertain.  
 
2.6 Data and Methodology 
2.6.1 Key Advantages of the Survey 
Although, as outlined above, the ascension of Hu-Wen administration (and later the 
Xi-Li administration) unleashed a wide array of profound changes in the Chinese political 
landscape, both in terms of official party rhetoric and the direction of tangible capital flows, 
the reaction of the Chinese public has gone largely unreported.9 Part of the reason for this 
lack of information is the relative scarcity of reliable data. In contrast with the United States 
and other western democracies, where multi-year opinion surveys are a tried and trusted 
tool of political scientists, similar surveys in China tend to be costly, limited, and rare. The 
first nationwide probability sample of Chinese citizens was not published until 1993, and 
even today, the vast majority of surveys are limited to individual cities, townships, or 
villages. Of the national-scale samples that do exist, very few are concerned with directly 
measuring government satisfaction among the general populace, and as of yet, no studies 
have attempted to track satisfaction changes in the same locations across multiple years. 
Thus, in designing this study, I sought to add value to the existing literature on Chinese 
public opinion by developing strengths in three key methodological areas.  
First, the survey maintains a robust sample size comparable to large-scale social 
surveys in the United States and Europe. The survey also includes separate satisfaction 
                                                        
9 For an important and useful exception to this, see Dickson et al. (2016). 
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indices for central, provincial, county, and township governments; an important distinction 
since, as mentioned above, prior research shows that Chinese citizens tend to 
“disaggregate” the state when assessing performance (Saich 2015b). Second, the first round 
of surveys was administered in the spring and summer of 2003, less than a year after Hu 
and Wen effectively assumed leadership of the Chinese political system. The survey were 
repeated in 2004, and administered biannually between 2005 and 2011, thus serving as 
approximate bookends for the Hu and Wen regime. The two most recent surveys were 
conducted in January 2015 and February 2016 respectively, just a few years after the Xi 
administration came to power. Finally, while each round of surveys contains several topic-
related questions unique to that particular year, the core of the survey has remained 
unchanged since 2003, allowing the possibility of inter-temporal comparisons.  
Together, these three strengths make it possible to measure broad changes in 
government satisfaction dating from the beginning of the Hu-Wen era to the current Xi 
regime, while also offering the potential to examine finer-scale differences in satisfaction 
changes across a wide range of demographic, socioeconomic, and geographic groups.  
 
2.6.2 Survey Methodology  
The main findings and analysis of this chapter are based on the results of a 
purposive stratified survey conducted in eight waves between 2003 and 2016.  Each wave 
contains approximately 4,000 respondents, producing a total sample size of N = 31,299. 
Respondents, aged 16 through 60, were selected from 15 locations across China, with 
each location chosen to create a reasonably representative national sample in terms of 
geographical location, average per capita income, and population. Seven of the survey 
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locations contained urban-only (city) samples, while the other eight locations contained 
both urban (cities and towns) and rural (village) samples. Within each of these survey 
locations, individual respondents were randomly selected through neighborhood 
committee lists using the KISH method.10 No fewer than 250, 150, and 100 respondents 
were identified for each city, town, and village sample, respectively.   
In terms of socioeconomic and demographic variables, the sample was relatively 
representative of the country as a whole.  
The sample was 48% male, compared to the national rate of 51% (World Bank 
2017); with a median age of 39 years, compared to the national median of 37 years (CIA 
World Factbook 2017). Also, 7.7% of the respondents had a college degree, similar to the 
7.4% rate among all Chinese adults (KPMG 2010). However, the survey had a strong 
urban bias, with 78% of all responses coming from urban areas, compared to a national 
urbanization rate of 56% (CCTV 2016). This urban bias also resulted in measured 
household incomes that were significantly higher than corresponding national averages. 
Therefore, the survey was weighted to correct for imbalances in urban/rural composition, 
city population size, and annual household income.11   
The main dependent variable of government satisfaction was measured on an 
ordinal scale of 1-4 (with 4 being the highest). When asked about their satisfaction with 
government performance, each respondent was presented with the following prompt: “I 
                                                        
10 Household area sampling according to a “face sheet” or table with fractional representation of each 
potential adult (Kish 1949). 
11 See Appendix 1 (Section A1.1) for a more detailed explanation of this paper’s survey weighting 
procedures.  
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would like you to give an evaluation of each level of government's work performance and 
service level [我想请您对各级政府的工作表现与服务水平做出评价].” Then, for each 
of the four levels of government (central, provincial, county, and township), respondents 
were asked to choose between the following options: “very unsatisfied [很不 满意]” 
(coded as 1), “somewhat unsatisfied [不太 满意]” (coded as 2), “somewhat satisfied [比
较 满意]” (coded as 3), and “very satisfied [非常 满意]” (coded as 4). Respondents who 
were unsure or refused to answer the question were coded as missing values. 
Because the survey was administered in-person, the percentage of respondents 
who chose not to answer each question was fairly low. For the dependent variable of 
government satisfaction, the proportion of missing values ranged from 3.2% (at the 
central level) to 4.3% (at the township level).12 Among the independent variables, annual 
household income had the highest percentage of missing values at 3.3%.13 When 
performing the regression analyses, I used listwise deletion, which removes observations 
for which any data is missing (from either the dependent or independent variables). 
                                                        
12 These low rates of item non-response suggest that Chinese citizens are not afraid to answer political 
questions, despite China’s long history of punishing those who speak out against government leaders. Ren 
(2009) reaches similar conclusions, finding that reluctance to answer questions about sensitive topics is 
actually lower in authoritarian China than in democratic India. She reasons that item non-response in 
developing countries is driven more by apathy and lack of information than by political fear. This agrees 
with the results of this survey, which shows that Chinese citizens do not hesitate to express political 
dissatisfaction, especially with lower levels of government.  
13 Of the variables used, only age, income, education, and the government satisfaction variables contained 
missing values. No missing values were recorded for any of the following variables: gender, venue, region, 
year, population, GDP per capita, % of local budget spent on public services, total area of paved roads per 
capita, and ratio of urban to rural disposable income per capita.  
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Listwise deletion has the advantage of simplicity and comparability across analyses, but 
it runs the risk of biasing the results if the data is not MCAR (missing completely at 
random).14 To test the assumption of MCAR, I used the SPSS Missing Data Module to 
analyze the survey data. While it is impossible to conclusively prove MCAR (since it is 
not known what the missing values would have been), the results of my tests showed that 
the data was generally consistent with the MCAR assumption.    
 
2.7 Building a Theoretical Model 
In order to assess whether government policies targeting less-advantaged 
populations have had a positive effect on satisfaction, I test three main hypotheses using a 
battery of ordered logistic regression models. 15 The first two models use income-year and 
region-year interaction terms to determine whether, between 2003 and 2016, satisfaction 
increased relatively faster amongst China’s targeted “disadvantaged” populations. The 
third model adds a variety of city-level economic and political control variables, and tests 
their effects on the significance and magnitude of the coefficients from the first two models.         
 
The Income Effect: Because low-income individuals were the primary ostensible 
target of recent policies designed to mitigate inequality resulting from China’s rapid 
economic growth, I hypothesize that, if these initiatives have had their intended 
                                                        
14 Among the regression models presented in this paper, the number of observations deleted due to missing 
values ranges from approximately 5.8% to 8.4% of the total sample, with a slightly higher proportions of 
observations deleted in rural samples.  
15 I use a logistic rather than ordinary least squares (OLS) approach since governmental satisfaction is 
measured on an ordinal scale of 1-4 (with 4 being the highest). 
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effect, government satisfaction should have increased faster among poorer 
individuals.  
Hypothesis 1: Between 2003 and 2016, low-income individuals experienced a 
greater average increase in government satisfaction than high-income individuals. 
As public services are typically implemented by lower levels of government, this 
“income effect” should be most pronounced at the county and township level. 
 
For ease of analysis and interpretability, I categorized household income as a binary 
dummy variable, with those above the median income for each survey year classified as 
zero and those below the median classified as one.16  
 
 
The Region Effect: In addition to targeting low-income individuals, Hu and Wen, 
and more recently Xi and Li, also focused their efforts on citizens living in China’s 
geographic periphery.  As outlined above, “big push” development campaigns such 
as “Develop the West” and “Revive the Northeast” signaled attempts to redistribute 
financial and political resources along regional lines. Therefore, all else being 
equal, government satisfaction should have increased faster among individuals 
living in these targeted periphery regions than in the already-developed core.        
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Between 2003 and 2016, individuals living in China’s “periphery” 
regions (west, central, and northeast) experienced a greater average increase in 
                                                        
16 Because household income levels were reported as ranges rather than exact numbers, and because the 
upper and lower bounds for each range varied widely by year, using a continuous income variable was not 
feasible for this particular study. In essence, the income brackets were neither fine-grained nor consistent 
enough to use anything other than a binary categorical variable.   
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government satisfaction than individuals living in China’s “core” (coastal) region. 
As in Hypothesis 1, this “region effect” should be most pronounced at the county 
and township level.  
 
In categorizing the regional data, I once again used a binary dummy variable 
approach, with the core classified as zero and the periphery classified as one (Figure 2.1).17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17 In the pooled model (which includes all survey iterations between 2003 and 2016), 62% of respondents 
reside in the periphery region while 38% reside in the core region. 
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Figure 2.1 Survey Locations and the Core / Periphery Divide 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
Note: The “core region” includes the provinces and municipalities south and east of the 
black dividing line (Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, and Hainan). The “periphery region” includes all of the provinces covered 
by any of the three large-scale regional development plans outlined in the previous 
sections. The survey, conducted eight times between 2003 and 2016, surveys the same 15 
locations each time, with approximately 4,000 randomly-selected adult residents per 
iteration.  
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2.8 Adding the Macro-Scale Economic Variables 
The results of Hypotheses 1 and 2 show whether satisfaction is increasing faster 
amongst China’s targeted populations, but they do not provide any evidence about why 
such a change might be taking place. I hypothesize that any observed income or region 
effects should be explained, at least in part, by recent government policies designed to 
provide greater support for China’s disadvantaged groups. I use three city-level variables 
as proxies for this government support: the percentage of the local government budget 
spent on healthcare, welfare, and education (a proxy for public service provision), the total 
area of paved roads per capita (a proxy for infrastructure development), and the ratio of 
urban disposable income to rural disposable income (a proxy for local-scale inequality). I 
also control for local GDP per capita and city population. If, after adding these macro-scale 
economic variables to the pooled logistic regressions, the significance of the income-year 
and region-year interaction terms declines or vanishes completely, then it is possible to 
conclude that the income and region effects are being driven, at least in part, by tangible 
changes in living conditions and local government support. In addition, I expect each of 
the three main macro-scale economic variables to have a significant effect on satisfaction, 
with a sign on the coefficient that is consistent with the economic and political theories 
outlined in the introduction.            
 
 
Hypothesis 3: The area of paved roads per capita and the percentage of the local 
government budget spent on healthcare, welfare, and education will have a 
significantly positive effect on satisfaction, while urban-rural inequality will have 
a significantly negative effect on satisfaction. Furthermore, once these macro-scale 
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economic variables (along with GDP per capita and population) are added to the 
regression equations, the significance of the income and region effects observed in 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 respectively will decline or disappear entirely.    
2.9 Results  
2.9.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In testing my first two hypotheses, the goal is to determine whether or not 
satisfaction increased relatively faster amongst China’s targeted “disadvantaged 
populations” between 2003 and 2016. To do this, I used a pooled regression analysis which 
combines data from all eight iterations of our survey and controls for the effects of age, 
education, income, and other demographic variables.  
Because government satisfaction is measured on an ordinal scale from one to four 
(with four being the highest), I use an ordered logistic regression with robust standard 
errors. The independent variables of interest are both interaction terms (income-year and 
region-year), and the significance of these terms shows whether the core effects of income 
and region experienced a fundamental shift over time. Furthermore, the sign of the 
coefficient on each interaction term shows the direction of the fundamental shift, allowing 
me to conclude whether satisfaction did indeed rise faster among low-income residents and 
in China’s periphery.   
Before presenting the results of the pooled logistic regressions, it is useful to take a 
look at some descriptive statistics using mean satisfaction data from the survey. Table 2.1 
shows the increase in mean satisfaction between 2003 and 2016 for all four levels of 
government in both urban and rural areas. The first part of the table shows the difference 
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in mean satisfaction increase between low-income and high-income respondents, while the 
second part shows the difference between the periphery and core regions. If hypotheses 1 
and 2 are correct, the bottom “difference” rows should take on positive values, showing 
that mean satisfaction increased relatively faster amongst China’s targeted populations.     
 
 
Table 2.1 Mean Satisfaction Increase between 2003 and 2016 (By Income and Region) 
 Urban Rural 
 Central Provincial County Town Central Provincial County Town 
Low-Inc. 0.25 0.29 0.38 0.44 0.04 0.28 0.53 0.76 
High-Inc. 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.36 0.09 0.29 0.39 0.42 
Difference 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.14 0.34 
 
 Urban Rural 
 Central Provincial County Town Central Provincial County Town 
Periphery 0.24 0.34 0.39 0.43 0.07 0.35 0.56 0.78 
Core 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.23 0.19 
Difference 0.00 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.07 0.24 0.33 0.59 
 
 
Overall, the data show a uniformly positive increase in mean satisfaction toward all 
levels of government between 2003 and 2016. 18  However, while mean satisfaction 
increased across the board, the relative magnitude of those increases differed between low-
income and high-income individuals, and also between the core and periphery regions.19  
                                                        
18 See Appendix 1 (Section A1.3) for a table listing mean satisfaction rates for all four levels of government 
across all eight survey years in both urban and rural areas.  
19 Because initial satisfaction in 2003 was higher in the core region and amongst high-income individuals, 
the narrowing of the satisfaction gap over time could simply reflect the fact that low-income and periphery-
dwelling individuals had more room for improvement, while more privileged individuals were already 
nearly “capped out” in their government satisfaction rates. However, even if this is true, it does not 
invalidate the core hypothesis of this paper: namely, that changing rhetoric from leadership and targeted 
government assistance has helped to rapidly close the long-standing satisfaction gap between the country’s 
privileged and marginalized populations.       
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For example, in the first part of Table 2.1, the increase in average satisfaction between 
2003 and 2016 appears fairly similar for both low-income and high-income groups at the 
central and provincial levels of government. However, at the county and township levels, 
low-income residents exhibited strikingly higher increases in satisfaction than high-income 
residents. This apparent income effect for county and township governments holds true in 
both urban and rural areas.  
The second part of Table 2.1 shows an even clearer dichotomy, with mean satisfaction 
increasing faster in the periphery than in the core. In contrast to the first part, where the 
income effect appeared limited to the lowest two levels of government, the region effect 
can be seen at the central and provincial levels as well. However, the relative magnitude of 
the region effect grows as one gets closer to the local level, suggesting that residents in 
China’s periphery are becoming relatively more satisfied with their county and township 
governments when compared to their counterparts in the core region.  
While the descriptive data in Table 2.1 support the possibility of both an income and 
region effect, it is not possible to draw conclusions about statistical significance from 
descriptive analysis alone. Simply comparing changes within the two variables of interest 
does not control for the effects of other potentially cofounding variables such as age, 
gender, and education. Previous studies show that these variables are often significantly 
correlated with government satisfaction, and ignoring their effects would bias the results. 
Therefore, in order to test the significance of the apparent income and region effects shown 
in Table 2.1, I present an ordered logistic regression model using pooled data from all eight 
iterations of the survey. 
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2.9.2 Pooled Ordered Logistic Regression Models 
Using government satisfaction as the dependent variable, I performed two sets of 
pooled, ordered logistic regressions. The first set (Table 2.2) includes an income-year 
interaction term to test the significance of the income effect, while the second set (Table 
2.3) includes a region-year interaction term to test the significance of the region effect.  
Each of the two main sets is composed of eight separate regression models (four levels of 
government plus urban and rural components for each level). In addition to the highlighted 
interaction terms, I also controlled for the effects of gender, age, education, and survey 
year. Finally, in urban areas, I added an additional dummy variable to distinguish between 
respondents living in large cities and smaller towns. The results for both the income and 
region effects are shown below: 
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Table 2.2 The Income Effect (2003-2016) 
 
Table 2.3 The Region Effect (2003-2016) 
 
 
 
URBAN RURAL 
 CEN PROV CNTY TWN CEN PROV CNTY TWN 
Gender        
(Male) 
0.014 
(0.027) 
-0.056* 
(0.027) 
-0.117** 
(0.026) 
-0.146** 
(0.026) 
0.073 
(0.050) 
-0.033 
(0.050) 
-0.179** 
(0.049) 
-0.280** 
(0.047) 
AGE 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.012** 
(0.002) 
0.009** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Education 
(medium) 
-0.023 
(0.034) 
-0.074* 
(0.033) 
-0.102** 
(0.032) 
-0.107** 
(0.032) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Education 
(high) 
0.025 
(0.040) 
-0.065 
(0.040) 
-0.162** 
(0.039) 
-0.109** 
(0.038) 
0.007 
(0.062) 
-0.070 
(0.063) 
-0.243** 
(0.061) 
-0.200** 
(0.059) 
Income               
(low) 
-0.073 
(0.047) 
-0.083 
(0.045) 
-0.247** 
(0.044) 
-0.228** 
(0.044) 
0.050 
(0.87) 
-0.024 
(0.87) 
-0.068 
(0.84) 
-0.062 
(0.82) 
Venue                    
(town) 
0.216** 
(0.030) 
0.103** 
(0.030) 
-0.238** 
(0.029) 
-0.183** 
(0.029) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Region 
(Periph.) 
0.119** 
(0.030) 
0.070* 
(0.029) 
-0.201** 
(0.029) 
-0.163** 
(0.028) 
0.169** 
(0.062) 
0.109 
(0.062) 
-0.312** 
(0.060) 
-0.233** 
(0.058) 
Year 
0.085** 
(0.006) 
0.071** 
(0.004) 
0.025** 
(0.004) 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
0.028** 
(0.009) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.026 
(0.008) 
Income               
x Year 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
0.033** 
(0.006) 
0.037** 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
0.040** 
(0.011) 
0.041** 
(0.011) 
 URBAN RURAL 
 CEN PROV CNTY TWN CEN PROV CNTY TWN 
Gender        
(Male) 
0.015 
(0.027) 
-0.058* 
(0.027) 
-0.117** 
(0.026) 
-0.146** 
(0.026) 
0.074 
(0.050) 
-0.030 
(0.050) 
-0.175** 
(0.049) 
-0.273** 
(0.048) 
Age 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.012** 
(0.002) 
0.008** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Education 
(medium) 
-0.021 
(0.034) 
-0.077** 
(0.033) 
-0.110** 
(0.032) 
-0.118** 
(0.032) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Education 
(high) 
0.027 
(0.040) 
-0.068 
(0.040) 
-0.172** 
(0.039) 
-0.123** 
(0.038) 
0.005 
(0.062) 
-0.074 
(0.063) 
-0.251** 
(0.061) 
-0.220** 
(0.059) 
Income                  
(low) 
-0.065* 
(0.030) 
-0.110** 
(0.030) 
-0.063* 
(0.029) 
-0.025 
(0.029) 
0.096 
(0.056) 
0.087 
(0.056) 
0.187** 
(0.054) 
0.209** 
(0.053) 
Venue                    
(town) 
0.215** 
(0.030) 
0.104** 
(0.030) 
-0.230** 
(0.029) 
-0.175** 
(0.029) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Region 
(Periph.) 
0.251** 
(0.048) 
-0.100* 
(0.046) 
-0.394** 
(0.045) 
-0.500** 
(0.045) 
0.086 
(0.97) 
-0.157 
(0.96) 
-0.813** 
(0.95) 
-0.992** 
(0.93) 
Year 
0.095** 
(0.005) 
0.051** 
(0.005) 
0.020** 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.022* 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.029** 
(0.010) 
-0.040**      
(0.010) 
Region            
x Year 
-0.021* 
(0.006) 
0.029** 
(0.006) 
0.034** 
(0.006) 
0.058** 
(0.006) 
0.036** 
(0.012) 
0.045** 
(0.013) 
0.082** 
(0.012) 
0.124** 
(0.012) 
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Note: For Tables 2.2 and 2.3, results are presented as ordered logistic regression 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. For each result, significance levels are        
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01  
 
 
2.9.3 Demographic Control Variables 
It is worth noting that the expression of the control variables generally matches 
results shown in prior studies. For example, I find that males are significantly less satisfied 
with government than females, but only at the sub-national level. This supports the findings 
of Li (2004), who argues that men are more distrustful of local authorities and are more 
willing to engage in acts of “rightful resistance”. Also, at the national level, age and 
government satisfaction show a significant, positive correlation – a result that echoes the 
work of other researchers (Dickson et al. 2016; Lewis-Beck et al. 2014). Finally, I find that 
satisfaction with county and township government tends to decline with higher levels of 
education, an oft-reported phenomenon examined in great detail by Whyte (2010), Rong 
(2009), and several others. 
 
2.9.4 Sole effects of Income and Region 
While the fate of the first two hypotheses is ultimately determined by the sign and 
significance of the interaction terms shown in the bottom row of Tables 2.2 and 2.3, it also 
worth examining the “sole effects” of income and region respectively. In any regression 
with two interacting variables, the sole effect of one variable is given as the expression of 
that variable when the other variable (in this case year) is defined as zero. Thus, Table 2.2 
shows that, in 2003, low-income individuals were relatively less satisfied than high-income 
individuals at the county and township level in urban areas. Likewise, in 2003, Table 2.3 
shows that residents in China’s periphery expressed similar or greater relative levels of 
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support for the central government, but were relatively more dissatisfied with county and 
township governments than core residents.   
 
2.9.5 Analyzing the Interaction Terms (Hypothesis 1 and 2 Results) 
Broadly speaking, the significance associated with the coefficient of each interaction 
term shows whether there was a structural change in the relationship between the 
independent variable and satisfaction over time.  
For example, the coefficient on the income-year interaction term shows whether high 
and low-income individuals experienced fundamentally different satisfaction trends 
between 2003 and 2016. Moreover, if the coefficient is significant, the sign of the 
coefficient indicates the direction of structural change. Therefore, if Hypothesis 1 is 
correct, there should be a significant, positive coefficient for the income-year interaction 
term, meaning that satisfaction among low-income individuals increased more rapidly than 
among high-income individuals. 
Indeed, there is a significant, positive coefficients on the income-year interaction 
terms, but only at the county and local levels. Furthermore, for all four of the county and 
local level results in Table 2.2, the p-values are less than 0.01, suggesting a highly 
significant relationship. Thus, it is possible to conclude that there is strong evidence to 
support Hypothesis 1: 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 Result: In both urban and rural areas, average satisfaction with 
county and local governments increased significantly faster among low-income 
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individuals than among high-income individuals between 2003 and 2016, thus 
suggesting the presence of an income effect.  
 
For the region effect (Table 2.3), a similar pattern can be observed. This time, seven 
out of the eight interaction terms show a significant positive correlation, meaning that 
government satisfaction increased faster in the periphery than in the core. While all sub-
categories except “urban central” show a significantly positive interaction coefficient, the 
magnitude of the coefficients grow larger the closer one gets to the local level. Also, at 
each level of government, the size of the region effect appears to be relatively larger in 
rural areas. 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 Result: In seven out of the eight regressions, average satisfaction 
increased significantly faster in China’s periphery than in its core between 2003 
and 2016, thus suggesting the presence of a region effect. This effect was more 
pronounced at the local level (county and township) and in rural areas. 
 
 
 
2.9.6 Differences between the Hu-Wen and Xi Jinping Administrations 
Although many of the redistribution programs initiated by Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao continued with Xi Jinping, it is worth examining whether or not the income and 
region effects noted above continued under the new administration. To test this, I ran the 
same regressions as in Hypotheses 1 and 2, but removed all observations before 2011. This 
way, the coefficients on the interaction terms would represent structural changes since the 
last full year of the Hu-Wen administration (rather than since 2003). Table 2.4 compares 
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the sign and significance of the interaction terms in the full pooled model to the reduced 
model only containing observations from 2011-2016. 
 
 
Table 2.4 Comparing Interaction Terms between the Full and Reduced Models 
 
 
Note: In Table 2.4, all independent control variables used in the full model are also used 
in the reduced model. However, to save space, only the coefficients on the interaction terms 
are displayed.    
 
 
As shown above, the results are mixed. The income effect appears to continue and 
even accelerate under Xi Jinping in urban areas, but it appears to plateau in rural areas. 
Meanwhile, the region effect appears to level off under Xi Jinping, except at the township 
level in rural areas where the coefficient remains significant. Although the primary purpose 
of this chapter is to analyze changes since 2003 as a whole, these preliminary results 
suggest that the income and region effects noted under the Hu-Wen administration are still 
present, but may be diminishing under Xi Jinping.      
 
 
 
 INCOME EFFECT 
 URBAN RURAL 
 CEN PROV CNTY TWN CEN PROV CNTY TWN 
Full              
(2003-2016) 
0.001 -0.004 0.033** 0.037** 0.007 0.017 0.040** 0.041** 
Reduced 
(2011-2016) 
-0.029 -0.018 0.058** 0.086** -0.06 -0.032 -0.022 -0.039 
         
 REGION EFFECT 
 URBAN RURAL 
 CEN PROV CNTY TWN CEN PROV CNTY TWN 
Full             
(2003-2016) 
(0.021)** 0.029** 0.034** 0.058** 0.036** 0.045** 0.082** 0.124** 
Reduced 
(2011-2016) 
(0.146)** -0.014 0.009 0.111 -0.008 -0.074 0.056 0.181** 
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2.9.7 Hypothesis 3 Results 
While the results of Hypotheses 1 and 2 show a correlation between living in poorer, 
periphery regions and increased satisfaction over time, and they not imply any causal 
effects. Therefore, in order to determine whether the observed income and region effects 
are being driven by real changes in government policy and political rhetoric, it is necessary 
to include other independent variables in the model.  
First, in accordance with prior research (Dickson et al. 2016) on local-level 
satisfaction in China, I control for both city size (population) and wealth (GDP per capita). 
I also include the combined percentage of the local government budget spent on healthcare, 
welfare, and education (pct budget). This serves as a proxy for local government provision 
of public goods and services, and is similar to the method used by Dickson et al. (2016). 
Next, I use the total area of paved roads per capita to serve as a proxy for infrastructure 
construction and the spread of regional development projects in China’s periphery since 
the early 2000s. Finally, I include the ratio of urban to rural disposable income to serve as 
a proxy for local-level inequality. All of these data were collected at the municipal level 
from annual city statistical yearbooks.    
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Table 2.5 The Income Effect with Additional Macro-Scale Variables (2003-2016) 
 
 URBAN RURAL 
 CEN PROV CNTY TWN CEN PROV CNTY TWN 
Gender        
(Male) 
0.017 
(0.027) 
-0.055* 
(0.027) 
-0.116** 
(0.026) 
-0.146** 
(0.026) 
0.082 
(0.050) 
-0.027 
(0.050) 
-0.176** 
(0.049) 
-0.275** 
(0.047) 
Age 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.013** 
(0.002) 
0.009** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Education 
(medium) 
-0.033 
(0.034) 
-0.067* 
(0.033) 
-0.093** 
(0.032) 
-0.098** 
(0.032) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Education 
(high) 
0.007 
(0.040) 
-0.059 
(0.040) 
-0.151** 
(0.039) 
-0.098** 
(0.038) 
0.040 
(0.063) 
-0.029 
(0.063) 
-0.220** 
(0.061) 
-0.199** 
(0.059) 
Income                 
(low) 
-0.087 
(0.048) 
-0.052 
(0.046) 
-0.188** 
(0.045) 
-0.166** 
(0.045) 
0.189* 
(0.91) 
0.150 
(0.90) 
0.173* 
(0.87) 
0.177* 
(0.85) 
Venue                    
(town) 
0.122** 
(0.045) 
0.261** 
(0.044) 
-0.121** 
(0.043) 
-0.034 
(0.042) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Region 
(Periph.) 
0.004 
(0.040) 
-0.009 
(0.040) 
-0.326** 
(0.039) 
-0.282** 
(0.039) 
-0.261** 
(0.098) 
-0.362** 
(0.096) 
-0.930** 
(0.094) 
-0.708** 
(0.091) 
Year 
0.064** 
(0.007) 
0.054** 
(0.007) 
0.042** 
(0.007) 
0.031* 
(0.007) 
0.047* 
(0.018) 
0.023 
(0.019) 
0.068** 
(0.018) 
0.132 
(0.017) 
Population 
0.022** 
(0.004) 
0.031** 
(0.004) 
0.037** 
(0.004) 
0.036** 
(0.004) 
-0.026 
(0.016) 
0.036* 
(0.017) 
0.102** 
(0.016) 
0.043** 
(0.016) 
GDP Per 
Capita           
0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.007** 
(0.001) 
-0.013** 
(0.004) 
-0.010* 
(0.004) 
-0.018** 
(0.004) 
-0.023** 
(0.004) 
Pct 
Budget 
0.020** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.016** 
(0.003) 
0.024** 
(0.003) 
0.041** 
(0.007) 
0.048** 
(0.007) 
0.051** 
(0.007) 
0.019** 
(0.007) 
Roads 
0.028** 
(0.010) 
0.072* 
(0.010) 
0.072** 
(0.010) 
0.084** 
(0.010) 
0.313** 
(0.034) 
0.318* 
(0.034) 
0.188** 
(0.032) 
0.090** 
(0.032) 
Urb_Rur  
Ratio 
0.152** 
(0.035) 
-0.022 
(0.035) 
-0.151** 
(0.033) 
-0.240* 
(0.033) 
-0.126 
(0.067) 
-0.324** 
(0.066) 
-0.587** 
(0.063) 
-0.502** 
(0.062) 
Income             
x Year 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.0102 
(0.006) 
0.018** 
(0.006) 
0.020** 
(0.006) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.12) 
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Table 2.6 The Region Effect with Additional Macro-Scale Variables (2003-2016) 
 
 URBAN RURAL 
 CEN PROV CNTY TWN CEN PROV CNTY TWN 
Gender        
(Male) 
0.018 
(0.027) 
-0.057* 
(0.027) 
-0.116** 
(0.026) 
-0.146** 
(0.026) 
0.081 
(0.050) 
-0.027 
(0.050) 
-0.176** 
(0.049) 
-0.275** 
(0.048) 
Age 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.013** 
(0.002) 
0.008** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Education 
(medium) 
-0.026 
(0.034) 
-0.072* 
(0.033) 
-0.096** 
(0.032) 
-0.107** 
(0.032) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Education 
(high) 
0.016 
(0.040) 
-0.065 
(0.040) 
-0.155** 
(0.039) 
-0.112** 
(0.038) 
0.043 
(0.063) 
-0.031 
(0.063) 
-0.222** 
(0.061) 
-0.209** 
(0.059) 
Income                 
(low) 
-0.089** 
(0.031) 
-0.110* 
(0.030) 
-0.086** 
(0.029) 
-0.052 
(0.029) 
0.101 
(0.057) 
0.114* 
(0.057) 
0.162** 
(0.055) 
0.181** 
(0.054) 
Venue                    
(town) 
0.147** 
(0.046) 
0.236** 
(0.045) 
-0.121** 
(0.043) 
-0.061 
(0.043) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Region 
(Periphery) 
0.127* 
(0.052) 
-0.095 
(0.050) 
-0.372** 
(0.049) 
-0.451** 
(0.048) 
-0.176 
(0.117) 
-0.421** 
(0.116) 
-0.991** 
(0.114) 
-1.01** 
(0.111) 
Year 
0.089** 
(0.009) 
0.026** 
(0.009) 
0.047** 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.053* 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.025) 
0.047* 
(0.024) 
0.041     
(0.023) 
Population 
0.022** 
(0.004) 
0.031** 
(0.004) 
0.037** 
(0.004) 
0.035** 
(0.004) 
-0.027 
(0.016) 
0.036** 
(0.017) 
0.101** 
(0.016) 
0.041** 
(0.016) 
GDP Per 
Capita          
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.006** 
(0.001) 
-
0.014** 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.016** 
(0.004) 
-0.015** 
(0.004) 
Pct Budget 
0.019** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.016** 
(0.003) 
0.025** 
(0.003) 
0.040** 
(0.007) 
0.049** 
(0.007) 
0.052** 
(0.007) 
0.023** 
(0.007) 
Roads 
0.049** 
(0.011) 
0.051** 
(0.011) 
0.072** 
(0.011) 
0.063** 
(0.011) 
0.314** 
(0.034) 
0.308* 
(0.034) 
0.181** 
(0.033) 
0.055 
(0.032) 
Urb_Rur 
Ratio 
0.123** 
(0.036) 
0.007 
(0.035) 
-0.155** 
(0.034) 
-0.216* 
(0.034) 
-0.130 
(0.068) 
-0.296** 
(0.068) 
-0.566** 
(0.065) 
-0.413** 
(0.063) 
Region             
x Year 
-0.029** 
(0.008) 
0.024** 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.038** 
(0.007) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
0.074** 
(0.015) 
 
Note: Data obtained from Author’s Survey Data and Chinese annual city statistical 
yearbooks 
 
 
Notably, GDP per capita tends to be negatively associated with satisfaction, 
especially at the county and township levels. This shows that other factors besides 
increased local wealth are responsible for driving satisfaction increases in low-income and 
periphery regions. Also, population size is almost uniformly associated with increased 
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satisfaction, illustrating that citizens living in larger cities tend to be more supportive of 
government. 
 Among the three macro-scale variables of particular interest, all appear to exhibit a 
significant relationship with satisfaction in the direction predicted by Hypothesis 3. The 
combined percentage of the local budget spent on healthcare, welfare, and education is 
significantly and positively associated with satisfaction in all 16 of the regression models.20 
Similarly, the area of paved roads per capita is positively associated with satisfaction in all 
but one of the regression models. By contrast, the ratio of urban-to-rural disposable income 
tends to be negatively associated with satisfaction, though only at the sub-national level. 
Interestingly, this negative relationship holds true for both rural and urban areas, suggesting 
that urban-rural inequality has negative impacts on satisfaction even in areas not suffering 
directly from regional income divides.  
 Also, after adding the macro-scale economic variables, the magnitude of the 
coefficients on the income-year and region-year interaction terms experienced a significant 
decline in 11 out of the 12 regression models for which the income and region effects were 
observed. Table 2.7 compares the value of each interaction term before and after the 
addition of the new variables, along with a coefficient test to determine whether the second 
coefficient is significantly more different from the first.  
 
 
                                                        
20 I also tested the regression models using total per capita local spending on healthcare, welfare, and 
education rather than spending as a percentage of the local budget. However, the end results were not 
significantly altered. 
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Table 2.7 Comparing the Interaction Term Coefficients before and after the Addition of 
the New Macro-Scale Economic Variables 
 
 
Income Effect 
 
Urban Rural 
 
Central Prov County Town Central Prov County Town 
Original 
Models 
0.001 0.003 0.033** 0.037** -0.007 -0.017 0.040** 0.041** 
Plus Macro-
Scale Vars. 
-0.001 -0.010 0.018** 0.020** -0.014 -0.008 -0.003 -0.006 
Coefficient 
Test 
0.67 <0.01** <0.01** <0.01** <0.01** <0.01** <0.01** <0.01** 
 
        
 
Region Effect 
 
Urban Rural 
 Central Prov County Town Central Prov County Town 
Original 
Models 
-0.021** 0.029** 0.034** 0.058** 0.036** 0.045** 0.082** 0.124** 
Plus Macro-
Scale Vars. 
-0.029** 0.024** 0.007 0.037** -0.015 0.017 0.016 0.074** 
Coefficient 
Test 
0.08 0.3 <0.01** <0.01** 0.01** 0.01** <0.01** <0.01** 
 
Note: Table 2.7 presents the coefficients of each interaction term both before and after the 
addition of the macro-scale economic variables to the model. The bottom rows employ a 
chi-squared test statistic to test the hypothesis that the original coefficient – the modified 
coefficient = 0. For each result, significance levels are * chi-2 < 0.05, ** chi-2 < 0.01.  
 
These results are important because they suggest that much of the observed 
significance of the income and region effects can be explained by the addition of the new 
variables related to local quality of life and government service provisions. 
Hypothesis 3 Result: In both urban and rural regions, satisfaction generally 
increases with the combined percentage of the local budget spent on healthcare, 
welfare, and education; and also with the area of paved roads per capita. By 
contrast, satisfaction generally declines with the size of the ratio of urban to rural 
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disposable income. Moreover, in all but one of the 12 sub-regressions in which the 
income or region effect was observed, the magnitude of the interaction term 
coefficients declines after the addition of the macro-scale economic variables, 
signifying that much of the significance of the income and region effects can be 
explained by local-scale changes in quality of life and government service 
provisions.    
2.10 Conclusion 
These results suggest that persistent inequality and slowing rates economic growth 
have not led to increasing levels of dissatisfaction among the Chinese citizens hit hardest 
by reforms. In fact, the relatively high satisfaction levels of high-income residents in 
coastal provinces has remained fairly static since 2003, while lower-income and non-
coastal satisfaction levels have risen significantly. This narrowing of the satisfaction gap 
between advantaged and disadvantaged populations, especially at the county and township 
levels, has significant implications for the future of party stability, potential 
democratization, and China’s economic development.  
Most scenarios envisioning a systemic collapse of the Chinese political system involve 
either a sharp economic downturn or wide-ranging social unrest triggered by high degrees 
of embedded inequality.21 These scenarios hinge on inequality as a catalyst for social 
pressure, followed by a response from the ruling elite and the party. However, this chapter 
                                                        
21 See for example Diehl (2012). 
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questions whether China’s persistently high levels of inequality have in fact fueled negative 
shifts in government satisfaction amongst China’s populace. 
These results also raise further questions about the range of conditions under which 
satisfaction gaps between different societal groups (and also between upper and lower 
levels of government) might become politically salient or not. Further research into these 
questions could produce a much-needed causal analysis to explore potential linkages 
between observed levels of service provisions and inequality in China and bottom-up 
citizen pressures for political change.22 To date, this longitudinal study has shown little 
evidence of such pressures, and has instead demonstrated significant increases in citizen 
satisfaction with government performance, with the highest increases in satisfaction 
occurring among the very same populations that many have identified as future potential 
hotspots for unrest and dissatisfaction. Thus, while it would certainly be premature to 
declare the Chinese government immune from bottom-up resistance, the data presented in 
this chapter suggests that such resistance is unlikely to be driven by gaps in satisfaction 
between high and low-income groups or between residents of core and periphery areas.  
                                                        
22 Additional research is also needed to determine if the observed trends in government satisfaction will 
hold as Xi Jinping continues to consolidate political power, especially if he attempts to remain as party 
leader beyond 2022. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOMETHING IN THE AIR: COMPARING OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE 
MEASURES OF LOCAL AIR QUALITY AND PERCEIVED GOVERNANCE IN 
CHINA   
ABSTRACT 
This chapter leverages a unique, large-sample survey from China and matches it 
with fine-scale, daily air quality data in order to understand the complex interactions 
between objective and perceived air pollution, subjective well-being, government 
satisfaction, and citizen action. Included among the results are four major findings: (1) 
That objective air quality at the city level (as measured by AQI) is significantly and 
negatively associated with perceived local air quality, but that other less-sensible 
pollutants such as SO2 do not appear to the same effect, (2) That objective air pollution 
levels have no direct effect on reported life satisfaction, though daily deviations from 
annual AQI means do, (3) That objective measures of air quality have no direct effect on 
citizen satisfaction with local environmental governance, though observed air quality 
does have an indirect effect via the pathways of perceived air quality and life satisfaction, 
and (4) That neither objective nor perceived measures of air quality appear to directly 
affect an individual’s willingness to participate in local environmental protests, and that 
such a willingness is primarily governed by an individual’s personal political and 
environmental ideology, as well as past exposure to air-pollution-related health issues. 
Together, these findings present one of the first comprehensive analyses of air pollution 
perceptions in China, and offer an early look at how citizens in non-democratic, 
developing countries are responding to the global phenomenon of worsening air quality.   
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3.1 Introduction 
 
As the costs of Chinese air pollution grow clearer, the topic has gained increasing 
traction among academics, government officials, and the general public. In addition, the 
significance of poor air quality as a source of public unrest has been demonstrated by the 
ever-growing number of domestic petitions and protests over the past decade (Hoffman 
and Sullivan 2015). However, despite the obvious importance of the issue, relatively little 
is known about how Chinese citizens form opinions about air pollution and respond to it 
at the local level.  
Several studies have attempted to determine how people in China perceive air 
quality, while others have examined the impact of air pollution on life satisfaction, 
government approval, or official complaints. None, however, have looked at all of these 
issues in a systematic and comprehensive way. Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to 
leverage a large-sample, nationally-representative survey and match it with fine-scale, 
daily air pollution data in order to understand the complex interactions between objective 
and perceived air pollution, public opinion, and citizen action. The results, which are 
detailed in Section 3.4, can be distilled into four main findings: 
 
1. Objective vs. Perceived Air Quality: Objective air quality at the city level 
(as measured by China’s daily Air Quality Index, or AQI) is negatively 
associated with perceived local air quality, even after controlling for a wide 
range of demographic, economic, and political variables. In other words, 
citizens are able to tell when local air quality is good or bad, and they are able 
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to rate it in a relatively accurate and consistent manner. However, other less-
sensible pollutants such as SO2 do not appear to have any effect on perceived 
air quality.  
2. Air Quality and Life Satisfaction: Objective air pollution levels have no 
direct effect on reported life satisfaction, but daily deviations from annual 
AQI means do. Thus, while Chinese citizens can accurately assess air quality, 
high levels of air pollution alone aren’t enough to make them unhappy. 
Rather, it is worsening air quality (or air quality that is worse than usual) 
which causes unhappiness, suggesting a possible habituation effect to air 
pollution.   
3. Satisfaction with Environmental Governance: Objective measures of air 
quality (both absolute levels and trends) have no direct effect on the perceived 
quality of environmental governance. However, perceived local air quality 
does affect opinions about governance, both directly and indirectly (via life 
satisfaction). In essence, when it comes to evaluating local government 
performance, perceptions matter more than reality.   
4. Willingness to Participate in Environmental Protests: Neither objective 
nor perceived measures of air quality appear to directly affect an individual’s 
willingness to participate in local environmental protests. Bad (or worsening) 
air quality may make people unhappy, but this by itself is not enough to make 
them willing to take action. Rather, the direct determinants of an individual’s 
willingness to protest include his or her personal environmental ideology, 
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satisfaction with local air pollution governance, and (self-reported) exposure 
to air-pollution-related health problems.  
The results outlined above are robust to a series of alternative specifications, 
including distance effects, non-linear pollution variables, and multiple imputation to deal 
with missing values. Taken together, these findings show that there are in fact strong 
statistical relationships between measured air pollution, citizen perceptions, quality of 
life, and the willingness to take action. However, these relationships are more complex 
and nuanced than most studies have yet reported. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Comparing Objective and Perceived Pollution 
Due to the relatively recent emergence of reliable and extensive air quality data, 
studies linking objective pollution levels to individual perceptions did not become 
widespread until the mid-2000s. One exception is Groot (1967), who notes a strong rank-
order correlation between the frequency with which respondents in St. Louis perceived 
neighborhood air pollution to be a problem and the actually-measured level of suspended 
particulates in that neighborhood. Using more fine-scale data, Nikolopoulou et al. (2011) 
measure instantaneous concentrations of airborne PM2.5
23 near a UC San Diego 
construction site and ask passing individuals to rate the surrounding air quality. They find 
that higher PM2.5 concentrations are in fact correlated with perceptions of poor air quality 
                                                        
23 PM2.5 refers to airborne particulate matter less than 2.5 microns in diameter. Similarly, PM10 refers to 
airborne particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter.  
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and that low-sunlight conditions accentuate the visibility of suspended particulates. On a 
more global scale, Silva et al. (2012) employ data from several European countries and 
find a negative relationship between average annual PM10 concentrations and perceived 
air quality. In this case, the relationship is non-linear and diminishing, with the strength 
of the correlation becoming less pronounced at higher levels of pollution.   
Studies focusing on developing countries are much rarer, and as of yet there are 
no published articles that use nation-wide data to compare objective and perceived air 
quality in mainland China. Liao et al. (2015) make use of data from Taiwan, where local-
level pollution levels are more readily accessible, and find a significant relationship 
between monthly average Pollution Standard Index (PSI) ratings and negative perceived 
air quality. Huang et al. (2017) do manage to obtain data from mainland China, and they 
find a positive correlation between daily PM2.5 exposure and public perception of air-
pollution-related health effects. However, their survey is limited to the three major cities 
of Beijing, Nanjing, and Guangzhou. Other studies in China use more unorthodox 
methods in an attempt to link objective and perceived measures of air quality without the 
use of survey questionnaires. Both Wang et al. (2015) and Jiang et al. (2015) sift through 
millions of social media posts on Sina Weibo, and each find a significant correlation 
between the frequency of posts mentioning air pollution and the measured air quality at a 
given time and place. Similarly, Qin and Zhu (2015) report that, in a typical Chinese city, 
Baidu searches related to the term “emigration” grow by approximately 2.3-4.7% for 
every 100 point increase in the previous day’s AQI.     
 
 
3.2.2 The Environmental Determinants of Subjective Well-Being 
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In recent decades, both economists and policymakers have increasingly embraced 
the use of subjective well-being (SWB) as a proxy for personal utility and social welfare 
(Smyth et al. 2008). Therefore, there is a rich literature dealing with the effects of 
environmental pollutants on life satisfaction, quality of life, and other measures of SWB. 
Unfortunately, there is little consistency across this literature with regard to the type of 
pollutants measured, the time-scale at which they are analyzed, or the geographical 
locations studied. Despite these inconsistencies, most studies find that SWB being is 
negatively affected by at least one of the major air pollution indicators. 
In one of the first of such studies, Welsch (2006) uses panel data from several 
European countries and finds that reductions in average annual NO2 concentrations 
between 1990 and 1997 improved SWB equivalent to giving each respondent an extra 
$750 per year in income. Expanding upon this approach, Ferreira et al. (2013) use 
regional-scale panel data from Europe and control for a wide variety of climate and 
weather variables, finding a robust negative relationship between annual average SO2 
concentrations and life satisfaction. These findings are mirrored by several other studies 
in OECD countries, with similar results obtained for a wide range of pollutants including 
PM10 (Levinson 2011; Orru et al. 2015), PM2.5 (Darcin 2017; Dolan and Laffan 2016; 
Laffan 2018), O3 (Schmitt 2013), and NO2 (MacKerron and Mourato 2009). 
In China, the first studies to examine the link between air pollution and life 
satisfaction were forced to rely on annual emissions data from statistical yearbooks rather 
than measured atmospheric concentrations. For example, Smyth et al. (2011) calculate 
that a one standard deviation increase in SO2 emissions is equivalent to a 12-13% 
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reduction in average monthly income in six Chinese cities. By contrast, later studies were 
able to make use of more detailed atmospheric data. By holding happiness constant, 
Zhang et al. (2017a) report that the average Chinese citizen is willing to pay $42 per year 
for a 1% reduction in local, city-level PM2.5 concentrations. However, in a similar study 
published by the same authors (Zhang et al. 2017b), they are careful to note that the 
negative effects of air pollution on SWB are only present for measures of hedonic 
happiness (short-term, moment-to-moment happiness), and not for life satisfaction (long-
term, evaluative happiness). In other words, bad air quality may worsen people’s 
immediate moods, but it doesn’t appear to affect their overall life outlook, suggesting that 
people may habituate to air pollution over time. A comparable conclusion is reached by 
Fajardo et al. (2013), who use Visual Air Quality (VAQ) to determine that students in 
Beijing report a much higher level of “acceptable” air pollution than respondents in North 
America, signifying that worse air quality in China may cause citizens to readjust the 
levels of pollution that they find tolerable.     
Relatively fewer studies focus on the effects of perceived air quality on SWB, but 
there is reason to believe that perceived pollution may have just as much, if not more, 
effect on quality of life than objective measures. In contrast to the above studies, Liao et 
al. (2015) find that objective air quality (as measured by monthly local AQI) has no direct 
effect on life satisfaction in Taiwan. Rather, it has an indirect effect via the pathway of 
perceived air quality. They argue that studies measuring the effect of objective air quality 
on SWB without controlling for perceived air quality may find a direct causal effect when 
none is present. This result is mirrored by the work of Van Praag and Baarsma (2005), 
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who investigate the effects of aircraft noise around Amsterdam Schiphol Airport and find 
that objective noise measurements are not related to life satisfaction, but that perceived 
noise pollution is.  
 
3.2.3 Air Pollution, Government Approval, and Citizen Complaints: 
While the existing literature largely agrees that air pollution (either real or 
perceived) likely has some effect on SWB, no such consensus exists for the effects of air 
pollution on perceptions of governance or the willingness of citizens to engage in 
complaints or protests. A few recent studies argue that poor air quality does in fact cause 
Chinese citizens to view their government in a more negative light. Notably, Alkon and 
Wang (2018) use daily AQI data from Beijing and report that air pollution decreases 
satisfaction with both the central and local government, and increases citizen demands for 
government oversight. Also, Huang et al. (2016) find that hazy days are positively 
correlated with perceived corruption at the city level in China, although they find no 
equivalent relationship for concentrations of SO2 or NO2. Finally, Shi and Guo (2018) 
report that increases in air pollution lead to more online searches for the word 
“corruption” in China, and that this effect is strongest when local AQI levels cross the 
thresholds of “heavy” and “severe” pollution.24 
Nevertheless, some other studies find no such relationship between objective air 
quality and perceived governance in China. For example, Huang et al. (2017) write that, 
                                                        
24 In mainland China, heavy pollution (zhongdu wuran重度汚染) corresponds to an AQI between 200 and 
299, while severe pollution (yanzhong wuran嚴重汚染) corresponds to an AQI of 300 or above.  
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although public perception of air pollution increases on hazy days, trust in government 
remains constant across all conditions. Likewise, Ding (2018) argues that measured AQI 
does not affect perceptions of local environmental governance, and that media reporting 
and other political factors are more important. 
Current literature also disagrees about whether objective or perceived air pollution 
has any effect on Chinese citizens’ willingness to lodge complaints or engage in other 
forms of environmental protest. Dasgupta and Wheeler (1997) use provincial-level data 
and find that total suspended particulate (TSP) emissions are significantly related to the 
annual number of environmental complaints reported by Chinese provincial 
environmental protection bureaus (EPBs). Additionally, using a calculation to estimate 
individual daily PM2.5 exposure in three Chinese cities, Huang et al. (2017) find that 
exposure to severe haze pollution and past experience with pollution-related harms were 
key factors in influencing public willingness to take actions in response to haze. 
On the other hand, Zhong and Hwang (2016) write that neither objective nor 
perceived air pollution levels (as measured by AQI) appear to have any effect on Chinese 
urban residents’ willingness to participate in street protests over a hypothetical pollution 
issue. Instead, they argue that willingness to protest is more strongly tied to individual 
attitudes towards Chinese institutions, including trust and support of the political system 
and perceived government transparency. In another study, Wang and Cheng (2017) find 
that perceptions about environmental issues in China have no bearing on an individual’s 
likelihood to lodge an environmental complaint. Rather, other factors such as more 
frequent internet use, appear to be more important. Similarly, Munro (2014) writes that 
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political experience and information resources are amongst the best predictors of self-
identification as a pollution victim, and that self-identified pollution victims don’t appear 
any more willing to take actions against pollution than other citizens.  
As is common with research in the social sciences, much of the apparent discrepancy 
in the above results can be explained by differences in survey wording, variable selection, 
study location, and statistical methodology. Therefore, one of the main goals of this 
chapter is to present a clearer and more systematic means of arranging the data and 
interpreting the results.  
 
3.3 Data and Survey Methodology 
3.3.1 Survey Questionnaire and Air Pollution Data 
The core of this chapter is a unique survey questionnaire, designed by the author 
and implemented by Horizon Research, a private Chinese firm. Face-to-face interviews 
were conducted with 3,693 individuals across 74 Chinese municipalities in June and July 
of 2016. The survey includes both urban and rural samples, and within each municipality, 
respondents were chosen randomly using municipal household records.25 In addition to 
standard demographic and socioeconomic information, the survey asks a wide range of 
questions concerning citizen perceptions of air quality, governance, and life satisfaction. 
It also asks respondents about their environmental values, personal habits, media 
consumption, and environmentally-related behaviors.  
                                                        
25 For more detailed information about the survey methodology, see Appendix 2 (Section A2.1). 
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Next, local air quality data was collected with the help of the Chinese Institute of 
Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), a domestic environmental NGO. IPE was able to 
provide daily air quality information for six pollutant indicators (AQI, PM2.5, PM10, NO2, 
SO2, and O3), which were obtained from ground-level monitoring sites maintained by the 
Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). This pollution data was then 
matched with the survey data, with roughly half of the 74 survey locations receiving an 
exact match. In the survey locations where no exact match was possible, pollution 
concentrations were estimated from the nearest available monitoring sites using inverse 
distance weighting. Because the survey questionnaire was implemented over multiple 
dates in each location, this study contains a total of 363 unique city-date pairs, each of 
them matched to daily air pollution concentrations at the local level.    
 
3.3.2 Variable Selection 
As outlined in Section 3.1, the four main dependent variables of interest are 
perceived local air quality (measured on a 10 point scale), life satisfaction (also a 10 point 
scale), satisfaction with local environmental governance (a 4 point scale), and willingness 
to participate in a hypothetical environmental protest (a binary dummy variable). Among 
the dependent variables, daily local AQI is chosen as the primary indicator of objective 
air pollution, though other pollutants are also considered. The other important objective 
pollutant indicator is termed AQITrend, a variable which measures the difference between 
a location’s AQI on a given day and that location’s annual average AQI.  
The study also makes use of several other independent variables related to 
subjective air quality, personal environmental and political views, media use, and self-
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reported health problems due to air pollution. In accordance with prior literature, several 
control variables are also employed, including age, age-squared, gender, education, 
income, hukou status, smoking status, and family composition. Finally, the study also 
controls for municipal-level variables such as GDP per capita, municipality type, region, 
and workforce composition. The equation for each of the four main regression models is 
summarized in Equation 3.1: 
 
𝐄𝐪𝐮𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝟑. 𝟏:  𝑌 = 𝐴𝑄𝐼 + 𝐴𝑄𝐼𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 +  𝛼 +  𝛾 + 𝜃 +  𝛿 +  𝜀                                                                 
 
In the above equation, Y represents the dependent variable, AQI is daily local air 
quality, AQITrend is the daily deviation from average annual air quality, α is a vector of 
demographic and socioeconomic control variables, λ is a vector of personal opinion 
control variables, θ is a vector of municipal-level control variables, δ represents location 
fixed-effects, and ε is the error term.       
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Table 3.1 Definitions of Variables and Sample Characteristics 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Mean (SD) 
AQ Perceived Subjective local air quality, 1-10 scale 6.28 (1.74) 
Life Sat Life satisfaction (respondent’s SWB), 1-10 scale 6.89 (1.47) 
AP Town 
Reported satisfaction with local (township) air pollution 
governance, 1-4 scale 
2.38 (0.85) 
Protest 
Respondent’s reported willingness to participate in a hypothetical 
local protest regarding air pollution issues, dummy (yes = 1, no = 0) 
0.67 (0.47) 
AQI Local AQI on day of survey 54.2 (20.8) 
AQITrend Year-to-date average local AQI – local AQI on day of survey 32.9 (19.8) 
Age Age of respondent 40.6 (12.3) 
Age2 
Age of respondent squared 1809 
(1087) 
Education 
Respondent’s highest level of education completed, 1-7 scale        
(1 = below middle school, 7 = post-graduate degree) 
3.59 (1.22) 
Male Dummy (male = 1, female = 0) 0.49 (0.50) 
Income Respondent’s monthly household income (in Yuan) 0.50 (0.50) 
Hukou Dummy (hukou status = 1, no hukou status = 0) 0.89 (0.31) 
Smoke Dummy (respondent smokes = 1, respondent does not smoke = 0) 0.33 (0.47) 
Old+Young 
Dummy (=1 if respondent has a family member over the age of 70 
or under the age of 5 living in the household, 0 otherwise) 
0.40 (0.49) 
Health 
Dummy (=1 if respondent believes that they or an immediate 
family member has suffered negative health impacts due to air 
pollution, 0 otherwise) 
0.37 (0.48) 
NEP 
New Ecological Paradigm score, a series of 15 yes/no questions 
designed to measure respondents’ environmental attitudes,               
-7  to +8 scale (higher scores indicate more progressive views) 
2.18 (2.66) 
Clean 
Dummy (=1 if respondent would prefer cleaner air, 0 if respondent 
would prefer cheaper energy) 
0.52 (0.50) 
AP Concern Respondent’s level of concern about local air pollution, 1-10 scale 7.36 (1.66) 
AQ Past 
Respondent’s opinion of current local air quality compared to five 
years prior (1 = worse, 2 = about the same, 3 = better)  
1.73 (0.80) 
AQ Comp 
Respondent’ opinion of local air quality compared to air quality of 
China as a whole (1 = worse, 2 = about the same, 3 = better) 
2.05 (0.79) 
MEP Use 
Dummy (=1 if respondent frequently or sometimes uses daily 
online air quality data made public by the MEP, 0 otherwise) 
0.46 (0.50) 
MEP Trust 
Dummy (=1 if respondent trusts daily online air quality made 
public by the MEP, 0 otherwise) 
0.57 (0.50) 
Internet 
Dummy (=1 if respondent would choose the internet as his or her 
preferred source for local air pollution news, 0 otherwise) 
0.33 (0.47) 
AP Focus 
Dummy (=1 if respondent feels that local government does NOT 
focus enough on air pollution issues, 0 otherwise) 
0.42 (0.49) 
AP Public 
Dummy (=1 if respondent feels that local government does NOT 
take public opinion into account when determining air pollution 
policies, 0 otherwise) 
0.38 (0.48) 
Periphery Region (1 = west, central, or northeastern region; 0 = east coast) 0.54 (0.50) 
Venue Municipality type (1 = large city, 2 = small town, 3 = rural village) 1.92 (0.88) 
GDP PC Local GDP per capita (measured in 1,000 Yuan) 57.8 (35.6) 
% Workforce 
Percentage of local workforce engaged in either manufacturing, 
mining, or energy production 
31.9 (10.1) 
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3.3.3 Statistical Model Selection 
 
For the two dependent variables measured on a 10 point scale (perceived local air 
quality and life satisfaction), this study treats the data as cardinal and uses ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression techniques. Previous literature shows that similar results are 
obtained regardless of whether such data is treated as cardinal or ordinal, but that the 
coefficients of OLS regressions are easier to interpret (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 
2004; Wang and Cheng 2017). For the AP Town variable, which is measured on a 4 point 
scale, this study uses ordered logistic regression. Finally, simple binary logistic 
regression is used for the Protest variable.   
Each of the four main regressions is carried out in several stages, with groups of 
independent variables added in successive blocs. By observing how the magnitude and 
significance of the independent variables of interest change as more control variables are 
added to the model, it is easier to understand their precise effect on the dependent 
variables. In addition, for the final three regression models, this study uses structural 
equation modeling (SEM) to better illustrate the potential pathways of causation among 
the variables and to distinguish between direct and indirect effects.  
After the main results are presented in Section 3.4, Section 3.5 carries out a series of 
robustness checks to ensure that the findings remain consistent across a variety of 
alternative specifications. First, the effects of geographical distance are tested by 
excluding observations from municipalities where survey data and air quality data do not 
exhibit an exact match. Second, the two objective pollution variables of AQI and AQITrend 
are binned into different severity classes to determine if the effects of pollution are non-
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linear. Finally, the results are re-run using multiple imputation techniques to account for 
the possibility that missing values may not be missing completely at random (MCAR).  
 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
3.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Of the 3,693 survey respondents, the mean perceived local air quality was 6.3 out 
of 10, with a standard deviation of 1.7. Overall, 28% of respondents felt that air quality in 
their locality was worse than air quality in China as a whole, while 34% thought it was 
better, and 38% thought it was about the same. When asked to look back over the past 
five years, 49% felt that local air quality had gotten worse, 22% said that it had improved, 
and 29% detected no difference.  
For life satisfaction, mean values were slightly higher at 6.9 out of 10, with a 
standard deviation of 1.5. For air pollution governance, respondents rated local (township 
level) governance as a 2.38 out of 4, while satisfaction with central-level air pollution 
governance was noticeably higher at 3.05 out of 4.26 When asked if they would be willing 
to participate in a hypothetical air-pollution-related protest in their locality, roughly two-
thirds of respondents (67%) said yes and only one-third (33%) said no. However, only 
11% of respondents had actually filed an official complaint related to air pollution in the 
previous year. 
 
                                                        
26 These results agree with previous studies showing that Chinese citizens tend to “disaggregate” the state, 
expressing a high degree of satisfaction with the central government, but lower levels of satisfaction with 
local government (Li 2004; Saich 2015). 
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For the objective pollution variable, mean local AQI on the survey date was 54, 
with a standard deviation of 21. In general, the survey corresponded with a period of 
better-than-average air quality in most locations. Compared to the daily observed average 
AQI of 54, the 2016 year-to-date average AQI was 87, with 93% of locations exhibiting 
better-than-average air quality during the survey period and only 7% exhibiting worse-
than-average air quality.        
Unsurprisingly, there was a high degree of correlation among the six objective air 
pollution indicators. For example, the Pearson-correlation coefficient between AQI and 
PM2.5 was 0.92, meaning that their effects on the regression analyses were nearly 
identical, and including them both in the same regression led to multicollinearity issues. 
In general, the three variables of AQI, PM2.5, PM10 were highly correlated with one 
another, with O3 and NO2 noticeably less so. By contrast, SO2 exhibited the lowest 
correlation with AQI. For this study, AQI was chosen as the main pollution indicator for 
two reasons. First, AQI represents a composite score and thus more accurately reflects 
the different possible types of air pollution. Second, it is the pollution variable that is 
most often reported by the Chinese government and domestic media sources, meaning 
that it is also the variable that ordinary citizens are most likely to be aware of.   
 
3.4.2 Regression 1: Objective vs. Perceived Local Air Quality 
The results show a clear negative relationship between daily AQI and perceived 
air quality at the local level. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, when local AQI is less than 40, 
mean perceived air quality is 6.78 out of 10. This number drops nearly 1.5 points to 5.28 
out of 10 when daily AQI is greater than 100. By contrast, there does not appear to be any 
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obvious relationship between daily mean SO2 concentrations and perceived local air 
quality (Figure 3.2). This discrepancy between the two air pollution indicators is likely 
due to a difference in public awareness, an effect also noted by previous researchers 
(Dasgupta and Wheeler 1997; Huang et al. 2016). AQI levels are widely reported by the 
media, and high AQI is most strongly correlated with PM2.5; a very dangerous and easily-
sensed pollutant. Conversely, although SO2 concentrations are often reported annually as 
cities and provinces strive to meet their five-year plan targets, daily concentrations 
receive much less attention. Also, unlike PM2.5, SO2 is a gas and is more difficult to 
detect visually.       
 
Figure 3.1 Daily Mean AQI and Perceived Local Air Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.76
6.30
5.98
5.68
5.28
4.50
5.00
5.50
6.00
6.50
7.00
Under 40 40-59 60-79 80-99 100+
P
E
R
C
IE
V
E
D
 L
O
C
A
L
 A
IR
 Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
OBSERVED AQI (DAY OF SURVEY)
  
71 
Figure 3.2 Daily Mean SO2 Concentrations and Perceived Local Air Quality  
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Table 3.2 Regression 1 Results (Dependent Variable is AQ Local) 
 
Ind. Vars A B C D E F 
AQI -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.006*** 
AQITrend  0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Age   -0.018 -0.026 -0.021 -0.018 
Age2   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Education   0.064* 0.037 0.041 0.048 
Male   -0.091 -0.086 -0.072 -0.004 
Income   -0.005 -0.005 0.037** -0.001 
Hukou   0.062 -0.117 -0.220** 0.037 
Smoke   0.061 -0.030 -0.055 -0.079 
Old+Young   -0.201** -0.138* -0.167** -0.109* 
Life Sat    0.128*** 0.144*** 0.135*** 
Health    -0.141* -0.155* 0.055 
NEP    -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.029** 
Clean    -0.217** -0.217** -0.115* 
AP Concern    -0.016 -0.019 0.002 
AQ Past        
same    0.273*** 0.258*** 0.267*** 
better    0.191* 0.213* 0.341* 
AQ Comp        
same    0.129 0.176* 0.278* 
better    0.921*** 0.908*** 0.840*** 
MEP Use    0.183** 0.168* 0.185** 
MEP Trust    -0.196*** -0.211*** -0.021 
Internet    -0.264*** -0.216*** -0.162*** 
AP Focus    -0.170*** -0.123*** -0.085*** 
AP Public    -0.232*** -0.196*** -0.136*** 
Periphery     0.458*** 0.054 
Venue        
small town     0.200* 0.155 
rural village     0.089 0.094 
GDP PC     -0.025* 0.008 
% Workforce     0.013*** 0.001 
Loc. Fixed 
Eff. 
No No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.046 0.051 0.212 0.233 0.468 
 
Note: For Tables 3.2-3.7, significance levels are * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; and          
*** = p < 0.001 
 
 
Column A confirms the results of the descriptive analysis, showing a clear 
negative relationship between daily local AQI and perceived local air quality. With a 
coefficient of -0.018, a hypothetical 100 point increase in AQI would decrease expected 
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perceived air quality by 1.8 points out of 10. In Column B, the AQITrend variable is added 
to the model. Its coefficient is insignificant, meaning that once daily AQI is controlled 
for, there is no added effect from having daily AQI levels that are signficantly higher or 
lower than annual averages. In other words, if the AQI on a survey date is high, then 
citizens are more likely to rate their local air quality as poor, regardless of whether that 
high value is typical for a locality or whether it represents an abnormal deviation from air 
quality that is normally good. This result suggests that, when it comes to rating local air 
quality, respondents are fairly accurate and do not seem to be influenced by short-term 
deviations from long-term averages.  
The demographic variables are added in Column C. All of them are insignficant, 
except for education, which has a weakly positive effect on perceived air quality, and 
Old+Young, which has a moderately negative effect. The lack of signficance for 
variables such as age, gender, or smoking status conflicts with the findings of some 
previous studies (Huang et al. 2017; Silva et al. 2012), but agrees with the work of Groot 
(1967).  
In Column D, the personal opinion variables are added to the model. Among these 
variables, life satisfaction has one of the strongest positive effects on perceived air 
quality, meaning that people who are satisfied with their lives are more likely to rate their 
local air quality as good, even after controlling for actual air quality. As expected, people 
who claim to have experienced negative health impacts from air pollution are more likely 
to rate air pollution as poor, though this effect is comparatively weak. Other personal 
opinion variables such as NEP and Clean have a stronger negative effect on perceived air 
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quality. AQ Past and AQ Comp both have a positive effect, meaning that respondents are 
more likely to rate their local air quality as good if they feel that air quality has improved 
over the past five years, and also if they believe that air pollution in their locality is better 
than in China as a whole. Additionally, respondents who make use of and trust AQI data 
reported by the MEP are more likely to rate their local air quality as positive, whereas the 
opposite is true for those who rely on the internet for breaking news about air pollution 
issues.  
Finally, when asked about air pollution governance, citizens are more likely to 
report negative perceptions of local air quality if they believe that their local government 
focuses too little on air pollution issues (AP Focus), or if they believe that it does not take 
public opinion into account when formulating air pollution policies (AP Public).  
Column E incorporates the remaining municipal-level variables into the model, while 
Column F adds in location fixed-effects. In Column E, several of the region-specific 
variables are signficant. However, after the addition of location fixed-effects in Column 
F, the signficance of these cityl-level variables dissapears, suggesting that much of their 
apparent effects are actually driven by other, unobserved location-specific variables. 
In the final model (Column F), adding location fixed-effects increases the overall model 
r-squared from 0.233 to 0.468, signifying a large increase in fit. While the location fixed-
effects eliminates the significance of the other city-specific variables, the significance of 
most other independent variables is maintained (with the notable exceptions of education, 
health, and MEP Trust). Most importantly, the AQI variable remains signficant at a p < 
0.01 level. Thus, even after controlling for all the other independent variables in the 
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model, obvserved daily AQI appears negatively related to perceived local air quality in 
China.           
3.4.3 Regression 2: Air Quality and Life Satisfaction 
Regression 2 is tested in a similar manner, but with life satisfaction as the 
dependent variable instead of perceived local air quality.  
 
Table 3.3 Regression 2 Results (Dependent Variable is Life Sat) 
 
Ind. Vars A B C D E F G 
AQ Perceived 0.119*** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.104*** 0.109*** 0.123*** 
AQI  0.003* 0.006** 0.007*** 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
AQITrend   0.006** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.006** 0.031*** 
Age    0.005 0.023 0.023 0.023 
Age2    -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Education    0.052* 0.064* 0.088** 0.121*** 
Male    0.047 -0.052 -0.053 -0.053 
Income    0.058*** 0.048*** 0.024* 0.050*** 
Hukou    0.210*** 0.274*** 0.351*** 0.182* 
Smoke    -0.085 -0.041 -0.050 -0.073 
Old+Young    -0.023 0.054 0.042 0.040 
Health     -0.312*** -0.184*** -0.156*** 
NEP     0.006 -0.007 -0.025* 
Clean     0.070 0.075 0.043 
AP Concern     0.097*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 
AQ Past         
same     0.079 0.089 0.051 
better     0.170* 0.161* 0.174** 
AQ Comp         
same     -0.138 -0.195** -0.056 
better     -0.129 -0.179* 0.010 
MEP Use     -0.144** -0.120 -0.066 
MEP Trust     -0.163*** -0.179*** -0.111** 
Internet     0.087 0.043 0.095 
AP Town     0.198*** 0.196*** 0.136*** 
AP Focus     -0.052 -0.095* -0.039 
AP Public     -0.221*** -0.253*** -0.165*** 
Periphery      -0.417*** 0.143*** 
Venue (City)        
small town      0.352*** 0.021 
rural village      0.068 0.028 
GDP PC      0.006 0.016*** 
% Workforce      -0.003 0.057*** 
Loc. Fixed Eff. No No No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.042 0.101 0.124 0.292 
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Once again, the demographic variables of age, age-squared, gender, and smoking 
status have little to no effect on the dependent variable. However, both education and 
household income have significantly strong and positive effects on life satisfaction. This 
agrees with previous research which shows that wealthier and more educated people 
report higher levels of SWB (Dolan et al. 2008). Having household registration      
(hukou 户口) status is also positively related to life satisfaction, although the significance 
of this variable decreases after the addition of location fixed-effects. 
Among the personal opinion variables, people who report negative health impacts 
from local air pollution are more likely to be dissatisfied with their lives. The same is true 
for those who report more positive NEP scores. Interestingly, respondents who are more 
concerned about air pollution tend to be more satisfied with their lives, a finding similar 
to Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy (2007), who report that people who are more concerned 
about certain environmental issues have higher levels of SWB. Respondents who feel that 
local air quality is better than it was five years ago also report higher levels of life 
satisfaction, though no such effect is observed for those who believe that local air quality 
is better than air quality in China as a whole. The effect of the MEP Trust variable is 
strongly positive, meaning that citizens who trust MEP air quality data tend to be more 
satisfied with their lives. Finally, the AP Town variable is significantly positive, while the 
AP Public variable is significantly negative, signifying that satisfaction with local 
governance increases life satisfaction while the belief that local government ignores 
public opinion reduces life satisfaction. 
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In Column F, the Periphery variable is significantly negative, but after the 
addition of location fixed-effects in Column G, the coefficient becomes significantly 
positive. Thus, after controlling for location-specific effects, citizens living in China’s 
periphery tend to be more satisfied with their lives than citizens living along China’s 
eastern coast. The GDP per capita and % Workforce variables are also significantly 
positive, meaning that respondents living in richer areas and areas with a higher 
proportion of the workforce engaged in manufacturing, mining, or energy production 
tend to report higher levels of SWB.  
The most important results are shown in the first three rows of Table 3.3. AQ 
Local (the dependent variable from Regression 1) has a significant and positive effect on 
life satisfaction. With a coefficient of 0.123, an increase in perceived local air quality 
from 0 to 10 would increase life satisfaction by 1.23 points out of 10 after controlling for 
the other independent variables. Unlike Regression 1, however, the AQI variable is 
insignificant after controlling for the personal opinion and location-specific variables.  
Thus, poor objective air quality alone does not appear to decrease life satisfaction 
in China. However, while the effect of baseline AQI levels is insignificant, the AQITrend 
coefficient remains significantly positive across all columns of the regression model. This 
means that, even after controlling for baseline AQI and perceived local air quality, 
citizens report higher SWB on days where air quality is significantly better than annual 
averages. Such a result suggests that, although Chinese citizens may accurately perceive 
objective air quality, bad air quality itself does not lead to poor SWB. Rather, when it 
comes to objective pollution measurements, it is the deviation from normal levels that 
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affects emotions. These findings agree with the work of (Zhang et al. 2017b) and 
(Fajardo et al. 2013), who argue that citizens habituate to local levels of air pollution and 
only show an emotional response when pollution levels deviate significantly from annual 
norms. 
While baseline AQI shows no direct effect on life satisfaction, it is possible that 
AQI has an indirect effect on life satisfaction via perceived air quality. To test this, a 
simple SEM is set up to determine whether perceived air quality mediates the effects of 
AQI and AQITrend on life satisfaction. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 SEM Path Analysis for Regression 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The numbers in Figure 3.3 show the standardized coefficients of the full regression 
model (Column G) rather than the unstandardized coefficients presented in Table 3.3 
because the partial mediation test suggested by Biesanz et al. (2010) requires 
standardized coefficients. The numbers in parentheses represent the T-scores of each 
coefficient. The other independent variables are controlled for but not shown. 
 
 
In Figure 3.3, the solid lines C’ and D’ represent the direct effects of AQI and 
AQITrend on life satisfaction after controlling for all other variables, while the dotted lines 
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C and D represent the direct effects after removing the potential mediating variable of 
perceived air quality. Meanwhile, the indirect effects of AQI and AQITrend on life 
satisfaction are represented by the two-step pathways of A1B and A2B respectively.  
To test the significance of the two indirect effects, the partial posterior method 
suggested by Biesanz et al. (2010) is employed. The first pathway A1B results in a 
significant p-value of 0.001, while the second pathway A2B results in an insignificant 
p-value of 0.13. Therefore, there is strong evidence of an indirect effect of AQI on life 
satisfaction via the mediating variable of perceived AQI, even though the direct effect of 
AQI on life satisfaction is insignificant.  
In essence, air pollution levels do not directly affect life satisfaction, but poor 
objective air quality can reduce satisfaction indirectly if it leads to a drop in perceived air 
quality. The above finding of partial mediation is supported by the work of (Liao et al. 
2015).     
 
3.4.4 Regression 3: Satisfaction with Environmental Governance 
Regression 3 tests the dependent variable of perceived local air pollution 
governance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
80 
Table 3.4 Regression 3 Results (Dependent Variable is AP Town) 
 
Ind. Vars A B C D E F G 
AQ Perceived 0.241*** 0.262*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.080** 
AQI  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.05 
AQITrend   -0.011** -0.012*** -0.003 -0.004 0.017 
Age    0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 
Age2    -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Education    0.072* 0.140** 0.137** 0.105* 
Male    -0.068 -0.039 -0.042 -0.033 
Income    -0.025* -0.005 0.002 0.018 
Hukou    0.237* 0.144 0.164 -0.023 
Smoke    0.060 0.091 0.089 0.055 
Old+Young    0.055 -0.009 -0.005 -0.015 
Life Sat     0.153*** 0.153*** 0.132*** 
Health     -0.512*** -0.528*** -0.347*** 
NEP     -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.021 
Clean     -0.183* -0.194* -0.181* 
AP Concern     -0.050* -0.057* -0.033 
AQ Past         
same     0.066 0.072 0.016 
better     1.247*** 1.256*** 0.876*** 
AQ Comp         
same     0.010 -0.002 -0.004 
better     0.559*** 0.566*** 0.455*** 
MEP Use     0.342*** 0.342*** 0.159* 
MEP Trust     0.017 0.027 -0.095 
Internet     -0.196* -0.190* -0.159* 
AP Focus     -0.092 -0.102* -0.032 
AP Public     -0.466*** -0.465*** -0.449*** 
Periphery      0.113 0.067 
Venue (City)        
small town      0.150 0.006 
rural village      0.201* 0.005 
GDP PC      0.028* 0.006 
% Workforce      0.001 0.003 
Loc. Fix. Eff. No No No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.114 0.115 0.191 
 
 
Among the demographic variables, only education has a significant effect on 
perceived air pollution governance after controlling for all of the other independent 
variables. Unsurprisingly, respondents who are more satisfied with their lives report 
higher satisfaction scores for governance, while those experiencing negative health 
impacts from air pollution report lower governance satisfaction scores. The Clean 
  
81 
variable is weakly (and negatively) significant, while the significance of the NEP and AP 
Concern variables disappears after controlling for location fixed-effects. Furthermore, 
respondents who feel that local air quality is better than five years ago and better than the 
rest of the country are more likely to be satisfied with local air pollution governance than 
those who believe that air quality is worse. Interestingly, those who use MEP air 
pollution data tend to be slightly more satisfied with local air pollution governance, while 
those who choose the internet as their source for air pollution news tend to be slightly less 
satisfied. Also, much like the first two regressions, the belief that local government 
doesn’t listen to public opinion is correlated with reduced satisfaction. Finally, after 
controlling for location fixed-effects, all of the municipal-level variables are insignificant.  
Looking at the main independent variables of interest, both AQI and AQITrend 
become insignificant after the inclusion of the personal opinion variables in Column E. 
Thus, among the three main pollution indicator variables, only perceived air quality 
remains significant across all stages of the model. This suggests that while objective 
pollution measures have a direct effect on perceived air quality (AQI) and life satisfaction 
(AQITrend), they have no direct effect on perceived local air pollution governance. Rather, 
satisfaction with local handling of air pollution issues tends to be driven entirely by 
subjective measures of air quality.  
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Figure 3.4 SEM Path Analysis for Regression 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 again employs an SEM path analysis to test the indirect effects of 
perceived air quality on perceived local air pollution governance (AP Town) via the 
potentially mediating variable of life satisfaction. In this case, the direct effect of 
perceived air quality on AP Town is already significant in its own right. However, the 
indirect effect via life satisfaction is also highly significant (p < 0.001). This means that 
people who view local air quality as poor are significantly more likely to rate local air 
pollution governance as poor. However, some of this effect is indirect, as poor perceived 
air quality tends to decrease general life satisfaction, which also has a negative effect on 
perceived governance. 
 
3.4.5 Regression 4: Willingness to Participate in Environmental Protests 
Regression 4 investigates the willingness of Chinese citizens to participate in a 
hypothetical air-pollution-related protest in their home towns.  
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Table 3.5 Regression 4 Results (Dependent Variable is Protest) 
 
Ind. Vars A B C D E F G 
AQ Perceived -0.021 0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.008 -0.029 0.044 
AQI  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.005 0.004 
AQITrend   0.002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 0.015 
Age    -0.015 -0.041 -0.030 -0.024 
Age2    0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Education    0.015 -0.021 -0.028 0.087 
Male    -0.131 -0.281* -0.253* -0.309* 
Income    -0.025 -0.042 0.006 0.060* 
Hukou    0.056 0.046 0.013 0.069 
Smoke    0.235* 0.320** 0.257* 0.191 
Old+Young    0.140* 0.165* 0.159* 0.004 
Life Sat     0.123*** 0.148*** 0.012 
Health     0.991*** 0.919*** 0.905*** 
NEP     0.063*** 0.072*** 0.038* 
Clean     0.596*** 0.562*** 0.377** 
AP Concern     0.070* 0.081* 0.101** 
AQ Past         
same     0.307** 0.308** 0.162 
better     0.185 0.307* 0.238 
AQ Comp         
same     -0.382** -0.257* -0.191 
better     -0.378** -0.311* -0.299 
MEP Use     0.374*** 0.370** 0.484*** 
MEP Trust     -0.151* -0.116* -0.032 
Internet     0.132 0.055 0.237** 
AP Town     -0.106 -0.121* -0.194** 
AP Focus     -0.088 -0.087 -0.016 
AP Public     -0.047 -0.025 -0.067 
Periphery      0.861*** 0.007 
Venue (City)        
small town      0.361* -0.272 
rural village      0.176 -0.093 
GDP PC      0.003 -0.001 
% Workforce      -0.003 -0.012* 
Loc. Fixed Eff. No No No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.101 0.121 0.216 
 
 
In the above regression, demographic factors do not appear to have a strong effect 
on an individual’s willingness to protest. Females and high-income respondents are 
slightly more likely to protest, but the significance of both variables is relatively weak. 
Likewise, among the location-specific variables, only % Workforce has a significant 
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effect on willingness to protest after controlling for location fixed-effects. Individuals 
living in localities with a higher percentage of the workforce engaged in manufacturing, 
mining, or energy production appear to be less likely to protest, perhaps signifying a 
reluctance to endanger their livelihoods. 
Most strikingly, none of the three main independent variables are significant after 
controlling for the other variables in the model. The fact that neither objective nor 
perceived local air quality has a direct effect on an individual’s willingness to protest 
agrees with the work of Zhong and Hwang (2015). 
Personal opinion variables are by far the most important determinants of an 
individual’s willingness to engage in local, air-pollution-related protests. Having 
experienced a health problem due to air pollution is among the strongest predictors of 
willingness to protest, as is MEP use. Interestingly, those who use MEP air quality data 
are more likely to engage in a hypothetical local protest, even though they are also more 
likely to rate local air quality and environmental governance positively. It is possible that 
MEP use could signify a high degree of environmental knowledge, motivation, and 
political efficacy, thus making these individuals more likely to protest even though they 
have a higher-than-average opinion of local air quality. Reliance on internet news is 
likewise correlated with a higher willingness to protest, suggesting that tech-savvy 
individuals with more access to independent media sources are more likely to challenge 
the status quo.  
Respondents with higher NEP scores, higher levels of air pollution concern, and 
who value cleaner air over cheaper energy are all more willing to engage in local air 
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pollution protests. However, both AQ Past and AQ Comp are insignificant after 
controlling for location fixed-effects. Finally, satisfaction with local air pollution 
governance (AP Town) is negatively correlated with willingness to protest. This is 
unsurprising, and confirms other research which shows that citizens who are dissatisfied 
with governmental performance are more likely to engage in protests (Zhong and Hwang 
2015).   
 
Figure 3.5 SEM Path Analysis for Regression 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 tests the indirect effects of air-pollution-related health impacts and life 
satisfaction on the willingness to protest via the potentially mediating variable of AP 
Town. Both indirect pathways were deemed to be significant using the partial posterior 
method (p = 0.018 for the health variable and p = 0.026 for life satisfaction). However, as 
in Figure 3.4, one of the independent variables (Health) also had a large direct effect on 
the Protest variable. Thus, while perceived negative health impacts due to air pollution 
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appear to make individuals more willing to protest directly, they also increase willingness 
to protest indirectly by lowering satisfaction with local governance.  
By contrast, there was no direct effect of life satisfaction on the Protest variable, 
meaning that low SWB only increases the likelihood of protesting indirectly by 
decreasing satisfaction with local air pollution governance.   
 
3.5 Robustness Checks 
In any statistical analysis, it is necessary to make sure that the results are not 
significantly altered by small changes in the assumptions of the underlying model. 
Therefore, this section tests the robustness of the above results to a series of alternative 
specifications. 
In the first alternative specification, only locations with an exact match between 
survey data and pollution data are retained in the regression model. As mentioned 
previously, due to the limitations of the MEP air quality data, roughly half of the survey 
locations could not be exactly matched with daily air pollution data, and in these 
locations AQI values were estimated from nearby stations using the inverse distance 
weighting method. However, treating estimated AQI values the same as observed values 
runs the risk of biasing the results. Therefore, Table 3.6 compares the original results to a 
restricted regression model where only the locations with exact matches are retained. In 
the interests of space, only the key independent variables are reported.  
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Table 3.6 Comparing the Original and Restricted Regression Models 
 
(a) Original Results 
 Regression 1:       
AQ Perceived 
Regression 2:       
Life Sat 
Regression 3:        
AP Town 
Regression 4: 
Protest 
AQ Perceived N/A 0.123*** 0.080*** 0.044 
AQI -0.006** -0.003 -0.005 0.004 
AQITrend 0.002 0.031*** 0.017 0.015 
Life Sat 0.135*** N/A 0.132*** 0.012 
Health 0.055 -0.156** -0.346*** 0.905*** 
AP Town N/A 0.136*** N/A -0.194** 
 
(b) Restricted Model 
 Regression 1:       
AQ Perceived 
Regression 2:       
Life Sat 
Regression 3:        
AP Town 
Regression 4: 
Protest 
AQ Perceived N/A 0.114*** 0.069*** 0.045 
AQI -0.007** -0.004 -0.006 0.001 
AQITrend 0.004* 0.021** 0.029 0.027 
Life Sat 0.136*** N/A 0.149** -0.041 
Health 0.087 -0.164** -0.248** 1.051*** 
AP Town N/A 0.138*** N/A -0.181** 
 
 
As shown above, most of the results obtained from the original regression model 
hold true in the restricted model. In Regression 1, the coefficients of AQI and life 
satisfaction remain largely unchanged, though the AQITrend variable becomes significant 
in the restricted model. In Regression 2, all four of the significant variables remain 
significant in the restricted model, though the significance level of AQITrend is reduced 
from p < 0.001 to p < 0.01. Similarly, in Model 3, the significance level of the health and 
AP Town variables is reduced, though once again the direction and baseline significance 
of the independent variables in retained. Finally, in Model 4, both the health and AP 
Town variables remain significant, and the coefficient of the health variables even 
increases. Thus, it appears that restricting the regression models to only include air 
  
88 
quality observations from survey locations with exact matches does not significantly alter 
the baseline results.  
In the second alternative specification, the AQI and AQITrend variables are broken 
into bins to test the possible non-linear effects of air pollution on citizen perceptions.  
 
 
Table 3.7 Testing for Non-Linear Effects of Air Pollution on Citizen Perceptions 
 
(a) The Ordinal AQI Variable for Regression 1 (AQ Local) 
AQI Reference (Below 40) 
40-59 -0.043 
60-79 -0.148 
80-99 -0.031 
100+ -1.039*** 
 
(b) The Ordinal AQITrend Variable for Regression 2 (Life Satisfaction) 
 
AQITrend Reference (Below 0) 
0-19 0.331 
20-39 0.217 
40-59 0.317 
60+ 1.643** 
 
Note: In the above table, only the binned pollution variables are shown. The other 
independent variables are controlled for but not listed. The magnitude and significance of 
the coefficients for each category are in comparison to the baseline reference category. 
 
 
 
As illustrated above, both of the binned pollution variables only have significant 
effects at their most extreme positive values. Compared to the reference value of below 
40, only AQI levels above 100 significantly reduce perceptions of local air quality. Thus, 
it appears that rising local AQI levels may not reduce perceived air quality in a linear 
fashion, and instead may only have a negative effect after reaching a certain threshold 
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value.27 Similarly, the positive effect of the ordinal AQITrend variable on life satisfaction is 
only significant at its highest level. Compared to the reference level of below zero 
(meaning that a locality’s measured daily AQI was worse than its annual average), only 
positive AQI deviations of more than 60 points appear to have a significant effect on 
SWB. Thus, once again, a non-linear threshold effect of air pollution on perceptions may 
be present. These observations agree with the work of Zhang et al. (2017b), who also find 
that the negative effects of air pollution on perception grow larger at higher levels of 
pollution.28 
Finally, in the third alternative specification, all four models are re-run with 
missing values estimated using multiple imputation. Due to the large number of 
independent variables in each model and the listwise deletion method used by Stata, the 
final regression models only contain between 59% and 64% of the original 3,693 survey 
observations. Unless all of the missing values are MCAR, not including any of the 
observations with missing values could bias the results. There are many techniques to 
deal with missing values, but multiple imputation generally has less bias than 
deterministic imputation because it uses the other independent variables in the dataset to 
predict the missing values and contains a random component (Schafer and Graham 
2002). 
After re-running the regressions using multiple imputation, the direction and 
significance of the key independent variables remained largely unchanged, suggesting 
                                                        
27 It should also be noted that, in China, an AQI of 100 is the official dividing line between a “blue sky 
day” and a “non-blue sky day”. The significance of blue sky days is explored further in Chapter 4. 
28 However, these results disagree with Silva et al. (2012), who find the opposite. 
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that the presence of missing values in the original models does not affect the validity of 
the results. The full details of this robustness check are included in Appendix 2 (Section 
A2.2).     
 
3.6 Conclusion 
With the use of a large-scale, nationally representative survey and daily, municipal-
level air pollution data, this chapter has clarified several important relationships between 
objective and perceived air pollution, public opinion, and citizen action in mainland 
China.  
First, daily local AQI is negatively correlated with perceived local air quality, 
although there is some evidence that this relationship is only present at AQI levels above 
100. Also, other less-sensible pollutants such as SO2 do not have the same negative effect 
on perceptions. Second, it is daily deviation from annual AQI norms (rather than daily 
AQI itself) that drives changes in SWB, suggesting a possible emotional habituation 
effect to air pollution in China. However, although AQI levels themselves have no direct 
effect on SWB, they do have an indirect effect via the mediating variable of perceived 
local air quality. Third, objective air quality measures do not have a direct effect on 
perceived local air pollution governance, but perceived air quality does affect perceptions 
of environmental governance, both directly and indirectly (via life satisfaction). Finally, 
neither objective nor perceived measures of air quality appear to directly affect an 
individual’s willingness to participate in local environmental protests. Rather, the direct 
determinants of an individual’s willingness to protest include personal environmental 
ideology variables, satisfaction with local air pollution governance, and self-reported 
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exposure to air-pollution-related health problems. In addition, life satisfaction has an 
indirect effect on willingness to protest via the mediating variable of satisfaction with 
local air pollution governance.  
As the world attempts to deal with the ever-increasing concern of hazardous air 
pollution, these findings have important implications for understanding the complex 
relationships between objective and perceived pollution, SWB, perceived governance, 
and citizen actions. In particular, this chapter offers one of the first comprehensive views 
of air pollution perceptions in China, and can thus serve as a template for much-needed 
future research in other non-democratic, developing countries. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
92 
CHAPTER 4 
 
DIFFERENT METHOD, SAME RESULT: AIR QUALITY DATA 
MANIPULATION IN CHINESE CITIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 This chapter compares hourly PM2.5 measurements from government-controlled 
and U.S. embassy-controlled monitoring stations in five mainland Chinese cities between 
January 2015 and June 2017. I use a novel form of outlier analysis called Impulse-
Indicator-Saturation (IIS) to show that, in four out of the five tested cities, government-
controlled monitoring stations systematically report lower-than-expected pollution 
concentrations when air quality is poor. These results refute the findings of other recent 
studies, which argue that Chinese air quality data manipulation ended after a series of 
policy reforms beginning in 2013. My findings provide evidence that local government 
manipulation did not end, but rather shifted in ways that make it harder to detect via more 
traditional discontinuity-based analyses. These results suggest that Chinese air quality 
numbers, while still useful, should not be taken entirely at face value.  
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4.1 Introduction 
For several decades, air quality in China has consistently ranked among the 
world’s worst. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact costs, even conservative 
estimates suggest that Chinese air pollution is responsible for tens of millions of deaths 
and trillions of dollars of lost GDP during the reform era.29 While initially dismissed as a 
regrettable but unavoidable side-effect of economic development, Chinese citizens, 
domestic media, and even the central government increasingly regard poor air quality as a 
policy issue of utmost importance. However, despite the obvious severity of the problem 
and intense public interest, widespread reporting of real-time air quality data in China 
began only recently. Even now, almost all Chinese air quality monitoring stations are 
owned and operated by local government officials, which raises questions about the 
reliability and integrity of the reported data. Because substandard environmental 
performance can cause local party leaders to be punished and denied promotion, they 
have a strong incentive to manipulate the data reported to public and to the central 
government in a way that understates pollution. Thus, if outsiders seek to understand the 
true nature of China’s environmental situation (and if central leaders hope to take further 
strides in improving local air quality), ensuring the accuracy of reported data is a 
necessary first step.   
                                                        
29 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Rohde and Muller (2015) estimate that, in 2014 alone, air pollution was 
responsible for 1.6 million premature deaths in China. In terms of economic damages, the World Bank 
(2007) estimates that Chinese air pollution causes an annual GDP reduction of 3.5-8%, which in 2017 alone 
would have cost China between 430 and 980 billion USD.  
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 Between 2001 and 2012, air quality data in China was limited to daily reports 
from fewer than 100 municipalities, with local performance evaluated by the annual 
proportion of “blue sky days” (lantian蓝天).30 This system incentivized municipal 
Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) to falsify reports to the central Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) when local air quality was close to the blue sky 
threshold. After 2012, the central government adopted an entirely new system, which 
expanded the number of air quality monitors and required all urban areas31 to transmit 
hourly air quality data directly to the central environmental ministry. The reforms also 
de-emphasized the blue sky day assessment metric. Instead cities were judged by their 
effectiveness in reducing their annual average concentrations of specific sub-pollutants. 
These changes were intended to enhance data reliability and discourage fraudulent 
reporting, and early evidence appeared promising. Two recent peer-reviewed studies32 
showed a cessation of statistical anomalies in Chinese air quality data after 2012, 
suggesting that central government reforms have been successful.  
Despite this apparent decline in fraud, Chapter 4 provides evidence that Chinese 
localities have in fact continued to manipulate air quality data; albeit in more subtle, 
difficult-to-detect ways. Although the central government’s post-2012 reforms make it 
more difficult for local EPBs to cook the books, they did not reduce the incentives for 
local leaders to cheat. Instead, the central government actually put greater pressure on 
                                                        
30 Blue sky days are days where the average API (or AQI) is less than 100. 
31 Cities at the prefecture-level (地级 diji) or above.  
32 The two studies, Chen et al. (2012) and Ghanem and Zhang (2014), are discussed in detail in Section 4.3. 
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local officials to engage in fraud by increasing the penalties for poor environmental 
performance without also increasing the flow of financial resources necessary to combat 
pollution.  
To detect these more elusive forms of data manipulation, I analyze the relation 
between air quality measurements reported by the government to those reported by U.S. 
embassies and consulates (which have little incentive to misreport) using a novel form of 
outlier analysis called Impulse-Indicator-Saturation (IIS). This procedure identifies 
periods when the two station measures of air pollution diverge sharply. If these sudden 
divergences (or impulses) occur more frequently than predicted by the significance level 
of the test, then this would suggest evidence of systematic, non-random bias. 
Furthermore, if the impulse coefficients are predominantly negative, this means that 
when the two datasets temporarily diverge, it is typically the government-controlled sites 
which report lower-than-expected air pollution concentrations relative to those measured 
at U.S. embassies and consulates. After comparing government and embassy monitoring 
sites, I find that impulse outliers are more frequent than expected and more negative than 
expected in four out of the five cities analyzed. Moreover, these negative impulses are 
significantly more likely to occur during times of heavy pollution, which indicates that 
the correlation between measurements at government and embassy stations declines when 
air quality is poor.  
Together, these results strongly suggest that local government officials manipulate 
air quality data in China’s largest and most important cities. To test the degree to which 
these results are robust, I repeat the analyses using measurements for five Taiwanese 
  
96 
cities over the same period and find no signs of manipulation. I also examine data from 
two additional mainland cities where air pollution data fraud was publically exposed and 
punished by the central government, showing that the methods used in this chapter are 
sensitive enough to detect manipulation where it is already known to exist.     
In the concluding section, I explore some of the reasons why data manipulation 
continues to be a problem in China and also propose some policy options to address the 
issue. Finally, I examine China’s most recent (post-2016) reforms to its air quality 
assessment laws, and explain why the central government may finally be on the right 
track towards limiting local data fraud.  
 
4.2 Bureaucratic Fragmentation and Incentives to Manipulate 
 In the absence of democratic elections, all local state and party leaders in China 
are appointed by government officials at higher levels of the political system. However, 
with nearly 3,000 county-level divisions and more than 40,000 township-level divisions, 
it is impossible for central leaders to personally assess the merits of every individual local 
official. Therefore, the placement and promotion of state and party officials is determined 
by the cadre evaluation system (CES), which ranks the performance of local leaders using 
a weighted formula of various “hard” and “soft” performance metrics.33 Historically, the 
CES has emphasized three performance metrics above all others: economic growth, 
                                                        
33 Hard targets are targets which are easily quantifiable, such as GDP growth, and are typically given higher 
priority. Soft targets are more difficult to quantify (such as reducing the burden on peasants and ensuring a 
healthy environment), and are thus often ignored by local cadres (O’Brien and Li 1999).  
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family planning, and maintaining social order.34  More recently, however, the central 
government has also emphasized environmental performance (and air pollution control in 
particular) as an important “hard” target (Zhang and Wu 2018). Every year, the central 
environmental ministry sets local air pollution targets in accordance with the goals of the 
current five-year plan, and these targets are passed down to provincial party secretaries, 
who in turn distribute them to city governments within the province.35 Each local 
government then signs a “target responsibility document” with the director of the local 
EPB, who is charged with executing a specific plan for pollution abatement (Turiel et al. 
2017). 
 In theory, this system holds both EPB directors and local party secretaries 
responsible for environmental performance and ensures that provinces and cities work to 
improve air quality. However, in practice, China’s efforts to control air pollution have 
been severely hampered by poor local enforcement and bureaucratic infighting. In his 
seminal work on Chinese governance, Lieberthal (1988) explains the concept of 
“fragmented authoritarianism”, whereby multiple bureaucratic groups at each level of 
government compete and bargain with one another to achieve their preferred policy 
                                                        
34 Family planning and maintaining social order are often referred to as hard targets with “veto power”. In 
other words, violations of these targets virtually ensures that a local cadre will not be promoted, regardless 
of his or her other performance attributes (Edin 2003). 
35 Throughout this chapter, I refer to “cities” as the administrative unit of interest. However, in China, the 
term “city” (chengshi 城市) can be used to refer to multiple levels of governance. For example, there are 
county-level cities (xianjishi县级市), prefecture-level cities (dijishi地级市), sub-provincial-level cities 
(fushengjishi副省级市), and direct-administered municipalities (zhixiashi直辖市); all of which have 
different administrative “ranks” and degrees of autonomy. In this chapter, when I refer to Chinese cities, I 
mean large urban areas of prefectural-rank or above, as these are the areas required to submit hourly air 
pollution data to the central environmental ministry. For further information on the different levels of 
Chinese governance, see Saich (2015b).   
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outcomes. In this struggle to carve out political influence, authority is channeled through 
two separate pathways: the vertical “tiao” (条) pathway (from upper-level bureaucratic 
units to units one-level below), and the horizontal “kuai” (块) pathway (from local 
governments to local bureaucratic units). This tiao-kuai divide creates a situation 
whereby environmental agencies must serve two masters, often with different policy 
goals (Sinkule and Ortolano 1995). For example, the directors of city-level EPBs must 
answer directly to both the provincial EPB (which typically prioritizes improving 
environmental quality) and the city government (which typically prioritizes economic 
growth). However, because local governments appoint EPB officials and fund their 
operations, horizontal ties almost always take precedence over vertical ones (Jahiel 1998; 
Ma and Ortolano 2000; Qi and Zhang 2014).  
With local environmental bureaucrats ultimately beholden to the power of the 
city’s communist party secretary, local policies are typically growth-oriented, since 
municipal governments rely heavily on businesses—many of which are highly-
polluting—for tax revenue and employment (Turiel et al. 2017). This leaves local EPBs 
in a weak bargaining position with respect to creating and enforcing environmental 
protection measures, especially because EPB officials frequently rank below the officials 
they are tasked with monitoring in the CCP hierarchy (Aden and Sinton 2006). This 
power imbalance is compounded by a lack of funding, manpower, and expertise within 
local EPBs. In fact, one recent study shows that the vast majority of provincial EPB 
directors are appointed from other bureaucratic departments and have no previous 
experience in environmental management (Kostka 2013). Despite this lack of power and 
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resources, EPB heads are still expected to meet the pollution targets handed down by the 
central environmental ministry, lest they be demoted or transferred to a less desirable 
post.36 Faced with air quality standards that are strict in their abatement targets but vague 
in how to actually achieve them (Beyer 2006), local EPBs have the unenviable task of 
reducing air pollution without stepping on the toes of local party leaders, all with little 
institutional support from above.  
 In response to these conflicting demands and pressures, local EPBs use various 
short-term coping strategies to achieve their bureaucratic goals. Drawing on field 
research from a municipal EPB in northern China, Zhou et al. (2013) argue that local 
environmental governance is defined by the process of “muddling through.” Essentially, 
environmental bureaucrats tend be reactive rather than proactive, improvising ad-hoc 
solutions to specific problems. With bottom-line objectives prioritized above all else, 
local EPB directors quickly learn to report the “correct” numbers to their higher-ups, 
even if that means colluding with other local officials or manipulating data. This 
tendency of Chinese officials to manipulate data in the face of hard performance targets 
and political pressures has been widely noted in existing literature, with official numbers 
on fish catch (Watson and Pauly 2001), agricultural land conversion (Seto et al. 2000), 
coal use (Nielsen and Ho 2013), GDP growth (Wallace 2016), and carbon emissions 
(Guan et al. 2012) all being called into question. In fact, a 2008 survey of village officials 
                                                        
36 Despite this increased emphasis on environmental performance targets, Wu et al. (2013) find that local 
environmental investment is actually negatively correlated with cadre promotion. Meanwhile, Shih et al. 
(2012) find that performance targets in general have very little actual effect on cadre promotion, and that 
political factors and personal connections are far more important.  
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by Lily Tsai reported that more than 80% of village cadres admitted to falsifying data 
reported to their superiors (Minzer 2009). Thus, it is unsurprising that official air quality 
statistics reported by the Chinese government are treated with a high degree of 
skepticism, both by outside observers and the general public itself.    
 
4.3 Literature Review: Chinese Air Quality Laws and Tests for Manipulation 
In China, concerted attempts to control local-scale air pollution began in 1996 
with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The NAAQS mandated the 
collection and publication of daily atmospheric concentration data for three pollutants: 
Sulphur dioxide (SO2), Nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and suspended particulates with a 
diameter of 10 microns or less (PM10). These three numbers were then combined to form 
a composite measure of general air quality, the air pollution index (API), which ranged 
from 0 to 500. By the early 2000s, 86 municipalities across China were reporting daily 
API values to the central environmental ministry (then called the State Environmental 
Protection Administration, or SEPA), which in turn released the data to the public online 
(You 2014).  
For any given day, a city’s API was assigned a specific threat level or grade, with 
higher numbers considered more dangerous. The most important dividing line was an 
API of 100, which separated “good” (liang hao良好) air quality from “lightly polluted” 
(qingdu wuran輕度汚染) air quality, with any API less than 100 earning the status of a 
“blue sky day”. At the end of each year, SEPA used this blue sky metric to rank cities 
from best to worst (Andrews 2008). Beginning in 2003, cities with at least 85% blue sky 
days were awarded a full 20 points for air quality while cities with fewer than 30% blue 
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sky days were awarded zero points (Chen et al. 2012). In turn, air quality was one 
component (worth 20% of the total) of a much broader assessment of local environmental 
performance called the Quantified Assessment of Urban Environmental Improvement 
(Ghanem and Zhang 2014). Ultimately, SEPA used these rankings to award the status of 
“National Model City for Environmental Protection” (guojia huanjing baohu mofan 
chengshi  国家环境保护模范城市) to top-performing municipalities. This award was 
intended to spur competition and improve local environmental quality because city 
leaders could receive favorable publicity and possibly even increase their odds of 
promotion by earning such a designation (Chen et al. 2012). However such an arbitrary 
dividing line between “good” and “bad” air quality created a strong incentive for local 
leaders to manipulate data when API was close to the blue sky day threshold. 
In the late 2000s, Andrews (2008) noted that official air quality statistics in 
Beijing exhibited a suspicious distribution, with a much higher-than-expected frequency 
of API reports just below 100, and a much lower-than-expected frequency of API reports 
just above 100. He hypothesized that local officials in Beijing were falsifying air quality 
data when daily API was close to the blue sky threshold, since a shift of just a few points 
in either direction could mean the difference between a successful “clean” day and an 
unsuccessful “polluted” day. Several years later, Chen et al. (2012) were the first to 
formally test this assumption, using daily API data from 37 Chinese cities between 2000 
and 2009. They found a statistically significant discontinuity at the API threshold of 100, 
also noting that the magnitude of the discontinuity increased after 2003 (the same year 
that SEPA increased the proportion of blue sky days necessary for a city to achieve a 
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perfect air quality score). Moreover, they also found that API threshold manipulation was 
far more likely towards the end of the calendar year if a given city was close to achieving 
its annual goal of 85% blue sky days. Expanding upon the work of Chen et al., Ghanem 
and Zhang (2014) analyzed air quality data from 86 Chinese cities between 2001 and 
2010, obtaining confidential information on the daily concentrations of each individual 
sub-pollutant (rather than just the baseline API). Using statistical methods similar to 
Chen et al., Ghanem and Zhang found sharp discontinuities at the blue sky threshold for 
roughly half of the cities in their dataset. These discontinuities were more pronounced on 
days with low wind speed and high visibility, suggesting that city officials were more 
likely to manipulate data on days when pollution was harder to visibly detect. 
Discontinuities also were greater in cities with higher population density, GDP per capita, 
and industrial value added per capita.  
By the early 2010s, it was clear that China’s air pollution control efforts were not 
working, and the central government began a series of reforms designed to improve data 
reliability while also holding local leaders accountable for poor air quality. SEPA was 
elevated to a cabinet-level position and renamed the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP), while the 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) set binding targets for nine 
environmental performance metrics, including SO2, NO2, and energy intensity (Kostka 
2014). In 2012, the MEP revised the NAAQS, expanded the total number of monitoring 
stations, and replaced the API with a more sophisticated and comprehensive Air Quality 
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Index (AQI).37,38 More importantly, all cities were required to report pollution 
concentrations hourly instead of daily, with data being relayed directly from local 
monitoring stations to the MEP without any handling by city or provincial EPBs. One of 
the major goals of these reforms was to reduce the threat of data manipulation, since 
localities would be forced to report primary air quality data in real-time instead of simply 
submitting an averaged number to the MEP at the end of each day (Zhang et al. 2017). 
In September 2013, the State Council supplemented the new NAAQS by issuing 
the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan (APPCAP) (daqi wuran fangzhi 
xingdong jihua大气污染防治行动计划) (Hsu et al. 2017). The APPCAP formally ended 
the blue sky day metric and established an entirely new system for evaluating local air 
pollution abatement efforts. It stipulated that, by 2017, all cities were expected to reduce 
their average annual PM10 concentrations by at least 10% compared with 2012 levels 
(MEP 2013). In addition, cities in three special attainment zones (the Pearl River Delta, 
the Yangtze River Delta, and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region) were required to reduce 
their average annual PM2.5 concentrations by 15%, 20%, and 25% respectively. Beijing in 
particular was singled out and tasked with reducing its annual PM2.5 concentrations to 
less than 60 ug/m3 by 2017 (Zhang and Wu 2018).39 To enforce these benchmarks, the 
                                                        
37 The Air Quality Index also added sub-pollutant scores for Ozone (O3), Carbon monoxide (CO) and 
particulate matter with a diameter less than 2.5 microns (PM2.5). PM2.5 is generally considered the most 
dangerous of the six sub-pollutants in the AQI metric, since the small size of the particulates allows them to 
be respired and diffused into the bloodstream (Apte et al. 2015).   
38 AQI is a non-linear metric composed of six individual sub-pollutant scores. The overall AQI at any given 
time is defined by the highest of these six individual scores. For more on the AQI and how it is calculated, 
see Appendix 3 (Section A3.1).  
39 ug/m3 is a pollution concentration metric, referring to micrograms of pollutant per cubic meter of air.  
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MEP pledged to conduct annual performance reviews and to “propose rectification 
opinions” to local officials who failed to show sufficient progress. For cities that did not 
achieve their targets, the law also stipulated that: 
 
“In the event of failure to effectively deal with heavy polluted weather due to 
ineffective work, lack of performance, etc., as well as intervention, falsification of 
monitoring data and failure to complete annual target tasks, the supervisory 
authority shall investigate the responsibility of the relevant units and personnel 
according to law.” (MEP 2013) 
 
Finally, the APPCAP also mandated that the MEP publish a list of the top ten most and 
least polluted cities each month in order to publically “name and shame” local leaders 
and apply pressure on them to improve their performance (MEP 2013). 
 By requiring hourly, real-time air pollution reporting and by eliminating the blue 
sky day threshold, the central government hoped to remove both the opportunity and 
incentive for local leaders to manipulate air quality data; and, after 2013, early results 
appeared promising. In 2016, Thomas Stoerk analyzed particulate matter concentrations 
in Beijing between 2008 and 2013, collecting data from both government-controlled 
monitoring stations as well as from the U.S. embassy in downtown Beijing. Stoerk 
employed Benford’s Law, a statistical procedure which is commonly used to detect data 
fraud, by checking the distribution of the leading digits for all hourly and daily air quality 
reports over the sample period.40 He found that the U.S. embassy data followed Benford’s 
                                                        
40 For more information on Benford’s Law, see Section 4.4 (Data and Methods). 
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Law (implying a random, unaltered distribution) for the entire sample period, but that the 
government-reported data violated Benford’s Law between 2008 and 2012, suggesting 
manipulation. However, in 2013, the government-reported data suddenly began to 
conform to Benford’s Law, a change which Stoerk attributed to the new policy reforms 
outlined above. Also in 2016, Liang et al. came to a similar conclusion, this time 
analyzing hourly PM2.5 data from five Chinese cities with U.S. embassies or consulates 
between January 2013 and December 2015. They found that, apart from Chengdu, 
government-controlled monitoring sites did not report consistently lower pollution 
concentrations than US-controlled ones. They also broke down hourly PM2.5 
concentrations into three ranges and used a series of T-tests to determine that both 
government and US-controlled sites spent the same average duration in each of these 
ranges. Thus, like Stoerk, Liang et al. concluded that there were no visible signs of 
official air quality data manipulation in major Chinese cities after 2012.41  
 Despite these two above findings, my research suggests that local air quality data 
manipulation in China did not end in 2013. While it is true that the manipulation around 
the blue sky day threshold observed by Chen et al. and Ghanem and Zhang ceased after 
the adoption of the new NAAQS and the APPCAP, I use a series of statistical tests to 
illustrate how local officials simply adjusted their manipulation tactics to adapt to new 
political realities. These results, combined with recent confirmed reports of air quality 
                                                        
41 One exception to these studies is Ravetti (2018), who uses an auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) 
process to detect discrepancies between embassy-reported and government-reported air quality data in 
Beijing. However, Ravetti only uses data extending through 2013.  
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data tampering in several Chinese cities, show that China still has a long way to go before 
it can safely claim to have eliminated the problem of local data fraud. 
 
4.4 Data and Methods  
4.4.1 Data Sources 
This chapter utilizes air quality data from four distinct data sources over several 
different time periods (Table 4.1):  
 
Table 4.1 Data Sources  
 
Data Source Date Range Freq. 
# of 
Cities Pollutants Recorded 
Mainland API (Old) 2001-2010 Daily 86 API (PM10, SO2, NO2) 
Mainland AQI (New) 2015-2018 Hourly 363 AQI (PM10, SO2, NO2, PM2.5, O3, CO) 
US Embassies and Consulates 2008-2017* Hourly 5 PM2.5 only 
Taiwan AQI 2001-2018 Hourly 74 AQI (PM10, SO2, NO2, PM2.5, O3, CO) 
* Hourly archived U.S. Embassy and Consulate data ends June 30, 2017 
 
 
1.) Mainland API (Old): Before 2013, local air quality data in mainland China is 
limited to daily reports from 86 cities. These daily API reports, which were 
tabulated and released by SEPA (and later MEP), are no longer publicly available. 
However, Ghanem and Zhang (personal request) agreed to share the 2001-2010 
API data used in their 2016 paper outlined above.  
2.) Mainland AQI (New): Beginning in 2013, China switched to hourly AQI 
reporting. Due to the addition of more than 200 new cities and the lag time 
required to modernize old monitoring sites, the new system was not fully 
operational until January 2015. Since then, the MEP has published detailed hourly 
air pollution data from 363 Chinese municipalities on their official website, but 
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these data are only publicly available for 48 hours before being removed and 
archived. A few different sources have managed to scrape and maintain this data 
for public use, but only Beijing Sinaapp <https://beijingair.sinaapp.com/> 
preserves the data for each of the six AQI sub-pollutants at the hourly time scale. 
3.) US Embassies and Consulates: In April 2008, the U.S. embassy in Beijing began 
collecting and publishing hourly PM2.5 concentrations, becoming the first 
continuously-operating source of air quality data in mainland China not controlled 
by the Chinese government. In subsequent years, measurements at the Beijing 
embassy were supplemented by hourly PM2.5 measurements at U.S. consulates in 
Shanghai (2011), Guangzhou (2011), Chengdu (2012), and Shenyang (2013). 
Together, these five U.S. embassies and consulates post real-time air quality data 
at <https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/>, although archived data only extends 
through June 30, 2017.        
4.) Taiwan AQI: Taiwan’s government maintains its own system of air quality 
monitors, comprising data from 74 cities. Unlike mainland China, Taiwan was an 
early adopter of the six-pollutant Air Quality Index, and it has reported daily AQI 
data since 2001. Current and archived data is available at 
<https://taqm.epa.gov.tw/taqm/en/>. 
4.4.2 Statistical Methods 
  
Following the example of both Chen et al. (2014) and Ghanem and Zhang (2016), 
this chapter checks these datasets for manipulation around specific pollution thresholds 
using a discontinuity test developed by McCarry (2008). The McCarry discontinuity test 
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analyzes all data points to the left and right of a potential break point, smoothing the 
histogram by running local linear regressions on the two sides separately. The log 
difference between the two predicted densities at the potential break point is called the 
discontinuity estimate. In the absence of a break, the discontinuity estimate should be 
close to zero, implying a smooth distribution. However, a significantly positive or 
negative discontinuity estimate implies that the predicted right-side density is much 
higher or lower than the predicted left-side density. For example, when testing an 
API/AQI threshold of 100, a significantly negative discontinuity estimate would mean 
that there are fewer-than-expected data points just above 100 and more-than-expected 
data points just below 100.42 
 While the McCarry discontinuity test is good at detecting data manipulation 
around a given threshold, it is not suitable for detecting other potential types of 
manipulation. For example, if all localities reduce their recorded API/AQI values by a 
given percentage before reporting them to the central ministry, the distribution would be 
shifted to the left but it would maintain its smooth shape. Likewise, if local officials 
physically tamper with air quality sensors more frequently on high-pollution days than on 
low-pollution days, the shape of the API/AQI distribution would change, but there would 
be no sharp, easily-identifiable breaks.  
As mentioned previously, Stoerk (2012) uses Benford’s Law to attempt to get 
around this problem. Benford’s Law stipulates that in many naturally occurring sets of 
                                                        
42 In the McCarry test, each discontinuity estimate carries an associated T-statistic and p-value. However, 
these values only show the likelihood of a discontinuity being present, not its relative magnitude.  
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numbers, the leading significant digit is more likely to be small.43 Because humans tend 
to be bad at picking truly random numbers, manipulated data would be unlikely to 
conform to Benford’s Law. However, existing studies show that Benford’s Law is only 
viable when the analyzed dataset spans multiple orders of magnitude (Fewster 2009). 
Thus, because 80% of all reported API/AQI values in mainland China fall between 30 
and 130, Benford’s Law would not be a dependable technique for validating the 
reliability of Chinese air pollution data.     
 Similar to Stoerk (2012) and Liang et el (2016), I compare hourly pollution data 
from government-controlled monitoring sites to pollution data from U.S. embassies and 
consulates operating in mainland China. However, instead of using Benford’s Law or 
comparing average pollutant concentrations, I check for individual hourly outliers where 
the long-run relationship between the two data sources temporary breaks down. To do 
this, I employ a procedure called Impulse-Indicator-Saturation (IIS). The IIS method 
analyzes the relationship between two or more time series and tests for an unknown 
number of breaks, occurring at unknown times, with unknown duration and magnitude.44 
The IIS procedure tests for breaks by running a simple OLS regression with the addition 
of “pulse dummies” for every time observation (T) in the dataset, with significant 
                                                        
43 For example, in sets that obey Benford’s Law, numbers with a leading digit of 1 are roughly six times 
more likely than numbers with a leading digit of 9 (Fewster 2009). 
44 Previous methodologies to detect outliers, such as ARIMA (SARIMA) models, searched for outliers in 
the first stage by following a specific-to-general approach, in which outliers are added one after another, 
followed by backward deletion. By contrast, the IIS method follows a general-to-specific approach 
(Marczak and Proietti 2014). 
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dummies at individual points indicating potential outliers (Marczak and Proietti 2016).45 
For the hourly PM2.5 data, the IIS regression equation is as follows: 
 
Equation 4.1: EMBt = α + β1GOVTt + β2IISt + et 
 
where EMBt is the embassy-reported PM2.5 concentration for each hour in the dataset. 
The GOVTt variable represents each hourly PM2.5 concentration from government-
controlled monitoring sites, while IISt is an impulse indicator variable specifying whether 
or not there is a significant outlier at any given point. Finally, α is a time-invariant 
constant while et is a random, heteroskedastic error term.  In the absence of manipulation, 
𝛽1 should equal 1 and 𝛼 should be relatively constant over the sample period, with short-
term variations due to changes in meteorological conditions, such as wind direction and 
the thickness of the planetary boundary layer.   
 In the above equation, the expected retention rate of impulse indicators for a 
model without outliers is equal to the significance level of each individual outlier test 
multiplied by the total number of points tested (Kaufmann and Pretis 2016). For example, 
at a significance level of 0.01, we would expect to find one significant impulse for every 
100 tested points purely by random chance.46 Moreover, we would also expect a roughly 
                                                        
45 The IIS model poses a problem of having more regressors (T+k) than observations (T), which can be 
solved by dividing all dummies into blocks and then selecting over blocks. In the simplest two-step block 
approach, half of the indicator dummies are added first and significant indicators are selected (with their 
times recorded) and then dropped so that the other half can be examined in the same way. Finally, the 
significant indicators from the two sets are combined and re-selected (Marczak and Proietti 2014). 
46 Hendry et al. (2008) show that choosing a different number of splits (blocks), or choosing unequal splits, 
do not affect the retention rate of impulses. Also, Johansen and Nielsen (2009) generalize the applicability 
of the IIS model to both stationary and non-stationary autoregressive processes. 
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equal number of positive and negative significant impulses. Since EMBt is the dependent 
variable, a negative impulse would indicate an hourly outlier when the government-
reported data was much higher than expected (relative to the long-run equilibrium), while 
a positive impulse would indicate an hourly outlier when the government-reported data 
was much lower than expected. The central premise of this chapter is that, if there are 
significantly more impulses than expected, and if those impulses are predominantly 
positive rather than negative, then the breaks that occur between the two datasets are not 
random and are biased in a particular direction. More specifically, assuming that the U.S. 
embassy data is accurate and non-manipulated, an abundance of positive impulses would 
likely indicate the artificial reduction of measurements reported by government-
controlled monitoring sites. Furthermore, if positive impulses are more common when 
EMBt is large, this would mean that manipulation is more likely on highly-polluted days 
when local officials have a greater incentive to report lower-than-actual pollution values.  
 
4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Summary Statistics 
 Despite the seriousness of the air pollution problem in China, several studies have 
shown that, for a majority of Chinese cities, average concentrations of most major air 
pollutants have actually fallen over the past decade (Liang et al. 2016; MEE 2018a; 
Nielsen and Ho 2013; Silver et al. 2018; Wang et al. 2014). This study confirms these 
declines. Table 4.2 shows that annual AQI values, when averaged across all 363 sample 
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cities, fell by 18.4% between 2014 and 2018.47 Likewise, average concentrations of five 
out of the six measured sub-pollutants also declined over this period.48  
 
Table 4.2 Average Annual AQI and Sub-Pollutant Concentrations for all Cities (2014-
2018)  
 
Year AQI PM2.5 PM10 SO2 CO NO2 O3 
2014 91.6 59.7 102.6 34.3 1.2 34.2 80.7 
2015 82.4 51.6 86.5 26.1 1.1 30.9 84.8 
2016 79.8 47.3 81.6 22.8 1.0 31.3 88.0 
2017 80.0 43.7 75.1 18.5 1.0 32.2 93.8 
2018 74.8 39.1 69.5 14.0 0.9 29.7 95.2 
% Change (2014-2018) -18.4% -34.5% -32.2% -59.1% -24.3% -13.1% 18.0% 
 
 
Going back even further, it is clear that average pollution concentrations have 
been declining for quite some time. Using data from the 47 cities that have reported API 
values since 2001, Figure 4.1 shows that reported air quality improved significantly 
between 2001 and 2010. After a slight increase during the early 2010s, annual API 
averages resumed their decline after 2014, with 2018 representing the best average air 
quality in the entire dataset. Moreover, APIs declined even faster in the five cities with 
U.S. embassies and consulates, suggesting that the largest, most important Chinese cities 
have reported the most rapid improvements in overall air quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
47 While this data comes from government-controlled sources, and thus may not be entirely accurate, it is 
unlikely that manipulation alone is responsible for the observed downward trend, as even embassy-
controlled sites report declining air pollution concentrations over the past several years (see Figure 4.2).  
48 Of the six sub-pollutants, only Ozone (O3) shows increasing average annual concentrations since 2014.  
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Figure 4.1 Average Annual API Values in Mainland China (2001-2018) 
 
 
 
Note: API values are unavailable from 2011-2013 
  
 
Even after restricting the dataset to include only pollutant concentrations reported 
by U.S. embassies and consulates, it is clear that average air quality has improved since 
2013. Figure 4.2 compares annual PM2.5 concentration data from government-controlled 
and embassy-controlled monitoring sites in five mainland cities, with both datasets 
showing a clear and consistent decline over the sample period. Thus, even if Chinese 
cities are manipulating air quality data, it does not discount the fact that the five 
megacities of Beijing, Shenyang, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu all appear to have 
made genuine progress in reducing their average concentrations of dangerous particulate 
matter over the past several years.   
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Figure 4.2 Average Annual PM2.5 Concentrations in Embassy Cities (2013-2018) 
 
 
 
Note: Government-reported PM2.5 data is unavailable for 2013. Also, embassy-reported 
data is only available through June 30, 2017 
 
 
 
4.5.2 Confirming Manipulation in the 2001-2010 API Data 
  
Before analyzing the more recent 2014-2018 AQI data, I confirm the results of 
Chen et al. and Ghanem and Zhang by testing for manipulation in the 2001-2010 API 
data. Using pooled daily data from all 86 cities, I run a McCarry discontinuity test around 
the API threshold of 100 (Figure 4.3). As expected there is a clear break in the 
distribution, with a significantly negative discontinuity estimate. These results also hold 
when testing backwards-calculated values for the sub-pollutant PM10.
49  
                                                        
49 In the 2001-2010 dataset, individual sub-pollutant concentrations are not available. However, on days 
with an API of 50 or above, the dataset identifies the sub-pollutant with the highest individual API (IAPI). 
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Figure 4.3 McCarry Discontinuity Tests for Daily API and PM10 Values (2001-2010) 
 
 
 
Note: For API (left), the blue sky day threshold is 100. However, for PM10 (right) it is 
150, since a PM10 concentration of 150 ug/m
3 translates to an air pollution index of 100. 
 
 
By testing each locality individually, I find that roughly one third of the 86 cities 
in the dataset exhibit negative API discontinuities significant at a 99% confidence level. 
By contrast, none of the cities exhibit positive discontinuities at the suspected API break 
point of 100. Other potential API breakpoints (50, 150, and 200) do not reveal significant 
discontinuities of any kind, which suggests that data manipulation was limited to days 
when air quality data was near the threshold for a blue sky day.  
                                                        
score. Therefore, it is possible to backwards-calculate the concentration of a given sub-pollutant, but only 
for days where that sub-pollutant has the highest IAPI score. Of the three AQI sub-components, PM10 is by 
far the most common “main” pollutant, achieving the highest IAPI score on more than 70% of days in the 
dataset.   
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I also run a simple logistic regression model to test which types of cities were 
most likely to report significant negative discontinuities around the API threshold. Cities 
in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and Yangtze River Delta regions were more likely to engage 
in threshold manipulation, as were cities with a higher proportion of days with API 
values between 90 and 110 (Table 3). However, a city’s population size did not affect its 
likelihood of manipulating air quality data.    
 
 
Table 4.3 Likelihood of Engaging in Threshold Manipulation by City Type   
 
Logistic Regression   # of obs = 86 
   Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
Log Likelihood = -38.948   Psuedo R2 = 0.2823 
     
Variable Odds Ratio Std. Error Z-Score P-Value 
_constant 0.022 0.019 -4.46 < 0.001** 
Population Size 1.02 0.056 0.37 0.712 
BTH / YRD Region 33.5 48.01 2.45 0.014* 
Frequency 90 < API < 110 0.184 0.926 3.77 < 0.001** 
 
Note: For the above logistic regression, cities with a significant negative API threshold 
discontinuity at a confidence level of 99% or above are coded as one, while all other 
cities are coded as zero.    
 
 
 
4.5.3 The End of Blue Sky Threshold Manipulation after 2012 
  
Since adoption of the new hourly AQI monitoring system in 2013, there is no 
evidence of continued threshold manipulation in mainland China (Figure 4.4). While the 
distribution of old 2001-2010 data is clearly unnatural, with a sharp discontinuity around 
the API threshold value of 100, the new 2014-2018 AQI data exhibits a smooth 
distribution with no signs of any significant threshold discontinuities. 
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Figure 4.4 Comparing the Distributions of Old vs. New Air Quality Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The left histogram displays the distribution of all daily API values (2001-2010), 
while the right histogram displays the distribution of all hourly AQI values (2014-2018).  
 
 
 
The visual evidence of the above histograms is confirmed by McCarry 
discontinuity tests on reported values for both API/AQI and PM10/PM2.5 (Table 4.4). No 
discontinuities are present in the post-2012 AQI data, in either hourly or daily air quality 
reports.50 Similarly, there are no signs of significant discontinuities in either the Taiwan 
dataset or the U.S. embassy dataset, which is consistent with the hypothesis that threshold 
manipulation is confined to the old, pre-2013 mainland data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
50 After 2013, air quality in China was reported hourly. However, in order to maintain a sense of continuity 
with the old API data, I also calculated daily average values for AQI and each of the six individual sub-
pollutants.  
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Table 4.4 McCarry Discontinuity Tests for all Air Quality Datasets     
  
  API PM10 AQI PM2.5 
Dataset 
Time 
Scale 
T-
Score 
P-Val 
T-
Score 
P-Val 
T-
Score 
P-Val 
T-
Score 
P-Val 
Old Mainland 
Data (2001-2010) 
Daily -15.77 0.000** -4.04 0.000** X X X X 
New Mainland 
Data (2015-2018) 
Hourly X X -0.23 0.71 -1.68 0.09 -0.82 0.41 
New Mainland 
Data (2015-2018) 
Daily X X -0.74 0.46 -1.11 0.27 -1.61 0.11 
Embassy Data 
(2008-2017) 
Hourly X X X X X X 0.45 0.65 
Embassy Data 
(2008-2017) 
Daily X X X X X X -0.72 0.45 
Taiwan Data 
(2001-2018) 
Daily -0.163 0.87 -0.15 0.88 1.52 0.14 1.26 0.21 
 
 
 
4.5.4 Detecting More Subtle Forms of Manipulation using Impulse-Indicator-Saturation 
(IIS) Analysis 
   
As mentioned above, the IIS model tests for significant outliers where the long-
run relationship between two time series temporarily breaks down. With a significance 
level of 0.01, there should be approximately one impulse outlier for every 100 
observations simply due to random chance. Therefore, with 101,245 hourly observations 
across all five sample cities, one would expect roughly 1,012 significant impulse outliers 
to be detected by the IIS model. If a significantly larger-than-expected number of outliers 
are detected, this would be suggestive of non-random processes biasing one of the two 
time series. Table 4.5 shows the results of a series of Chi-Squared (𝜒2) tests to determine 
whether or not the observed IIS impulses are more frequent than expected.  
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Table 4.5 Testing the Hypothesis that Observed Impulses > Expected Impulses 
City Hourly Obs Impulses (Exp) Impulses (Obs) P-Val (Obs != Exp) 
Pooled (All Cities) 101,245 1,012 1,390 < 0.001** 
Beijing 20,843 208 310 0.002** 
Shenyang 20,139 201 293 0.005** 
Shanghai 19,557 196 189 0.513 
Guangzhou 20,292 203 273 0.008** 
Chengdu 20,414 204 325 0.001** 
 
 
Table 4.5 shows that the frequency of impulse outliers is significantly greater than 
expected in the pooled city model, as well as in four out of the five individual city 
models. Only Shanghai fails to reject the null hypothesis of observed impulses = 
expected impulses, while the other four cities all reject the null at a greater than 99% 
confidence level.    
When analyzing the IIS model, the frequency of impulse outliers is not the only 
outcome of interest, since impulses can be either positive or negative depending on the 
directionality of a given outlier. Normally, one would expect an equal frequency of 
positive and negative impulses, with an overabundance of one or the other suggesting a 
systemic bias in one of the two time series. Therefore, assuming that the U.S. embassy 
data is accurate and unbiased, a high frequency of positive impulses would suggest that 
when the long-term relationship between the two data sources breaks down, it is the 
government-controlled sites that report lower-than-expected PM2.5 concentrations relative 
to the embassy-controlled sites (rather than the other way around).   
Figure 4.5 displays a histogram of coefficient values for the significant impulses 
in the pooled dataset, with hourly data on the left and averaged daily data on the right.    
  
120 
0
.0
0
5
.0
1
.0
1
5
.0
2
D
e
n
s
it
y
-300 -200 -100 0 100
COEF
0
.0
0
5
.0
1
.0
1
5
D
e
n
s
it
y
-300 -200 -100 0 100 200
COEF
Figure 4.5 Distribution of Impulse Coefficients in the Pooled Embassy City Dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Both the left and right histograms display the distribution of regression coefficients 
for the impulse (IIS) variable. For each histogram, the regression coefficients from all 
observations in all five cities are pooled together. The only difference is that the left 
histogram uses the results of the IIS regression with all hourly PM2.5 observations, while 
the right histogram uses the results of the IIS regression with averaged daily PM2.5 
concentrations. Thus, the left histogram contains more total observations.   
 
 
Figure 4.5 indicates that the vast majority of impulse outliers are positive, which 
is inconsistent with the null hypothesis that impulses are associated with random events. 
This visual evidence of manipulation is confirmed by statistical t-tests, which reject       
(p < 0.001) the null hypothesis that the average impulse coefficient value equals zero 
(Table 4.6).   
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Table 4.6 Testing the Hypothesis that Positive Impulses > Negative Impulses 
 
Daily PM2.5 Data Mean St. Dev St. Error T >  0 P-Val 
Pooled 0.22 6.72 0.084 0.9958 0.0042** 
Pooled (Coef != 0) 17.01 56.7 6.22 0.9962 0.0038** 
 
     
Hourly PM2.5 Data Mean St. Dev St. Error T >  0 P-Val 
Pooled 0.155 8.33 0.026 1 < 0.001** 
Pooled (Coef != 0) 12.89 74.78 2.15 1 < 0.001** 
 
 
Note: Both of the above tables employ pooled data from all five embassy cities over the 
entire sample period. For each table, the mean impulse coefficient value is tested in two 
ways: first, by using the coefficient values for all time points, and second by using only 
the coefficient values for significant outlier points (i.e. points where the impulse 
coefficient does not equal zero). As can be seen, the results of the T-tests hold under both 
sets of circumstances.    
  
 
It is also possible to run T-tests for each of the five embassy cities individually 
(Table 4.7).  
 
Table 4.7 IIS Coefficient T-Tests for Individual Cities 
 
Hourly PM2.5 Data  Mean St. Dev St. Error T >  0 P-Val 
Beijing  0.28 13.35 0.093 0.9987 0.0013** 
Beijing (Coef != 0) 18.99 108.42 6.2 0.9988 0.0012** 
Shenyang  0.285 10.62 0.0778 0.9999 0.0001** 
Shenyang (Coef != 0) 21.23 89.37 5.65 0.9999 0.0001** 
Shanghai -0.0227 4.22 0.0295 0.2203 0.7797 
Shanghai (Coef != 0) -2.01 39.61 2.601 0.2208 0.7793 
Guangzhou 0.184 5.204 0.0369 1  < 0.0001** 
Guangzhou (Coef != 0) 16.41 46.41 3.11 1 < 0.0001** 
Chengdu 0.062 3.57 0.0248 0.9936 0.0064** 
Chengdu (Coef != 0) 6.403 35.92 2.54 0.9938 0.0062** 
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Results in Table 4.7 indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
average impulse coefficient equals zero in four out of the five embassy cities tested (once 
again, only Shanghai fails to show a clear bias towards positive impulses).51  
Furthermore, visual evidence in Figure 4.6 suggest that positive impulses are 
positively correlated with air pollution, as measured by PM2.5 concentrations at embassy-
controlled monitoring sites.  
 
 
Figure 4.6 Impulse Coefficients as a Function of Embassy-Reported PM2.5 
Concentrations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
51 The T-tests outlined in the results section use impulse coefficient values pooled across the entire time 
series for each individual city. However, due to the computational intensity of the IIS test, each city’s time 
series was broken down into 14 “chunks” of 1,500 hours each. Looking at these individual chunks (rather 
than the pooled data) does not significantly alter the conclusions of this paper, but the results are omitted 
for the sake of space and clarity. The full results for each hourly chunk are presented in Appendix 3 
(Section A3.2).  
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The above scatterplot shows a clear positive correlation between the two 
variables, with more positive impulses being associated with higher embassy-reported 
PM2.5 concentrations. This correlation is further explored in Table 4.8 below:   
 
Table 4.8 Comparing Embassy and Government-Reported Average PM2.5 Concentrations   
 
Type PM 2.5_EMB PM 2.5_GOVT Difference 
All Hourly Observations 60.1 55.8 -4.3 
No Impulses Present 58.8 54.7 -4.1 
Impulses Present (Positive or Negative) 169.5 145.1 -24.5 
Positive Impulses Only 202.8 119.4 -83.4 
Negative Impulses Only 114.1 187.8 73.7 
 
 
Across all hourly observations, government-controlled monitoring sites report 
slightly lower PM2.5 concentrations than embassy-controlled monitoring sites (roughly 4 
ug/m3 lower on average). This difference alone does not prove local government 
manipulation, since differences in geographical location and meteorological conditions 
between stations can cause measurements to vary systematically.52,53 However, during 
hours when significant impulses are present, the average discrepancy between embassy-
controlled and government-controlled monitoring sites grows to 24.5 ug/m3. Even more 
dramatically, when only positive impulses are considered, embassy-controlled sites report 
average PM2.5 concentrations of 202.8 ug/m
3, compared to just 119.4 ug/m3 in 
government-controlled sites (a difference of 83.4 ug/m3). This correlation between 
                                                        
52 Since U.S. embassies and consulates tend to be located in downtown areas, whereas government-
controlled monitoring sites tend to be spread more diffusely throughout an entire city, it is unsurprising that 
embassy-controlled sites would record slightly higher average pollution levels than government-controlled 
ones.  
53 These differences are captured by 𝛼 in equation 4.1. 
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positive impulses and high PM2.5 concentrations can be confirmed statistically using 
simple OLS regression techniques (Table 4.9). Together, these results suggest that PM2.5 
concentrations measured at government-controlled and embassy-controlled monitoring 
sites are similar most of the time, but diverge dramatically when measured PM2.5 
concentrations at embassy-controlled monitoring sites are high.  
 
Table 4.9 Likelihood of Positive Impulses by Embassy PM2.5 Concentration   
 
OLS (Hourly PM2.5) IIS Coef. St. Error P-Val Corr. R^2 
Pooled   0.1396 0.0148 < 0.001** 0.261 0.068 
Beijing   0.3678 0.0297 < 0.001** 0.578 0.334 
Shenyang   -0.204 0.0304 < 0.001** 0.392 0.153 
Shanghai    0.285 0.0357 < 0.001** 0.467 0.217 
Guangzhou   0.569 0.0345 < 0.001** 0.742 0.551 
Chengdu   0.273 0.0276 < 0.001** 0.576 0.332 
 
In the above table, the size of an impulse coefficient at any given hour is 
significantly and positively related to the embassy-reported PM2.5 concentration at that 
hour. This relationship holds true for the pooled model and for four out of the five 
individual city models, with only Shenyang reporting an opposite effect.54 For Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu, the relationship between the two variables is quite 
strong, with R-squared values ranging from 0.217 to 0.551 (which translates to Pearson 
correlation coefficients of 0.466 and 0.742 respectively).55 Thus, not only are impulse 
                                                        
54 In Shenyang, higher impulse coefficients are actually associated with lower embassy-reported PM2.5 
concentrations, a counterintuitive result that merits further investigation.  
55 In addition to the OLS model shown in Table 4.9, I also run two logit models: the first with positive 
impulses as the dependent variable and the second with negative impulses as the dependent variable (both 
logit models use embassy PM2.5 as the independent variable). The results of each logit model show that the 
odds of hourly impulses (both positive and negative) increase significantly when embassy PM2.5 
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outliers more frequent than expected and significantly greater than zero; those positive 
impulses are also more likely to occur when air quality is particularly bad. Together, 
these results strongly suggest that most of China’s largest megacities have continued to 
engage in air quality data manipulation, even after the country’s 2013 policy reforms.      
 
4.6 Robustness Checks 
 
 
4.6.1 Testing for False Positives 
 
 With any statistical test, it is important to guard against both type I errors (false 
positives) and type II errors (false negatives). Type I errors are viewed as more serious 
because they cause the researcher to falsely claim the significance of a specific effect (in 
this case data manipulation) when in fact none is present (Cohen and Cohen 1988). 
Ideally, a researcher could apply his or her statistical model to a dataset where the null is 
known to be true, making sure that the rate of false positives is no greater than the 
significance level of the test. However, such precise calibration is often not possible 
when using real-world datasets. In the case of air quality data, there are no monitoring 
sites that collect information in the same fashion as mainland China and are known to be 
100% accurate. 
To evaluate the degree to which the results of this chapter may be contaminated 
by type I error, I use the IIS methodology to analyze air pollution in Taiwan, which uses 
the same AQI scale as mainland China and generally exhibits greater environmental 
                                                        
concentrations are high. However, the strength of the relationship is much higher for the positive impulse 
model. For both logit models, the positive relationship between hourly impulses and embassy PM2.5 
concentrations is significant for all five cities tested. The results of each logit model are presented in greater 
detail in Appendix 3 (Section A3.3).  
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transparency and a stronger rule of law. However, unlike mainland China, there are no 
U.S. embassies or consulates that collect and publish real-time air quality data.56 Instead, 
I pair nearby government-controlled monitoring sites, using the same IIS procedure to 
analyze the five pairs of Taiwanese monitoring sites (out of 74 total sites) that have the 
closest geographical proximity to one another. 
The null hypothesis of no manipulation implies that we should find that the 
frequency of significant impulses is equal to the significance level of the criterion used to 
retain impulses (0.01), and also that the average value of all significant impulses should 
equal zero.57 The former hypothesis is evaluated with a test statistic, which is calculated 
by comparing the frequency of observed impulses to expected impulses, and is 
distributed as a Chi-Squared (𝜒2) value (Table 4.10). A two-sided T-test is then used to 
test the second null hypothesis that the mean impulse coefficient values for each station 
pair is zero (Table 4.11).    
 
Table 4.10 Observed vs. Expected Significant Impulses for Taiwan Data  
 
 
                                                        
56 The United States does not maintain any formal embassies or consulates in Taiwan, but the non-profit 
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) serves as a de-facto embassy for U.S. state department officials in the 
area. However, none of the AIT’s three offices in Taiwan public report air quality data.   
57 As long as both stations don’t manipulate air quality data simultaneously, any manipulation will cause a 
significant impulse outlier. However, because we don’t know which of the two stations is manipulating the 
data, we don’t know if the impulse coefficient will be positive or negative. Therefore, unlike the mainland 
dataset, it is necessary to test whether the average impulse coefficient value differs from zero in either 
direction.   
Station Pairs Location Distance (Km)
Hourly 
Observations
IIS 
(Expected)
IIS 
(Observed)
P-Value 
(Obs != Exp)
Pair 1 (Renwu and Nanzi Districts) Kaohsuing City 4.8 20,180 202 175 0.056
Pair 2 (Qianjin and Zuoying Districts) Kaohsuing City 4.7 19,652 197 211 0.316
Pair 3 (Qianzhen and Fuxing Districts) Kaohsuing City 0.7 20,165 202 196 0.671
Pair 4 (Taixi and Mailiao Townships) Yunlin County 8.3 20,023 200 219 0.177
Pair 5 (Zhongming and Xitun Districts)  Taichung City 3.2 21,888 219 241 0.118
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Note: Because the significance level of the IIS test is α = 0.01, the expected frequency of 
significant impulses is 0.01 multiplied by the total number of observations, or 1% of the 
total observations. 
 
 
Table 4.11 Testing Mean IIS Coefficients in Taiwan   
 
 
  
 
Results in Table 4.10 indicate that the number of outliers for each of the five 
station pairs is not statistically different from the number expected based on the 1% 
threshold for statistical significance used to detect the impulses.58 Similarly, all of the 
results in Table 4.11 fail to reject the null hypothesis that the mean value of the impulses 
equals zero. Taken together, none of the five tests in Taiwan show any significant 
evidence of data manipulation. Thus, these results strongly suggest that the main findings 
of data manipulation in four out of the five tested mainland Chinese cities were not false 
positives. 
4.6.2 Testing for False Negatives 
 The other potential drawback of a statistical test is failing to detect a significant 
effect when one is present. However, with most real-world datasets, researchers do not 
have any a priori knowledge about when and where an effect is actually occurring (hence 
                                                        
58 The closest pair to violating the null hypothesis is Pair 1, with a Chi-squared p-value of 0.056. However, 
in this case, there are actually fewer than expected significant impulses, rather than more as we would 
expect with manipulation. 
Station Pairs Location Distance (Km) Mean IIS Coef. St. Error T-Stat P-Value
Pair 1 (Renwu and Nanzi Districts) Kaohsuing City 4.8 -0.182 0.831 -0.219 0.59
Pair 2 (Qianjin and Zuoying Districts) Kaohsuing City 4.7 -0.127 1.009 -0.126 0.55
Pair 3 (Qianzhen and Fuxing Districts) Kaohsuing City 0.7 1.287 0.74 1.74 0.06
Pair 4 (Taixi and Mailiao Townships) Yunlin County 8.3 -0.142 0.953 -0.149 0.56
Pair 5 (Zhongming and Xitun Districts)  Taichung City 3.2 0.049 0.846 0.058 0.48
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the reason for testing in the first place). Fortunately, there are two recent cases where 
local air quality data manipulation in China was detected, confirmed, and publicized by 
the central MEP. In both cases, the first in Xinyu City of Jiangxi Province and the second 
in Xinyang City of Henan Province, the local EPB director hired individuals to physically 
tamper with monitoring stations when air quality was bad, manipulating data dozens of 
times between September and October of 2017.59 More importantly, in each case the 
tampering was limited to one monitoring site per city, with all other sites being left 
alone.60      
 For each of the two above cities, I use the IIS methodology to compare hourly 
PM2.5 data from the corrupted monitoring station to averaged hourly data from the 
surrounding, non-corrupted monitoring stations. I also break up each time series into 18 
separate two-month chunks, ranging from January 2016 to December 2018. If the IIS test 
is sensitive enough to detect manipulation where it is already known to exist, then there 
should be a statistically significant number of positive impulses in the September 2017 – 
October 2017 chunk for both cities.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
59 The physical tampering included stuffing cotton yarn in the sensors and spraying them with mist from 
“fog gun cars” (Beijing News 2018). While it is known that the tampering occurred during September and 
October of 2017, the exact dates and hours of tampering were not released by the MEP.  
60 In Xinyu City, tampering occurred only at the Feiyu District monitoring site (with four other local sites 
left untouched), while in Xinyang city tampering occurred only at the Nanwan water treatment plant (with 
three other local sites left untouched).   
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Table 4.12 Signs of Data Manipulation over Time in Xinyu and Xinyang Cities 
 
   Xinyu City (Jiangxi Province) Xinyang City (Henan Province) 
Ch. 
# 
Date Range Mean 
St. 
Err. 
T-
Stat 
P-Val  Mean 
St. 
Err. 
T-
Stat 
P-Val  
1 Jan 2016 - Feb 2016 0.202 0.088 2.29 0.022* 0.433 0.122 3.55 <0.001** 
2 Mar 2016 – Apr 2016  0.313 0.074 4.21 <0.001** 0.212 0.110 1.92 0.055 
3 May 2016 – June 2016 -0.045 0.094 0.48 0.632 0.015 0.125 0.12 0.912 
4 Jul 2016 – Aug 2016  0.084 0.080 1.05 0.294 0.133 0.140 0.95 0.343 
5 Sep 2016 – Oct 2016 0.044 0.073 0.6 0.55 0.059 0.102 0.58 0.565 
6 Nov 2016 – Dec 2016  0.151 0.071 2.14 0.031* -0.034 0.117 0.29 0.767 
7 Jan 2017 – Feb 2017 0.292 0.077 3.78 <0.001** 0.248 0.125 1.98 0.048* 
8 Mar 2017 – Apr 2017  0.214 0.076 2.81 0.005** 0.316 0.126 2.51 0.012* 
9 May 2017 – Jun 2017  -0.057 0.068 0.84 0.4 -0.111 0.114 0.97 0.331 
10 Jul 2017 – Aug 2017  0.122 0.067 1.81 0.069 -0.089 0.119 0.75 0.454 
11 Sep 2017 – Oct 2017  0.276 0.094 2.95 0.003** 0.490 0.126 3.89 <0.001** 
12 Nov 2017 - Dec 2017 -0.119 0.079 1.51 0.133 0.188 0.106 1.77 0.063 
13 Jan 2018 - Feb 2018 -0.061 0.094 0.65 0.515 -0.120 0.092 1.31 0.189 
14 Mar 2018 - Apr 2018 0.111 0.090 1.23 0.218 -0.020 0.133 0.15 0.878 
15 May 2018 - June 2018 0.090 0.092 0.98 0.323 -0.106 0.098 1.08 0.283 
16 Jul 2018 - Aug 2018 -0.025 0.089 0.28 0.788 0.189 0.131 1.44 0.153 
17 Sep 2018 - Oct 2018 0.137 0.078 1.75 0.081 0.105 0.121 0.87 0.385 
18 Nov 2018 - Dec 2018 -0.050 0.061 0.82 0.411 -0.083 0.109 0.76 0.444 
 
Note: The two-month range where manipulation was known to have occurred 
(September 2017 – October 2017) is highlighted in yellow. For the “Mean” columns, the 
impulse coefficient values for all time points are used (not just when the coefficients do 
not equal zero).   
  
 
Results in Table 4.12 indicate that the mean impulse coefficient value for the 
September 2017 – October 2017 chunk is significantly greater than zero at a very high 
confidence level in both cities. Furthermore, the tests provide no evidence of continued 
manipulation after October 2017 in either city, a result which would be consistent with 
local officials changing their behavior after being caught and punished by the central 
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government. Interestingly, there are some additional signs of manipulation before the 
period in question, which suggests that local officials in each city engaged in data fraud 
long before they were actually caught. More specifically, data manipulation appears more 
common in the winter and early spring months, periods when Chinese air quality is 
typically worse due to coal-based heating and stagnant weather patterns (Liang et al. 
2016).  
Taken together, the results of section 4.6 suggest that the IIS test employed by this 
chapter is statistically robust, and avoids both type I and type II errors.    
 
 
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
  
In toto, the results of this chapter indicate that local Chinese officials continued to 
manipulate air quality data after the central government’s post-2012 policy reforms. The 
statistical evidence outlined in Section 4.5 is supported by media reports of ongoing data 
tampering in several Chinese cities. In addition to the cases of Xinyu and Xinyang 
described above, in March of 2018 the central environmental ministry (now called the 
Ministry of Ecology and Environment, or MEE) announced that it had caught seven cities 
engaging in air quality data manipulation during the previous year (Beijing News 2018). 
A month later, the central Ministry of Public Security (MPS) also charged 16 local 
officials in Linyi, Shanxi Province, for tampering with air quality monitors 53 times 
between April 2017 and March 2018.61  
                                                        
61 After a speedy trial, the local EPB director, Zhang Wenqing, was sentenced to two years in prison and 
two of his accomplices also received jail time (MEE 2018b). 
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 These reports of ongoing data manipulation are unsurprising, since the 2012 and 
2013 reforms did not eliminate incentives for local officials to cheat. Although requiring 
hourly measurements and abolishing the blue sky day metric eliminated manipulation 
around a given API threshold, local EPBs still face enormous pressure to report 
continuously decreasing pollutant concentrations. This pressure is compounded by the 
fact that the central government has increased penalties for local cadres in failing cities 
without also increasing the flow of centrally-backed resources or financial support. Since 
the mid-2000s, there has been no increase in central-to-local fiscal transfers for 
environmental protection, and of the money earmarked for pollution control, roughly half 
has been diverted for other purposes by city governments (Economy 2014). Thus, faced 
with increasingly difficult attainment targets and a persistent lack of resources, many 
local officials have taken the path of least resistance by continuing to report false air 
quality numbers. 
 Although the central leaders are acutely aware of this problem, until recently they 
have been slow and ineffectual in their response. However, beginning in late 2016, the 
central government has instituted a series of new reforms aimed at improving 
environmental governance. Specifically, Beijing announced the transition to a vertical 
(tiao)-based management system of the environmental bureaucracy, aimed at tackling the 
negative impacts of “local protectionism” in environmental management (Brombal 2017). 
Also, in September 2016, the power to nominate city-level EPB directors was transferred 
from city governments to provincial EPBs,62 and by 2020 provincial EPBs (rather than 
                                                        
62 However, city approval is still required to confirm nominees.  
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city EPBs) will assume full responsibility for the funding and personnel decisions of local 
monitoring stations (Xinhuanet 2016). Finally, in March of 2018, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection was replaced by the much larger and more powerful Ministry 
of Ecology and Environment (MEE). The new MEE has jurisdiction over a variety of 
environmental policy concerns previously managed by other agencies, including all 
issues related to GHG emissions and climate change (Kostka and Zhang 2018).63   
 The central government is also making a concerted effort to crack down on data 
manipulation by increasing the supervision and oversight of local officials. In March 
2017, Premier Li Keqiang promised to spend “whatever it takes” to control air pollution 
(Lau 2017), and in July the MEP began a surprise round of environmental inspections in 
the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region (Fuchs and Schmitt 2017). The party-controlled 
People’s Daily subsequently announced that these inspections would become the “new 
normal,” and by year’s end, central agencies had disciplined nearly 12,000 local officials 
and assessed more than $130 million in fines (Gan 2017). These MEP/MEE inspections 
have been carried out in tandem with the Central Organization Department (COD) and 
the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which are the two most 
important groups in determining a local officials’ promotion prospects.64    
 Together, these most recent reforms offer some hope that China is finally 
beginning to turn the corner in addressing the problem of local data manipulation. 
                                                        
63 Climate change issues were previously managed by the powerful National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC). 
64 In the words of Professor Junjie Zhang, director of the Environmental Research Centre at Duke Kunshan 
University, “These new central environmental inspection teams are different. They are like the ‘imperial 
envoys’” (Gan 2017).  
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However, because these reforms did not begin in earnest until late-2016 and 2017, it is 
unlikely that this chapter - which only uses data through June 2017 - would detect any 
positive effects. Thus, further research is needed to determine whether or not air quality 
data manipulation has been curtailed at all over the past two years. One way to do this is 
to wait until the five U.S. embassies and consulates in China release more recent archived 
PM2.5 data, and then test that data against government-reported data in the same fashion 
as outlined in section 4.5. However, ideally it would be possible to test all of China’s 363 
monitored cities, including the ones without U.S. diplomatic posts. While such an 
analysis would be more difficult, it should theoretically be possible to use an IIS 
procedure to compare individual cities against an inverse-distance-weighted (IDW) 
average of nearby cities. Significant hourly outliers would still be detectable as long as 
cities did not manipulate data in the same direction at the same time. It would also be 
useful to see if the rate at which local officials manipulate data is related to the presence 
of central inspection teams, or by any subsequent penalties imposed by central agencies.  
Overall, while China’s 2012-2013 environmental policy reforms improved the 
availability of air quality data and helped to reduce pollutant concentrations in urban 
areas, they did little to dissuade the manipulation of data by local officials. Although 
previous studies erroneously suggest that data manipulation ended after 2012, this chapter 
indicates that it continued; just in different, more difficult-to-detect forms. As the central 
government continues to implement new efforts to address data fraud, it remains to be 
seen whether these efforts will actually be effective or whether they will simply induce 
local officials to find newer and ever-more-innovative ways to falsify official statistics.        
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Recap of Major Findings 
It is no exaggeration to say that the environmental challenges facing China over 
the next several decades are truly unprecedented. In the 20th century, many industrializing 
nations were forced to balance the conflicting priorities of rapid economic growth and a 
clean environment, but none of those nations was a one-party, authoritarian state 
comprising nearly one-fifth of the world’s population. In China, air pollution is a 
particularly unique challenge, representing an institutional and public health crisis of 
enormous scale and scope with no clear parallels in human history. Thus, how China 
chooses to deal with these problems is both incredibly important and difficult to predict. 
Chapters 2-4 attempt to shed some light on how the process of environmental reforms 
might unfold in China. However, they focus less on the policy and substance of the 
reforms themselves, and more on the underlying factors surrounding those reforms; 
namely, government legitimacy, citizen attitudes, and institutional pressures. 
 Chapter 2 utilizes a unique, multi-year public opinion survey to analyze the ways 
in which ordinary Chinese citizens assess the performance of different levels of 
government. While satisfaction with the central government has remained strong and 
consistent virtually across the board, views of county and township governments have 
changed considerably over the past decade-and-a-half. Since 2003, lower-income 
residents and citizens living in China’s less-developed inland regions have reported 
comparatively greater increases in government satisfaction vis-à-vis their wealthier, 
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coastal counterparts. These outcomes, which I term the “income effect” and “region 
effect” respectively, grow statistically larger at lower levels of government, which are 
most responsible for the provision of public goods and services.  
More importantly, Chapter 2 also provides evidence that the income and region 
effects are the product of tangible shifts in government policy beginning with the 
ascension of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in 2003. By seeking to rebalance the gains of 
reform and provide a basic social safety net for China’s most vulnerable populations, the 
Hu-Wen administration represented a clear shift from Jiang Zemin’s growth-at-all-costs 
development strategy. While not all of Hu Jintao’s (and later Xi Jinping’s) lofty rhetoric 
was matched by real policy outcomes, Chapter 2 shows that Chinese citizens do in fact 
respond positively to increased rates of infrastructure provision, government spending on 
social programs, and reduced urban-rural inequality. These findings are significant for 
two main reasons: first, they show that recent government reforms have been successful 
in reducing the satisfaction gap between China’s “haves” and “have-nots”, lessening the 
immediate danger of widespread unrest and calls for political liberalization. Second, the 
fact that Chinese citizens appear to respond rationally to real changes in their material 
well-being also serves as a warning sign to China’s leaders that official rhetoric and 
government propaganda won’t be enough to satisfy the masses should the country ever 
experience a large and sustained drop in living standards.   
Of the many threats to China’s future standard of living, none is more serious than 
air pollution. Therefore, the goal of Chapter 3 is to examine how air pollution shapes 
citizen perceptions of local-scale air quality and also to gauge how these perceptions 
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influence views of governmental performance and rates of environmental activism. By 
comparing government-reported AQI to the results of a personally-designed, large-
sample public opinion survey, I uncover several noteworthy findings.  
First, Chinese citizens are fairly accurate in assessing local-scale air quality, at 
least when pollution is primarily composed of easily-sensed particulates such as PM10 
and PM2.5. While this result may seem obvious, citizen perceptions do not always match 
objective reality, especially in authoritarian states where sensitive information is tightly 
controlled. Chapter 3 is the first nation-wide study to show that, at least in China, people 
do generally have enough information to tell when local air quality is good or bad, which 
suggests that government officials in authoritarian states cannot easily suppress evidence 
of environmental degradation. 
Second, despite being able to accurately assess local air quality, Chinese citizens 
do not display a strong emotional response to absolute levels of air pollution. People 
know when local air quality is good or bad, but if air quality has been relatively 
consistent for years or even decades, then these results are already “baked in” to citizens’ 
outlook on life. In other words, people habituate to long-term air pollution levels, which 
means that poor air quality alone is not enough to reduce SWB. Rather, daily deviations 
from annual AQI averages are more accurate in predicting life satisfaction. All else equal, 
a daily AQI of 75 is likely to lead to lower levels of reported life-satisfaction in a city 
where average annual AQI is 50, but higher levels of reported life-satisfaction in a city 
where average annual AQI is 100. This finding is important because it suggests that 
Chinese citizens will likely respond positively to small reductions in future pollutant 
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concentrations, even if those concentrations remain dangerously high by international 
standards.  
Third, although objective air quality clearly affects individual perceptions, it has 
no direct effect on citizens’ assessment of local environmental governance. In essence, 
once perceived air quality and life satisfaction are controlled for, measured air pollution 
levels are not related to government approval. This result is unsurprising, because it 
simply tells us that there is no subconscious effect of bad air quality (above-and-beyond 
negative perceptions) that drives government dissatisfaction. However, while there is no 
direct effect of objective air quality on perceived environmental governance, SEM 
analysis shows that there is an indirect effect via the pathways of perceived air quality 
and life satisfaction. Thus, measured air pollution concentrations can still serve as a 
useful proxy for citizens’ views of local environmental governance in situations when 
public opinion survey data is absent. 
Fourth, Chapter 3 finds that neither objective nor perceived measures of air 
quality appear to directly affect an individual’s willingness to participate in local 
environmental protests, and that such a willingness is primarily governed by personal 
political and environmental ideology, as well as by past exposure to air-pollution-related 
health issues. This result suggests that poor air quality and citizen discontent alone will 
not be enough to unleash a wave of bottom-up environmental activism in China. While 
Chinese citizens do increasingly care about environmental issues, at this stage most are 
still reluctant to take action against the current system unless they perceive a direct and 
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imminent threat to their physical well-being (or the well-being of their immediate family 
members).       
While Chapters 2 and 3 focus on how ordinary people respond to economic and 
environmental data, Chapter 4 takes a look at the government-reported data itself and 
analyzes it for signs of manipulation. Contrary to other recent findings, this study 
concludes that government manipulation of local air quality data remains commonplace, 
at least in China’s largest and most important megacities. By using IIS analysis, I show 
that, in four out of the five tested cities, impulse outliers are more frequent than expected, 
and also that government-controlled monitoring stations systematically report lower-than-
expected PM2.5 concentrations relative to U.S. embassy-controlled monitoring stations. In 
addition, I find that these positive “impulse outliers” are more prevalent when embassy-
measured PM2.5 concentrations are high, suggesting that manipulation is more likely 
when air quality is poor. 
Together, these results show that the central government’s 2012-2013 reforms, 
which were designed in large part to improve data accuracy and reliability, were not 
wholly successful. While they did end the practice of “threshold” manipulation around 
the blue sky day cutoff point, the reforms simply induced local officials to devise subtler 
and harder-to-detect forms of data fraud. Thus, recent studies analyzing post-2012 air 
pollution data failed to detect manipulation, not because they were incorrect in their 
analysis, but instead because they were looking for manipulation in places where it no 
longer existed. Chapter 4 exposes these newer methods of local air quality data 
manipulation, and ensures that the results are robust to both type I and type II errors.          
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Ultimately, the conclusions of Chapter 4 suggest that Chinese air quality numbers, 
while still useful, should not be taken entirely at face value. The institutional factors of 
bureaucratic fragmentation, low institutional capacity, and strict performance targets 
without adequate financial support assure that local officials will continue to manipulate 
data as long as they can get away with it. Central leaders are well aware of this fact, and 
since late-2016, they have finally appeared willing to attack the root causes of poor data 
reliability in China. While the results of Beijing’s most recent round of institutional 
reforms remain unclear, the reliability of government-reported data in China should 
continue to be an issue of utmost importance to future researchers, since any quantitative 
analysis is only as good as the data that supports it.   
 
5.2 Tying it all Together: A Look Ahead 
 
 
The results of this thesis suggest that the broad-based legitimacy of China’s 
political system is not currently under threat. Citizens often express dissatisfaction with 
specific policy measures and outcomes, but overall satisfaction remains higher than at 
any point during the past two decades. That being said, these results also show that 
political attitudes do shift with measurable changes in individuals’ material well-being. 
Thus, if China were ever to experience a sharp and prolonged decline in living standards, 
ordinary people’s assessments of governmental performance could begin to deteriorate.         
Of course, it is impossible to predict exactly when such a decline might occur. 
While no system is immune to downturns, China’s economic expansion has been 
remarkably stable since 1989. Growth has been strong and consistent, large trade 
surpluses have led to a national government flush with cash, and basic improvements in 
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infrastructure and social support have led to increased living standards for the vast 
majority of Chinese citizens (Ma 2015). However, these advantages - whether due to 
strong leadership, luck, or some combination of the two – cannot last forever. Of the 
many challenges facing China in the coming decades, perhaps none is more serious than 
the deadly scourge of air pollution. This particular problem cannot be ameliorated by 
economic growth, and its scale and scope have so far defied the ability of Chinese 
officials to impose a “quick fix” without seriously altering the country’s institutional 
structure. However, in the post-Tiananmen era, China’s leaders have been extremely 
reluctant to embrace such broad, wholesale changes in governing strategy. Innovative 
reforms are almost always framed as one-time responses to particular local challenges 
and rarely spread beyond their township or county of origin (Fewsmith 2013). In other 
words, while the CCP has been very good at adopting tactical, short-term fixes to specific 
policy issues, it has been far less successful at implementing meaningful, long-term 
changes to the country’s political structure.  
However, as this dissertation has shown, the problems of environmental 
degradation and air pollution will require more than just a short-term fix. If the CCP is to 
remain in power for another 70 years, it cannot base its legitimacy solely on continued 
GDP growth and increased international clout. The Mao-Era government, for all its 
flaws, was able to use ideology and political values to maintain a deep and unshakable 
base of popular support. By contrast, China’s current leaders retain little of this reflexive 
ideological allegiance. Their legitimacy is more akin to that of a successful portfolio 
manager: they are popular mainly because things are going well. However, if China 
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cannot translate its sustained economic growth into improved financial security and a 
healthy environment for the majority of its population, then the problems created by the 
lack of institutionalization within the country’s political system could burst to the 
forefront. Thus, while the Chinese government remains broadly popular and is not 
currently facing widespread upheaval, the political loyalty of the people is not 
unconditional. Should material conditions ever significantly decline, the CCP might just 
come to realize that its support is a mile wide but a foot deep.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
A1.1 Survey Sample Weighting Procedures 
 
As the following tables reflect, the Chapter 2 survey samples have an urban bias, 
resulting in respondents with higher age ranges and, in some cases, higher income levels 
than the corresponding regional averages.  In the analysis stage, the results were weighted 
to compensate relative population size, urban bias, age, and income.   
 
Table A1.1 Example of Population Weighting (Proportion of City population/Proportion 
of Sampled City Population)65 
 
 
City Population 
（million） 
Percentage of Total 
Sample 
Proportion of Sampled 
Population in each City (%) 
Weight 
Beijing 7.441 21.36 14.10 1.51 
Shanghai 9.838 28.24 14.80 1.91 
Guangzhou 4.155 11.93 13.62 0.88 
Wuhan 4.489 12.89 13.40 0.96 
Chengdu 2.341 6.72 14.75 0.46 
Shenyang 3.981 11.43 14.58 0.78 
Xi’an 2.589 7.43 14.75 0.50 
Total 34.834 100 100  
 
 
Table A1.2 Example of Urban Weighting (Proportion of City/Town/Village populations 
(national)/Proportion of Sample City/Town/Village populations)66 
 
 National Population（%） Sample (%) Final Weight 
Cities 23.55 47.03 0.5008 
Towns 13.37 29.16 0.4585 
Villages 63.08 23.82 2.6487 
Total 100.0 100.0  
 
 
                                                        
65 Statistics taken from non-rural data in the 2002-2015 Annual Statistics of Cities in China. 
66 Calculated based on the Fifth National Population Census (2000). 
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Table A1.3 Example of Age Weighting 
 
Stratified Comparison of Sample Ages and National 
Average  
       
  
Age 
Group Sample China   
  16-19 5.14% 10.54%   
  20-24 11.32% 12.02%   
  25-29 12.10% 11.53%   
  30-34 12.86% 14.54%   
  35-39 12.55% 14.51%   
  40-44 11.97% 10.91%   
  45-49 13.36% 10.19%   
  50-54 10.79% 9.30%   
  55-60 9.91% 6.47%   
NOTE: Age group 16-19 for real values "China" was calculated by 
taking 0.75 of the population percent value reported for 15-19 year 
olds.  
 
China Source: U.S. Census Bureau, March 2004 
(data is from 2000)   
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Table A1.4: Example of Income Weighting 
 
 
 
A1.2 Macro-Scale Economic Variables 
 
The addition of the macro-scale economic variables was done using data from 
annual Chinese statistical yearbooks (the specific variables include population, GDP per 
capita, area of paved roads per capita, the ratio of urban to rural disposable incomes, and 
the combined percentage of local government budget spent on healthcare, welfare and 
Stratified Comparison of Sample Median Income Levels and National Average 
Place Sample 
2002 
Average Fit 
Beijing 12-24,000 13251.84 
Shanghai 12-24,000 14395.8 
Guangzhou 12-24,000 11960.88 
Wuhan 6-12000 7142.16 
Chengdu 6-12000 6988.56 
Shenyang 6-12000 6941.4 
Xian 6-12000 6747 
Zhejiang Shaoxing Zhuji County 12-24000 12682.44 
Fujian Fuzhou Changle County 12-24000 9861.48 over 
Liaoning Jinzhou Beining County 6000 and under 6941.4 under 
Hebei Shijiazhuang Xinji County 6-12000 7015.2 
Hunan Yueyang Linxiang County 6-12000 7371.84 
Sichuan Chengdu Pengzhou County 6-12000 6988.56 
Shaanxi Xianyang Xingping County 6-12000 6747 
Zhejiang - Feng Qiao Village 5001-8000 4940.36 
Fujian - Chang Xian Village 4001-5000 3538.83 over 
Liaoning - Zhong An Village 1001-2000 2751.34 under 
Hebei - Xinji Village 3001-4000 2685.16 over 
Hunan - Zhan Qiao Village 3001-4000 2397.92 over 
Sichuan - Li An Village 1001-2000 2107.64 under 
Shaanxi - Pan Village 1001-2000 1596.25 
Hubei - Feng Shuling Village 3001-4000 2444.06 over 
 
China Village Averages Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 2003-2016, Per Capita Annual Net 
Income of Rural Households 
 
China City and Township Averages Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 2003-2016, Per Capita 
Annual Income of Urban Residents 
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education).  Annual yearbooks were used to obtain city-level data for each of the 
corresponding survey waves between 2003 and 2016, with yearbook data lagging the 
survey data by one year (survey data from 2003 was matched with yearbook data from 
2002, and so on). This was done because each round of surveys was taken at a different 
point in the calendar year, so yearbook data from the most recent full calendar year (the 
previous one) would provide the most consistent results.  
The specific yearbook data itself was obtained from a variety of sources, 
including China Data Online, local government statistical bureau websites, and personal 
contacts in Beijing.  
 
 
A1.3 Mean Government Satisfaction Rates (2003-2016) 
 
The tables below show mean satisfaction rates over time for all four levels of 
government in both urban and rural areas. Although mean satisfaction increases virtually 
across the board between 2003 and 2016, Table A1.5 depicts the difference in satisfaction 
increases between high and low-income populations, while Table A1.6 depicts the 
difference in satisfaction increases between the core and periphery regions. 
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Table A1.5: Mean Government Satisfaction Rates over Time (High vs. Low Income) 
 
Urban Areas 
Central Provincial County Town 
Year High  Low Year High  Low Year High  Low Year High  Low 
2003 3.066 3.014 2003 2.851 2.788 2003 2.633 2.511 2003 2.514 2.446 
2004 3.036 2.97 2004 2.908 2.851 2004 2.809 2.659 2004 2.74 2.591 
2005 3.044 3.047 2005 2.961 2.939 2005 2.821 2.772 2005 2.768 2.696 
2007 3.122 3.223 2007 3.03 3.058 2007 2.909 2.824 2007 2.767 2.709 
2009 3.291 3.331 2009 3.129 3.151 2009 2.92 2.858 2009 2.796 2.761 
2011 3.167 3.209 2011 3.041 3.06 2011 2.826 2.763 2011 2.724 2.654 
2015 3.357 3.334 2015 3.157 3.106 2015 2.802 2.796 2015 2.635 2.659 
2016 3.3 3.261 2016 3.136 3.073 2016 2.874 2.89 2016 2.874 2.89 
Rural Areas 
Central Provincial County Town 
Year High  Low Year High  Low Year High  Low Year High  Low 
2003 3.171 3.269 2003 2.915 2.931 2003 2.575 2.505 2003 2.369 2.208 
2004 3.185 3.188 2004 3.029 3.038 2004 2.747 2.685 2004 2.537 2.482 
2005 3.094 3.2 2005 3.021 3.06 2005 2.726 2.79 2005 2.451 2.628 
2007 3.38 3.424 2007 3.244 3.274 2007 2.958 2.914 2007 2.64 2.649 
2009 3.458 3.503 2009 3.227 3.294 2009 2.808 2.889 2009 2.526 2.527 
2011 3.317 3.442 2011 3.079 3.317 2011 2.812 2.949 2011 2.598 2.794 
2015 3.305 3.337 2015 2.887 2.843 2015 2.377 2.452 2015 2.328 2.346 
2016 3.265 3.304 2016 3.203 3.211 2016 2.963 3.035 2016 2.789 2.972 
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Table A.1.6 Mean Government Satisfaction Rates over Time (Core vs. Periphery) 
 
Urban Areas 
Central Provincial County Town 
Year Core Periph Year Core Periph Year Core Periph Year Core Periph 
2003 3.034 3.047 2003 2.928 2.759 2003 2.754 2.468 2003 2.637 2.38 
2004 3 3.019 2004 2.92 2.871 2004 2.832 2.716 2004 2.799 2.622 
2005 3.058 3.035 2005 2.985 2.919 2005 2.876 2.729 2005 2.826 2.651 
2007 3.076 3.241 2007 3.006 3.068 2007 2.902 2.834 2007 2,745 2.725 
2009 3.241 3.345 2009 3.04 3.21 2009 2.871 2.901 2009 2.757 2.79 
2011 3.088 3.252 2011 2.95 3.114 2011 2.827 2.774 2011 2.769 2.64 
2015 3.47 3.272 2015 3.157 3.12 2015 2.836 2.779 2015 2.597 2.679 
2016 3.269 3.288 2016 3.114 3.1 2016 2.918 2.86 2016 2.752 2.811 
Rural Areas 
Central Provincial County Town 
Year Core Periph Year Core Periph Year Core Periph Year Core Periph 
2003 3.189 3.256 2003 3.004 2.9 2003 2.721 2.456 2003 2.527 2.158 
2004 3.199 3.19 2004 3.122 3.017 2004 2.97 2.637 2004 2.746 2.435 
2005 3.144 3.17 2005 3.085 3.027 2005 2.846 2.729 2005 2.581 2.548 
2007 3.268 3.463 2007 3.11 3.32 2007 2.884 2.95 2007 2.734 2.593 
2009 3.468 3.487 2009 3.126 3.314 2009 2.958 2.813 2009 2.707 2.458 
2011 3.289 3.414 2011 3.064 3.243 2011 2.904 2.875 2011 2.771 2.682 
2015 3.366 3.301 2015 2.977 2.821 2015 2.412 2.417 2015 2.088 2.439 
2016 3.188 3.325 2016 3.11 3.248 2016 2.954 3.016 2016 2.72 2.942 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
A2.1 Survey Methodology 
 
The findings and analysis of Chapter 3 are based on the results of a purposive 
stratified survey of 3,693 respondents, conducted via face-to-face interviews across 74 
Chinese municipalities between June 14 and July 13, 2016. The survey questionnaire was 
designed by the author and implemented by Horizon Research Consulting Group (零点研
究咨询集团), a private Chinese firm. The full survey, in both English and Chinese, is 
available upon request.  
Respondents, aged 18 through 86, were selected from three municipal types: 
urban city, urban town, and rural village. For each type, specific survey locations were 
chosen based on their geographical location, average per capita income, and population. 
The sites were selected to be as nationally representative as possible for all three 
variables, representing lower-middle income, middle income, and upper income 
individuals; as well as western, eastern, northern and southern populations of China.  At 
each individual survey site, respondents were randomly selected through neighborhood 
committee lists using the KISH method.67   
In terms of socioeconomic and demographic variables, the sample was relatively 
representative of the country as a whole. The sample was 49% male, compared to the 
national rate of 51% (World Bank 2017); with a median age of 40 years, compared to the 
national median of 37 years (CIA World Factbook 2017). Also, 7.7% of respondents had 
                                                        
67 Household area sampling is conducted using a “face sheet”, or table with fractional representation of 
each potential adult (Kish 1949).  
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a college degree, similar to the 7.4% rate among all Chinese adults (KPMG 2010). The 
survey does have a slight urban bias, with 65% of all responses coming from urban areas 
compared to a national urbanization rate of 56% (CCTV 2016). However, median 
monthly household income (5,500 Yuan sample vs. 5,800 Yuan national) (Forbes 2010), 
smoking rates (33% sample vs. 28% national) (Global Adult Tobacco Survey 2010), and 
GDP per capita (57,800 Yuan sample vs. 58,873 Yuan national) (International Monetary 
Fund 2017) all fall within representative ranges. Figure A2.2 below shows a map of all 
74 survey locations. 
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Figure A2.1 Survey Location Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the figure above, all 74 survey locations are marked in red. Location types are 
differentiated between cities (square markers), towns (diamond markers), and rural 
villages (circle markers). All locations south and east of the black dividing line are 
classified as belonging to the “core” region (which includes the coastal provinces of 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong), 
while all locations to the west or north of the black line are classified as belonging to the 
China Survey:              
(May-July 2016) 
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“periphery” region (all other provinces). More detail about each of the 74 survey 
locations is included in Table A2.3 below: 
 
Table A2.1 More Detailed Information about the Survey Locations 
 
Location Chinese Name Province Location Type Exact Match? 
Ar Horqin 阿鲁科尔沁旗 Inner Mongolia Town No 
Bazhong 巴中 Sichuan City Yes 
Beijing 北京 Beijing City Yes 
Cangxi 苍溪 Sichuan Town No 
Caoxian 曹县 Shandong Town No 
Changsha 长沙 Hunan Town Yes 
Chengdu 成都 Sichuan City Yes 
Chongqing 重庆 Chongqing City Yes 
Dalian 大连 Liaoning City Yes 
Dangshan 砀山 Anhui Rural Village No 
Fangxian 房县 Hubei Rural Village No 
Fushun 抚顺 Liaoning Rural Village Yes 
Fuzhou 福州 Fujian City Yes 
Guangzhou 广州 Guangdong City Yes 
Guilin 桂林 Guangxi City Yes 
Haiyuan 海源 Ningxia Town No 
Hangzhou 杭州 Zhejiang City Yes 
Huainan 淮南 Anhui City Yes 
Huaining 怀宁 Anhui Rural Village No 
Huangping 黄平 Guizhou Rural Village No 
Huzhou 湖州 Zhejiang City Yes 
Jiaxing 嘉兴 Zhejiang City Yes 
Jingyang 泾阳 Shaanxi Rural Village No 
Jingzhou 荆州 Hubei City Yes 
Jinzhong 晋中 Shanxi City No 
Jinzhou 晋州 Hebei Rural Village Yes 
Jurong 句容 Jiangsu Town Yes 
Juxian 莒县 Shandong Town No 
Kaiyuan 开源 Liaoning Rural Village No 
Linshu 临沭 Shandong Rural Village No 
Linwu 临武 Hunan Rural Village No 
Lufeng 陆丰 Guangdong Rural Village No 
Luhe 陆河 Guangdong Rural Village No 
Mudanjiang 牡丹江 Heilongjiang City Yes 
Nanchang 南昌 Jiangxi City Yes 
Nanchong 南充 Sichuan City Yes 
Nanxiong 南雄 Guangdong Town No 
Nanzhang 南漳 Hubei Rural Village No 
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Ningjin 宁晋 Hebei Town No 
Pinglu 平陆 Shanxi Rural Village No 
Pingnan 平南 Guangxi Rural Village No 
Pingxiang 萍乡 Jiangxi City Yes 
Qingdao 青岛 Shandong City Yes 
Shanghai 上海 Shanghai City Yes 
Shayang 沙洋 Hubei Town No 
Shenyang 沈阳 Liaoning City Yes 
Sheyang 射阳 Jiangsu Town No 
Shimian 石棉 Sichuan Rural Village No 
Taicang 太仓 Jiangsu Rural Village Yes 
Tengxian 藤县 Guangxi Rural Village No 
Tianjin 天津 Tianjin City Yes 
Tianmen 天门 Hubei Rural Village No 
Wenzhou 温州 Zhejiang City Yes 
Wu’an 武安 Hebei Rural Village No 
Wuhan 武汉 Hubei City Yes 
Wuyi 五一 Zhejiang Town No 
Xiangcheng 襄城 Henan Rural Village No 
Xiantao 仙桃 Hubei Town No 
Xiaxian 夏县 Shanxi Town No 
Xincai 新蔡 Henan Rural Village No 
Xingguo 兴国 Jiangxi Rural Village No 
Suqian 宿迁 Jiangsu City Yes 
Xuzhou 徐州 Jiangsu City Yes 
Yangzhou 扬州 Jiangsu City Yes 
Yexian 叶县 Henan Rural Village No 
Yingde 英德 Guangdong Rural Village No 
Yongjia 永嘉 Zhejiang Rural Village No 
Yueqing 乐清 Zhejiang Rural Village No 
Yugan 余干 Jiangxi Town No 
Zhaoqing 肇庆 Guangdong City Yes 
Zhenxiong 镇雄 Yunnan Town No 
Zhuanghe 庄河 Liaoning Town No 
Zibo 淄博 Shandong City Yes 
 
Note: The “Exact Match” column refers to whether or not each of the 74 surveyed cities 
also reports hourly AQI data to the public via the MEP.  
 
 
 
A2.2 Missing Values and Multiple Imputation 
 
In the Chapter 3 survey questionnaire, many questions allow the respondent to 
select the answer “not sure/don’t know.” In other cases, the respondent may refuse to 
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answer the question entirely. For both of these above instances, a value of “.” is entered 
into Stata and the response is treated as “missing.” Due in part to the face-to-face nature 
of this particular survey, missing values are relatively rare. As shown in Table A2.5 
below, only six of the 29 variables used in the regression models having missing value 
rates greater than 5%, and 10 variables have no missing values at all. 
 
Table A2.2 Missing Value Rates for all Regression Variables    
 
Variable Name Missing Values % Missing 
Health 465 12.6% 
MEP Trust 396 10.7% 
Clean 357 9.7% 
AP Public 252 6.8% 
MEP Use 250 6.8% 
Protest 232 6.3% 
AP Town 169 4.6% 
AP Focus 127 3.4% 
AQ Comp 85 2.3% 
AQ Past 77 2.1% 
Education 75 2.0% 
Income 70 1.9% 
AP Concern 64 1.7% 
AQ Perceived 61 1.7% 
Life Sat 60 1.6% 
Internet 59 1.6% 
Smoke 27 0.7% 
Old+Young 17 0.5% 
Hukou 11 0.3% 
AQI 0 0% 
AQITrend 0 0% 
Age  0 0% 
Age2 0 0% 
Male 0 0% 
NEP 0 0% 
Periphery 0 0% 
Venue 0 0% 
GDP PC 0 0% 
% Workforce  0 0% 
 
 
Despite the relatively low prevalence of missing values, a significant proportion 
of observations are omitted from each of the four main regression models. This is 
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because Stata uses a process called listwise deletion, which omits observations that have 
missing values for any of the dependent or independent variables used in a given 
regression model. Thus, although no single variable has a large percentage of missing 
values, together the rate of observations with any missing values is fairly significant. As 
shown in Table A2.6, each of the four main regression models only contain between 59% 
and 64% of the original 3,693 survey observations. 
 
Table A2.3 Omitted Observation Rates for Each Regression Model 
 
Regression Model Dependent Variable Omitted Observations % Omitted 
Model 1 AQ Perceived 1,321 35.7% 
Model 2 Life Sat 1,360 36.8% 
Model 3 AP Town 1,487 40.3% 
Model 4 Protest 1,516 41.1% 
 
 
In any regression model where a significant proportion of the observations are 
omitted due to missing values, the results run the risk of being biased. In fact, the results 
will necessarily be biased unless the missing values are “missing completely at random” 
(MCAR), meaning that there is no relationship between whether a data point is missing 
and any values in the dataset, either missing or observed. Unfortunately, there is no way 
to definitely test whether or not missing values are MCAR, because there is no way of 
knowing what those missing values would have been. Some statistical procedures aim to 
infer whether or not missing values are MCAR, or at least MAR (missing at random), but 
these tests are not definitive. 
Another technique to deal with missing values is called imputation, whereby 
missing values are estimated and then entered into the regression model as if they 
actually existed. This process is also prone to errors, but when done correctly it can 
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lessen the bias of the end results. Schafer and Graham (2002) describe a special form of 
imputation called multiple imputation. Instead of filling in a single value for each missing 
value, multiple imputation replaces each missing value with a set of plausible values that 
represent the uncertainty about the right value to impute (Schrafer and Graham 2002). 
This technique is generally recognized as most reliable form of imputation, since it uses 
the other independent variables in the dataset to predict the missing values and also 
contains a random component. Therefore, this chapter runs a robustness check on the 
original results presented the main text by using multiple imputation to estimate all 
missing values. 
Table A2.4 below presents the results of all four main regression models, both 
before and after multiple imputation. Note that only the coefficients from the full models 
(with all of independent variables and location fixed-effects included) are shown.  
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Table A2.4 Regression Results using Multiple Imputation for Missing Values 
 
(a) Original regression results before multiple imputation (full models only) 
Independent 
Variables 
Regression 1      
(AQ Perceived) 
Regression 2 
(Life Sat) 
Regression 3         
(AP Town) 
Regression 4 
(Protest)  
AQ Perceived n/a 0.123*** 0.080*** 0.044 
AQI -0.006*** -0.003 -0.05 0.004 
AQITrend 0.002 0.031*** 0.017 0.015 
Age -0.018 0.023 0.007 -0.024 
Age2 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
Education 0.048 0.121*** 0.105* 0.087 
Male -0.004 -0.053 -0.033 -0.309* 
Income -0.001 0.050*** 0.018 0.060* 
Hukou 0.037 0.182* -0.023 0.069 
Smoke -0.079 -0.073 0.055 0.191 
Old+Young -0.109* 0.040 -0.015 0.004 
Life Sat 0.135*** n/a 0.132*** 0.012 
Health 0.055 -0.156*** -0.347*** 0.905*** 
NEP -0.029** -0.025* -0.021 0.038* 
Clean -0.115* 0.043 -0.181* 0.377** 
AP Concern 0.002 0.083*** -0.033 0.101** 
AQ Past      
same 0.267*** 0.051 0.016 0.162 
better 0.341* 0.174** 0.876*** 0.238 
AQ Comp      
same 0.278* -0.056 -0.004 -0.191 
better 0.840*** 0.010 0.455*** -0.299 
MEP Use 0.185** -0.066 0.159* 0.484*** 
MEP Trust -0.021 -0.111** -0.095 -0.032 
Internet -0.162*** 0.095 -0.159* 0.237** 
AP Town n/a 0.136*** n/a -0.194** 
AP Focus -0.085*** -0.039 -0.032 -0.016 
AP Public -0.136*** -0.165*** -0.449*** -0.067 
Periphery 0.054 0.143*** 0.067 0.007 
Venue (City)     
small town 0.155 0.021 0.006 -0.272 
rural village 0.094 0.028 0.005 -0.093 
GDP PC 0.008 0.016*** 0.006 -0.001 
% Workforce 0.001 0.057*** 0.003 -0.012* 
Loc. Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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(b) Regression results after multiple imputation (full models only) 
Independent 
Variables 
Regression 1      
(AQ Perceived) 
Regression 2 
(Life Sat) 
Regression 3         
(AP Town) 
Regression 4 
(Protest)  
AQ Perceived n/a 0.117*** 0.055** 0.060 
AQI -0.004*** -0.002 0.005 -0.002 
AQITrend 0.020 0.033*** 0.013 0.026 
Age -0.018 0.007 -0.011 0.006 
Age2 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
Education -0.028 0.083*** 0.056 0.076 
Male -0.052 0.055 -0.129 -0.096 
Income 0.005 0.043*** 0.013 0.050* 
Hukou 0.046 0.137* 0.003 0.058 
Smoke 0.007 -0.134* 0.132 0.076 
Old+Young -0.064 -0.073 -0.080 -0.071 
Life Sat 0.133*** n/a 0.155*** 0.042 
Health -0.059 -0.103** -0.268*** 0.813*** 
NEP -0.029** -0.022* 0.004 0.027* 
Clean -0.153*** 0.028 -0.184* 0.410** 
AP Concern 0.002 0.118*** 0.015 0.138*** 
AQ Past      
same 0.197** 0.035 0.029 0.161 
better 0.311* 0.184** 0.888*** 0.196 
AQ Comp      
same 0.197* -0.055 -0.020 0.157 
better 0.771*** 0.031 0.581*** -0.080 
MEP Use 0.133** -0.019 0.186* 0.327** 
MEP Trust -0.054 -0.144** -0.090 -0.130 
Internet -0.172*** 0.001 -0.127 0.147* 
AP Town n/a 0.175*** n/a -0.104* 
AP Focus -0.081** -0.045 -0.017 -0.043 
AP Public -0.126*** -0.161*** -0.418*** -0.081 
Periphery -0.038 0.283*** 0.121* 0.022 
Venue (City)     
small town -0.122 -0.840* 0.469 0.626 
rural village -0.322 -0.347 0.191 0.014 
GDP PC -0.007 0.011** 0.010* 0.003 
% Workforce -0.003 0.012* 0.005 0.001 
Loc. Fixed Eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: For the above table, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, and *** = p < 0.001. 
 
 
As shown above, the sign and significance of most of the main independent 
variables in the original models remain broadly similar after multiple imputation.     
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APPENDIX 3 
 
A.3.1 The National Air Quality Index (AQI) in Mainland China 
 Mainland China maintains a national Air Quality Index (AQI), which ranges from 
a low of zero to a high of 500 (with higher values indicating worse air quality). The AQI 
is divided into six separate severity levels, and is designed to give citizens a general sense 
of how dangerous local air quality is at any particular time. The six pollution severity 
levels (along with their Chinese translations) are shown in Table A.3.1 below.  
 
Table A.3.1 AQI Categories in Mainland China 
AQI 
Air Pollution 
Level 
Air Pollution Category 
0–50 Level 1 Excellent (优秀) 
51–100 Level 2 Good (良好) 
101–150 Level 3 Lightly Polluted (轻度污染) 
151–200 Level 4 Moderately Polluted (中度汚染) 
201–300 Level 5 Heavily Polluted (重度污染) 
>300 Level 6 Severely Polluted (严重污染) 
 
 The AQI is a non-linear composite index, comprising atmospheric concentration 
values from six different sub-pollutants.  To generate an AQI value, an Individual Air 
Quality Index (IAQI) score is assigned to each sub-pollutant, and the final AQI is the 
highest of these six scores. The final AQI value can be calculated either per hour or per 
24 hours. The score for each sub-pollutant is non-linear, as is the final AQI score. Thus 
an AQI of 200 does not imply that pollution is twice as high as an AQI of 100, nor does it 
mean that the air is twice as harmful. Likewise, the atmospheric concentration of a sub-
pollutant when its IAQI is 100 does not necessarily equal twice its concentration when its 
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IAQI is 50. The AQI threshold cutoffs for each of the six different sub-pollutants in 
mainland China (as well as the AQI threshold cutoffs for PM2.5 concentrations at U.S. 
embassies and consulates in mainland China) are shown in Table A.3.2 below.  
 
Table A.3.2 AQI Threshold Cutoffs for Different Sub-Pollutant Concentrations 
 
Sources: Li et al. (2017) and Stoerk (2016). 
 
To calculate a sub-pollutant’s IAQI, the following formula is used: 
𝐈𝐀𝐐𝐈 =  
𝑰𝑨𝑸𝑰𝑯 − 𝑰𝑨𝑸𝑰𝑳
𝑪𝑯 −  𝑪𝑳
 (𝑪𝑰 − 𝑪𝑳) + 𝑰𝑨𝑸𝑰𝑳 
where IAQIH is the upper bound of the AQI severity category, IAQIL is the lower bound 
of the AQI severity category, CI is the measured sub-pollutant concentration, CH is the 
upper concentration threshold of the AQI severity category, and CL is the lower 
concentration threshold of the AQI severity category. For example, if PM2.5 was 
measured at 50 ug/m3, the government-calculated IAQI would be:                                   
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(100-50) / (75-35) * (50 – 35) + 50 = (50 / 40) * (15) + 50 = (1.25*15) + 50 = 68.75             
However, the embassy-calculated IAQI would be: 
(150-100) / (65.5-40.5) * (50 – 40.5) + 100 = (50 / 25) * (9.5) + 100 = (2 * 9.5) + 100 = 119 
 
Once IAQI values are calculated for each of the six different sub-pollutants, the 
overall AQI is simply the highest of the six IAQI values.  
 
A.3.2 IIS Analysis using Hourly Chunks  
 The T-tests outlined in Section 4.5.4 use impulse coefficient values pooled across 
the entire time series for each individual city. However, due to the computational 
intensity of the IIS test, each city’s time series was broken down into 14 “chunks” of 
1,500 hours each. Looking at these individual chunks (rather than the pooled data) does 
not significantly alter the conclusions of this paper, but the results were omitted from the 
main body of Chapter 4 for the sake of space and clarity. The full results for each hourly 
chunk are presented in Table A.3.3 below. 
 
Table A.3.3 IIS Coefficient T-Tests (Hourly Chunks for all Five Cities) 
Hourly Chunks Mean St. Dev St. Error T >  0 P-Val 
Beijing (Chunk 1) -20.8 135.1 27.0 0.225 0.775 
Beijing (Chunk 2) 49.2 110.7 26.8 0.957 0.043 
Beijing (Chunk 3) 3.6 53.4 11.9 0.619 0.381 
Beijing (Chunk 4) -6.7 39.6 8.3 0.212 0.788 
Beijing (Chunk 5) 25.1 153.3 29.0 0.803 0.197 
Beijing (Chunk 6) -21.8 105.0 18.0 0.118 0.882 
Beijing (Chunk 7) 51.5 89.6 14.4 1.000 0.000 
Beijing (Chunk 8) 139.1 219.2 69.3 0.962 0.038 
Beijing (Chunk 9) -80.4 32.0 13.1 0.001 0.999 
Beijing (Chunk 10) -12.6 96.3 19.7 0.265 0.735 
Beijing (Chunk 11) 18.8 59.6 9.9 0.966 0.034 
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Beijing (Chunk 12) 36.4 72.9 29.8 0.862 0.138 
Beijing (Chunk 13) 58.9 91.2 15.2 1.000 0.000 
Beijing (Chunk 14) -10.2 61.7 43.6 0.427 0.573 
Shenyang (Chunk 1) 50.8 122.3 23.1 0.982 0.018 
Shenyang (Chunk 2) 22.0 57.2 13.1 0.945 0.055 
Shenyang (Chunk 3) 18.9 33.1 9.6 0.963 0.037 
Shenyang (Chunk 4) 9.1 47.5 10.6 0.799 0.201 
Shenyang (Chunk 5) -141.1 128.2 28.7 0.000 1.000 
Shenyang (Chunk 6) 10.2 42.1 7.8 0.898 0.102 
Shenyang (Chunk 7) 54.8 49.7 12.4 1.000 0.000 
Shenyang (Chunk 8) 69.8 40.4 13.5 1.000 0.000 
Shenyang (Chunk 9) 18.3 21.4 4.8 0.999 0.001 
Shenyang (Chunk 10) 18.8 67.1 13.7 0.909 0.091 
Shenyang (Chunk 11) 32.2 54.5 10.9 0.997 0.003 
Shenyang (Chunk 12) 97.9 74.4 15.2 1.000 0.000 
Shenyang (Chunk 13) 27.2 46.9 23.5 0.835 0.165 
Shanghai (Chunk 1) -11.9 45.9 8.8 0.095 0.906 
Shanghai (Chunk 2) -0.6 33.7 7.0 0.466 0.534 
Shanghai (Chunk 3) 11.2 62.3 22.0 0.687 0.314 
Shanghai (Chunk 4) 0.4 21.9 6.1 0.525 0.475 
Shanghai (Chunk 5) 1.6 21.5 4.7 0.631 0.369 
Shanghai (Chunk 6) 10.1 61.9 13.5 0.768 0.232 
Shanghai (Chunk 7) 4.1 42.3 10.3 0.653 0.348 
Shanghai (Chunk 8) 2.2 25.9 9.3 0.591 0.409 
Shanghai (Chunk 9) 2.6 22.3 5.0 0.694 0.306 
Shanghai (Chunk 10) -4.2 23.8 6.9 0.275 0.725 
Shanghai (Chunk 11) -38.9 42.6 10.3 0.001 0.999 
Shanghai (Chunk 12) 2.2 35.9 9.3 0.591 0.409 
Shanghai (Chunk 13) -4.9 26.3 7.0 0.249 0.751 
Shanghai (Chunk 14) 15.7 36.0 12.7 0.872 0.128 
Guangzhou (Chunk 1) 12.9 44.3 10.2 0.890 0.110 
Guangzhou (Chunk 2) 26.2 25.6 8.1 0.995 0.005 
Guangzhou (Chunk 3) 14.5 43.2 8.2 0.957 0.043 
Guangzhou (Chunk 4) 3.8 22.3 7.4 0.689 0.311 
Guangzhou (Chunk 5) 19.7 30.5 7.0 0.994 0.006 
Guangzhou (Chunk 6) 9.9 32.3 7.2 0.906 0.094 
Guangzhou (Chunk 7) 1.9 21.2 3.7 0.695 0.305 
Guangzhou (Chunk 8) -4.7 23.2 9.5 0.321 0.679 
Guangzhou (Chunk 9) 16.2 23.1 6.2 0.990 0.011 
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Guangzhou (Chunk 10) 3.3 24.8 8.3 0.651 0.349 
Guangzhou (Chunk 11) 8.8 22.7 5.7 0.929 0.072 
Guangzhou (Chunk 12) 8.9 21.5 5.2 0.945 0.055 
Guangzhou (Chunk 13) 100.9 116.3 31.1 0.997 0.003 
Guangzhou (Chunk 14) 13.1 23.8 7.9 0.931 0.069 
Chengdu (Chunk 1) 16.6 32.3 8.3 0.033 0.967 
Chengdu (Chunk 2) -14.0 41.8 12.1 0.135 0.865 
Chengdu (Chunk 3) 19.1 39.3 7.9 0.989 0.011 
Chengdu (Chunk 4) 13.1 27.4 8.7 0.917 0.083 
Chengdu (Chunk 5) 8.6 25.8 5.8 0.923 0.077 
Chengdu (Chunk 6) 7.2 51.0 10.6 0.748 0.252 
Chengdu (Chunk 7) 11.7 24.3 6.5 0.953 0.047 
Chengdu (Chunk 8) -5.0 29.9 9.0 0.294 0.706 
Chengdu (Chunk 9) 9.0 40.2 12.1 0.762 0.238 
Chengdu (Chunk 10) 12.6 22.5 6.8 0.953 0.047 
Chengdu (Chunk 11) 17.0 38.1 9.8 0.947 0.053 
Chengdu (Chunk 12) -9.4 26.7 6.5 0.083 0.917 
Chengdu (Chunk 13) 32.2 31.3 12.8 0.973 0.027 
Chengdu (Chunk 14) 11.8 22.9 7.3 0.930 0.070 
 
Note: When calculating the “Mean” column, this table used only the coefficient values 
for significant outlier points (i.e. points where the impulse coefficient does not equal 
zero). 
 
 
A.3.3 Comparing Impulse Outliers and Hourly PM2.5 Concentrations using Logistic 
Regression Models 
 
In Section 4.5.4, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to show that the 
size of an impulse outlier coefficient at any given hour is significantly and positively 
related to the embassy-reported PM2.5 concentration at that hour. This relationship holds 
true for the pooled model and for four out of the five individual city models, with only 
Shenyang reporting the opposite effect. However, because the presence of a positive or 
negative impulse is easily categorized as a binary variable, it is also useful to test the 
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relationship between impulse coefficients and embassy-reported PM2.5 concentrations 
using logistic regression techniques. Below, I present the results of two logistic 
regression analyses, the first using the presence of a positive IIS coefficient as the binary 
dependent variable (Table A.3.4), and the second using the presence of a negative IIS 
coefficient as the binary dependent variable (Table A.3.5).     
 
Table A.3.4 Logistic Regression Model Assessing the Likelihood of Positive Impulses 
by Embassy-Reported PM2.5 Concentration 
 
LOGIT (IIS_POS) PM 2.5_EMB ST. ERROR P-VALUE PSUEDO R^2 
Pooled City Model 0.012  0.0003   < 0.001**  0.1847 
Beijing 0.011 0.0004   < 0.001** 0.2843  
Shenyang 0.010 0.0006  < 0.001**  0.1635 
Shanghai  0.026 0.0014   < 0.001** 0.2268  
Guangzhou  0.043 0.0018   < 0.001**  0.4038 
Chengdu 0.021  0.0012   < 0.001** 0.2171  
 
Table A.3.5 Logistic Regression Model Assessing the Likelihood of Negative Impulses 
by Embassy-Reported PM2.5 Concentration 
 
LOGIT (IIS_NEG) PM 2.5_EMB ST. ERROR P-VALUE PSUEDO R^2 
Pooled City Model  0.007 0.0004  < 0.001** 0.0364  
Beijing  0.003 0.0008   < 0.001**  0.0102 
Shenyang  -0.011 0.0007  < 0.001**   0.2578 
Shanghai  0.009 0.0018  < 0.001**   0.0164 
Guangzhou  0.012 0.0027   < 0.001** 0.0150  
Chengdu  0.006 0.0019  0.002** 0.0077  
 
 
Note: In Table A.3.4, the dependent variable (IIS_POS) is coded as one if there is a 
significantly positive impulse coefficient at a given hour and zero otherwise.  In Table 
A.3.5, the dependent variable (IIS_NEG) is coded as one if there is a significantly 
negative impulse coefficient at a given hour and zero otherwise. For both tables, the 
second column represents the coefficient of the independent variable, hourly embassy-
reported PM2.5 concentration (PM 2.5_EMB). Finally, for the P-Value column,                        
* represents a significance level of p < 0.05, while ** represents a significance level of    
p < 0.01. 
  
164 
 
 
 As shown above, the results of each logistic regression model show that the odds 
of hourly impulses (both positive and negative) increase significantly when embassy 
PM2.5 concentrations are high. For both logistic models, this positive relationship 
between hourly impulses and embassy PM2.5 concentrations is significant for all five 
cities tested (as well as for both pooled city models). However, the strength of this 
relationship is much stronger for the positive impulse model, with pseudo R-squared 
values roughly an order of magnitude greater. This makes sense, since the average 
discrepancy between government-reported and embassy-reported PM2.5 concentrations is 
larger during hours with positive impulses (Table 4.8). These results reinforce the 
findings of Table 4.9, and suggest that government manipulation is more likely when 
local air quality is bad.      
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